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Preface 
 
In our modern societies, humans are constantly cognitively solicited until a relatively 
advanced age. This continuous cognitive stimulation can obviously be experienced at work but 
it can also more insidiously come from overcrowded environments, social networks, or 
constant advertisement on the internet, which eventually bury people in an uninterrupted flow 
of information. Cognitive fatigue has progressively become one of the most prevalent causes 
of accidents in everyday life (Dinges, 1995; Shen et al., 2008) but also in the workplace 
(McCormick et al., 2012). If cognitive fatigue can be considered a normal and adaptive 
response to long-lasting tasks (Boksem & Tops, 2008), it can also lead to tragic consequences 
in certain professions. For example, studies have already found evidence of attention drops in 
airplane pilots (Bartlett, 1943) or large speed variation in car or train drivers under cognitive 
fatigue (Brown, 1994; Campagne et al., 2004; Kecklund & Akerstedt, 1993; Torsvall & 
Akerstedt, 1987). This phenomenon is also striking in emergency services like in firefighters 
(Aisbett & Nichols, 2007; Aisbett et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2016) and in intensive care unit 
physicians (Maltese et al., 2016). When continuously exposed to cognitive fatigue, some 
individuals can unfortunately develop the so-called burnout condition (Maslach et al., 2001) 
with its inherent costs for the public health care system but also for the employer (Ricci et al., 
2007), in addition to the burden for the individual. 
Cognitive fatigue can be observed in various domains: Blain et al. (2016) showed that 
daylong intense cognitive work tends to enhance impulsivity in economic decisions. Likewise, 
cognitive fatigue has been shown to impair economic decisions, preferences, strategies 
(Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015), emotion regulation (Grillon et al., 2015), as well as cognitive 
flexibility in university students (Plukaard et al., 2015). In the sport domain, cognitive fatigue 
has also been found to alter soccer-specific decision-making (Smith et al., 2016), intermittent 
running performance (Smith et al., 2015) as well as table tennis performance (Le Mansec et 
al., 2018). 
In more severe cases, cognitive fatigue can further develop into a permanent 
condition, such as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS; Tanaka & Watanabe, 2010). Cognitive 
fatigue is also frequently reported in psychological conditions such as depression 
(Demyttenaere et al., 2005; Lavidor et al., 2002) and neurological illnesses such as Parkinson’s 
disease (PD),  Multiple Sclerosis (MS), traumatic brain injury, stroke, myasthenia gravis, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or postpolio syndrome (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000; Kluger et al., 
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2013). Obviously, given the potentially tragic consequences of cognitive fatigue, studies are 
needed to better understand this phenomenon.   
On the other hand, medical progress has radically increased life expectancy in the last 
decades, reaching the age of 81.44 in Belgium (in 2017). At the same time, people have been 
progressively required to work until a more advanced age although diminished cognitive 
functioning efficiency has been found in older age (Collette & Salmon, 2014; Crawford et al., 
2000; Salthouse et al., 2003; West, 1996, 2000). Therefore, it seems crucial to become aware 
of how cognitive fatigue manifests in advancing age. Surprisingly, very few studies have 
investigated cognitive fatigue, behaviorally or at the cerebral level, in aging populations. 
In addition to older age, the middle-aged population also seems particularly at risk 
for cognitive fatigue. Indeed, midlife has sometimes been considered as the most challenging 
life period due to the presence of many cognitive requirements (children to care for, work, 
social life, everyday duties). However, middle-aged people have scarcely been the focus of 
interest in the literature, probably because of the difficulty reaching this busy population. In 
an attempt to understand cognitive fatigue at different life stages, studies presented in this 
Thesis work have systematically focused on three age groups: young, middle-aged, and older 
people.  
The first chapter of this Thesis work starts by presenting definitions and models of 
cognitive fatigue, from those emphasizing energy depletion as the consequence of long-lasting 
work to those integrating notions that more particularly focus on the voluntarily controlled 
effort (e.g., executive function, costs/benefits or effort/reward calculation, opportunity cost) 
invested by the individual into a cognitive activity. For the sake of completeness, this chapter 
ends by the presentation of some pathological fatigue models.  
The second chapter describes studies investigating cognitive fatigue in young people. 
This chapter makes the distinction between experimental protocols based on the Time-on-Task 
approach (i.e., performing a unique long-lasting task) and those based on the Probe approach 
(i.e., performing two consecutive tasks in order to test transfer fatigue effects from the first to 
the second). The presentation of studies also distinguishes between objective (behavioral, 
electrophysiologic, neuroimaging, connectivity, motivation-related) and subjective (self-
reported scales) assessment of cognitive fatigue. 
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The third chapter is dedicated to the presentation of models of cognitive and cerebral 
aging. It starts by describing cognitive functions that are known to decline with age as well as 
potential mediators (i.e., processing speed and inhibition) of age-related declines. It presents 
the well-recognized patterns of cognitive reserve (Stern, 2002, 2009) as well as cerebral 
compensation postulated in the PASA, ELSA, CRUNCH, and HAROLD hypotheses. It also 
presents models that more largely integrate factors potentially influencing cognitive aging 
(Dennis & Cabeza, 2013; STAC; STAC-R) as well as the hypothesis of the declining 
dopaminergic system. This chapter ends by describing cognitive efficiency in the middle-aged 
population.  
The last introductory chapter is dedicated to the presentation of studies about 
cognitive fatigue in older as well as in middle-aged population.  
Regarding the experimental part of the Thesis, the first study was based on a Time-
on-Task approach in which a 160-minute Stroop task was continuously administrated to 
young, middle-aged, and older people in order to test performance decrement (increase in 
extreme reaction times (RTs)) as a function of both the time spent on task and age.  
The second study was based on the same protocol as the first one, except that rest 
breaks were given every 40 minutes. This study allowed us to test whether periodically 
interrupting the task with short breaks (5 minutes) might relieve cognitive fatigue and allow 
people to maintain performance. The extent to which the three age groups benefit from breaks 
was also investigated. 
The third study used a Probe approach in which a fatigue condition (i.e., a long-lasting 
Stroop task) or a control condition (i.e., watching videos) was directly followed by an N-Back 
task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) acquisition. This procedure 
allowed us to test whether cerebral activity is differentially modulated by a fatigue state as a 
function of age.  
This work ends by a general discussion of the results of the three studies and proposes 
future lines of investigation in this research field. 
We hope our results will contribute to advance knowledge about cognitive fatigue in 
aging and will be the starting point of many other studies afterwards. We already thank all 
readers for their interest and wish them a compelling reading.  
36 
 
Préface 
 
Dans nos sociétés modernes, les êtres humains sont constamment sollicités 
cognitivement, et ce  jusqu’à un âge relativement avancé. Cette stimulation cognitive continue 
peut être vécue au travail mais peut également provenir de façon insidieuse de nos 
environnements surchargés, des réseaux sociaux, ou des publicités constantes sur Internet, 
plongeant finalement les individus dans un flot ininterrompu d’information. La fatigue 
cognitive est progressivement devenue l’une des plus importantes causes d’accidents dans la 
vie quotidienne (Dinges, 1995; Shen et al., 2008) mais également dans le milieu du travail 
(McCormick et al., 2012). Si la fatigue cognitive peut être considérée comme une réponse 
normale et adaptée face à des tâches de longue durée (Boksem & Tops, 2008), elle peut 
également mener à des conséquences tragiques dans certaines professions. Par exemple, des 
études ont montré des chutes d’attention chez les pilotes d’avion (Bartlett, 1943) ou de grande 
variation de vitesse chez des conducteurs de voitures ou de train cognitivement fatigués 
(Brown, 1994; Campagne et al., 2004; Kecklund & Akerstedt, 1993; Torsvall & Akerstedt, 
1987). Ce phénomène est également évident dans les services d’urgence tels que chez les 
pompiers (Aisbett & Nichols, 2007; Aisbett et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2016) et les médecins 
attelés aux unités de soins intensifs (Maltese et al., 2016). À force d’être confrontés de façon 
continue à la fatigue cognitive, certains individus peuvent malheureusement développer une 
condition dite de burnout (Maslach et al., 2001), engendrant des coûts tant au niveau du 
système de soins de santé publique qu’au niveau des employeurs (Ricci et al., 2007). 
La fatigue cognitive est présente dans des domaines variés : Blain et al. (2006) ont 
montré qu’un travail cognitif intense durant toute la journée tend à augmenter l’impulsivité 
dans les prises de décision économiques. De la même façon, il a été montré que la fatigue 
cognitive dégrade les prises de décisions, les préférences, et les stratégies économiques 
(Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015), la régulation des émotions (Grillon et al., 2015), ainsi que la 
flexibilité cognitive chez des étudiants universitaires (Plukaard et al., 2015). Dans le domaine 
du sport, on a également montré que la fatigue cognitive altère les décisions footballistiques 
(Smith et al., 2016), la performance lors de courses intermittentes (Smith et al., 2015), ainsi 
que les performances au tennis de table (Le Mansec et al., 2018). 
Dans les cas les plus importants, la fatigue cognitive peut devenir une condition 
permanente comme chez les patients avec le Syndrome de Fatigue Chronique (CFS; Tanaka 
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& Watanabe, 2010). La fatigue cognitive est également fréquemment rapportée dans des 
conditions psychologiques telles que la dépression (Demyttenaere et al., 2005; Lavidor et al., 
2002) et dans les maladies neurologiques telles que la maladie de Parkinson, la sclérose en 
plaques, les accidents traumatiques crâniens, les accidents vasculaires cérébraux, la 
myasthénie, la sclérose latérale amyotrophique, ou le syndrome postpolio (Chaudhuri & 
Behan, 2000; Kluger et al., 2013). Etant donné les conséquences tragiques de la fatigue 
cognitive, la nécessité de réaliser des études permettant de mieux comprendre ce phénomène 
est évidente. 
Par ailleurs, les progrès médicaux de ces dernières décennies ont radicalement 
augmenté l’espérance de vie, atteignant l’âge de 81.44 ans (en 2017) en Belgique. 
Parallèlement, l’on a progressivement demandé aux individus de travailler jusqu’à un âge 
avancé, alors que des diminutions de l’efficacité du fonctionnement cognitif ont été montrées 
à un âge plus élevé (Collette & Salmon, 2014; Crawford et al., 2000; Salthouse et al., 2003; 
West, 1996, 2000). Par conséquent, prendre conscience de la manifestation de la fatigue 
cognitive dans les âges plus avancés semble crucial. De façon surprenante, très peu d’études 
ont investigué la fatigue cognitive, aussi bien du point de vue comportemental que cérébral, 
dans les populations vieillissantes.   
Outre l’âge élevé, l’âge moyen semble également constituer une population 
particulièrement à risque de souffrir de fatigue cognitive. En effet, l’âge moyen a parfois été 
considéré comme la période de vie la plus difficile vu les nombreuses exigences 
l’accompagnant (prendre soins des enfants, travailler, avoir une vie sociale, gérer les tâches du 
quotidien). Cependant, les individus d’âge moyen ont rarement été le centre d’intérêt des 
recherches scientifique, probablement à cause de la difficulté à accéder à cette population.  
Le premier chapitre de ce travail de Thèse commence par la présentation de 
définitions et modèles de la fatigue cognitive, allant de ceux soulignant la déplétion d’énergie 
comme étant la conséquence d’un travail de longue durée jusqu’à ceux intégrant des notions 
se focalisant plus particulièrement sur l’effort contrôlé et volontaire (ex. : les modèles faisant 
intervenir les fonctions exécutives, le calcul coûts/bénéfices ou effort/récompense, les coûts 
d’opportunité) investi par l’individu dans une activité cognitive. Par souci d’exhaustivité, ce 
chapitre se termine par la présentation de certains modèles portant sur la fatigue pathologique.  
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Le deuxième chapitre décrit un ensemble d’études ayant investigué la fatigue 
cognitive chez les individus jeunes. Ce chapitre fait la distinction entre les protocoles 
expérimentaux basés sur l’approche Time-on-Task (c.-à-d. réaliser une tâche unique de longue 
durée) et ceux basés sur l’approche Probe (c.-à.-d. réaliser deux tâches consécutives dans le 
but de tester si l’effet de fatigue de la première tâche est transférable à la seconde tâche). La 
présentation des études fait également la distinction entre les mesures objectives 
(comportementales, électrophysiologiques, de neuroimagerie, de connectivité, liées à la 
motivation) et subjectives (échelles auto-rapportées) de la fatigue cognitive.  
Le troisième chapitre est dédié à la présentation des modèles du vieillissement 
cognitif et cérébral. Il débute par la présentation des fonctions cognitives connues pour décliner 
avec l’âge ainsi que les médiateurs potentiels (c.-à-d. vitesse de traitement et inhibition) de ces 
déclins liés à l’âge. Ce chapitre présente les patterns bien connus de réserve cognitive (Stern, 
2002, 2009) ainsi que de compensation cérébrale postulée dans les hypothèses PASA, ELSA, 
CRUNCH, et HAROLD. Il présente également des modèles qui intègrent plus largement les 
facteurs potentiels pouvant influencer le vieillissement cognitif (Dennis & Cabeza, 2013; 
STAC; STAC-R) ainsi que l’hypothèse du déclin du système dopaminergique. Ce chapitre se 
termine par la description de l’efficience cognitive dans la population d’âge moyen.  
Le dernier chapitre d’introduction est dédié à la présentation d’études portant sur la 
fatigue cognitive chez les personnes plus âgées ainsi que dans la population d’âge moyen.  
Concernant la partie expérimentale de la Thèse, la première étude était basée sur 
l’approche Time-on-Task dans laquelle une tâche Stroop de 160 minutes a été administrée de 
façon continue à des personnes jeunes, d’âge moyen, et plus âgées afin de tester les diminutions 
de performances (augmentation des temps de réaction extrêmes (RTs)) en fonction du temps 
passé sur la tâche et de l’âge.  
La deuxième étude était basée sur le même protocole que la première, à l’exception 
de l’introduction de pauses de repos toutes les 40 minutes. Cette étude nous a permis de tester 
si le fait d’interrompre périodiquement la tâche avec des pauses courtes (5 minutes) peut 
soulager la fatigue cognitive et permettre aux individus de maintenir la performance, mais 
également de tester si les trois groupes d’âge bénéficient des pauses de la même façon.   
La troisième étude a utilisé une approche Probe dans laquelle une condition fatigante 
(c.-à-d. une tâche Stroop de longue durée) ou une condition contrôle (c.-à-d. visionnage de 
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vidéos) était directement suivie par une tâche N-Back durant une acquisition d’imagerie par 
résonance magnétique fonctionnelle (fMRI). Cette procédure nous a permis de tester si 
l’activité cérébrale était modulée de façon différente par un état de fatigue en fonction de l’âge.  
Ce travail se termine par une discussion générale des résultats des trois études et 
propose de futures lignes d’investigation dans ce domaine de recherche. 
Nous espérons que ces résultats contribueront à faire avancer les connaissances sur la 
fatigue cognitive dans le vieillissement et seront le point de départ d’autres études par la suite. 
Nous remercions déjà tous les lecteurs pour leur intérêt et leur souhaitons une agréable lecture. 
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Chapter 1: Definitions and Models of Cognitive Fatigue 
“Cognitive fatigue” or “mental fatigue” has become a frequently used expression but 
is yet not that simple to define. As readers will appreciate, definitions vary from an author to 
the other. Most of the time, authors have linked cognitive fatigue to objective decrements in 
performance in the task at hand. Cognitive fatigue has also been proposed to result from 
different causes such as energy depletion, sustained demands, workload/overload, 
boredom/underload, effort, or demotivation. Otherwise, some relationships exist between 
cognitive and physical fatigue, certain studies showing that one kind of fatigue is likely to 
influence the other (Mehta & Parasuraman, 2014; Van Cutsem et al., 2017). However, given 
this Thesis work is not focused on physical fatigue, the Introduction will start by a brief 
distinction between these two types of fatigue and only focus on cognitive fatigue afterwards. 
As above-mentioned, there exist many different definitions of cognitive fatigue and 
it is not straightforward to choose or to isolate a consensual definition. Therefore, before 
presenting the most influencing models of cognitive fatigue, it is important to present the 
different aspects but also the different categories of cognitive fatigue. For example, some 
authors have considered fatigue as an adaptive emotion (Boksem & Tops, 2008; Hockey, 
2013) or have pointed out that some related feelings are very close and sometimes confounded 
with the feeling of fatigue (Hockey, 2013; Kuppuswamy, 2017). We also present the well-
recognized distinction between Active versus Passive cognitive fatigue. Finally, we present 
the objective (i.e., performance-related) versus subjective (feeling-related) aspects of cognitive 
fatigue. Through the Introduction, the reader will also find some Boxes highlighting, defining, 
or contrasting some key concepts presented in the main text. 
Cognitive versus Physical Fatigue  
Some authors claim that cognitive and physical fatigue have to be considered as a 
unique concept and have proposed a common definition integrating the two aspects. For 
example, the Japanese Society of Fatigue Science defines fatigue as follows: 
  A decline in the ability and efficiency of mental and/or physical activities that is 
caused by excessive mental or physical activities or disease. Fatigue is often 
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accompanied by a peculiar sense of discomfort, a desire to rest, and a decline in 
motivation, referred to as fatigue sensation. (Kitani, 2011) 
 Similarly, Kuppuswamy (2017) proposed that fatigue is an inference on the first 
place and must be considered as a single construct which does not distinguish between the 
mental or the physical aspect.  
Contrary to this unitary view, other authors make the distinction between the 
cognitive and physical aspects that have been referred as central and peripheral fatigues 
(Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000). While peripheral fatigue refers to neuromuscular and muscular 
failure, central fatigue relates to the reduction in attention, in self-motivation, as well as in 
efficiency of mental workload in the absence of cognitive failure or motor weakness 
(Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000, 2004). It has also been proposed that cognitive fatigue would be 
partly responsible for physical fatigue (Mehta & Parasuraman, 2014; Van Cutsem et al., 2017) 
but further studies are needed to confirm this link (McMorris et al., 2018).  
Otherwise, different tools are used to assess these two types of fatigues. Physical 
fatigue is often targeted by muscle evaluation while cognitive fatigue is measured by cognitive 
tasks. From a clinical point of view, myopathic weakness is considered a reliable index of 
peripheral fatigue. Likewise, performing a series of strong muscle contractions has been shown 
to induce a shortening of the muscle group during several minutes (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2004). 
Studies assessing neuromuscular fatigue also often require participants to perform handgrip 
strength exercises (Mehta & Parasuraman, 2014; Shortz et al., 2015; Shortz & Metha, 2017, 
Terentjeviene et al., 2018). By contrast, measures of cognitive fatigue target mental operations 
that do not require muscle contractions. For example, cognitive fatigue studies typically 
require participants to perform a mental task (e.g., arithmetic problems, visual attention task, 
switching task, inhibition task) during several minutes or even several hours.  
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Several Definitions of Cognitive Fatigue 
Defining cognitive fatigue is not straightforward and the main issues are presumably 
the relationships between cognitive fatigue and some intrinsically related notions such as 
motivational aspects or boredom (Lorist, 2008). Indeed, it appears that our everyday use of 
different expressions such as “I’m tired”, “ I’m feeling sleepy”, or “I’m bored” have 
progressively triggered a certain conceptual blurring in the scientific community, so that 
depending on the authors, definitions emphasize more or less one aspect or another. The 
following lines present some definitions belonging to different authors. Trejo et al. (2005, p.1) 
defined cognitive fatigue as “the unwillingness of alert, motivated subjects to continue 
performance of mental work”, this state being independent from sleepiness, motivating, 
learning, or physical fatigue. According to Lorist et al. (2005, p. 199), “mental fatigue refers 
to the effects that people experience following and during the course of prolonged periods of 
demanding cognitive activity, requiring sustained mental efficiency.” Holtzer et al. (2011, p.8) 
defined cognitive fatigue “as an executive failure to monitor performance over acute but 
sustained cognitive effort, which results in decline and more variable performance than the 
individual’s optimal ability.” In his thesis, Borragán also proposed to define cognitive fatigue 
as being: 
The temporary decrease in mental resources developing over time on sustained 
cognitive demands/effort. The onset of cognitive fatigue is gradual and depends on 
each individual’s capacity. Its presence often comes with an increased subjective 
feeling of mental exhaustion and a usual failure to maintain optimized behavioral 
performance in a context where the level of motivation remains stable. (2016, p.25, 
unpublished thesis) 
 
Cognitive Fatigue as an Adaptive Emotion 
Some authors also consider fatigue as an evolutionary adaptive emotion. For 
example, Hockey (2013) defined fatigue as “as an emotion, having an adaptive, goal-directing 
function and a central role in the system responsible for maintaining motivational priorities.” 
Similarly, van der Linden (2011) proposed that “fatigue might be considered as a stop emotion” 
(p. 153, italics original). Kurzban et al. (2013) also agreed that “subjective experience can be 
understood computationally as motivating the organism to behave adaptively” (Lazarus, 1993; 
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Tooby et al., 2008). In this sense, fatigue would have a metacognitive function leading to the 
interruption of the current task goal and allowing other goals to be considered instead. Also 
considering cognitive fatigue as an adaptive response, Boksem and Tops (2008, p. 126) 
proposed that “mental fatigue refers to the feeling that people may experience after or during 
prolonged periods of cognitive activity.” These feelings may involve tiredness, exhaustion, an 
aversion to continue the current task, and a decrease in the level of commitment to the task at 
hand (Holding, 1983; Hockey, 1997; Meijman, 2000). In addition, Boksem and Tops also 
proposed that mental fatigue can be associated with impaired cognitive and behavioral 
performance. This latter proposal will be fully supported by experimental studies I will present 
in Chapter 2 (see for example Boksem et al., 2005; Lorist et al., 2005; van der Linden & 
Eling, 2006). 
Some authors have also claimed that fatigue takes place in different steps. Trejo et al. 
(2007) described cognitive fatigue as manifesting in three stages: 1) a brief state in which 
alertness is high; 2) a longer state of normal alertness; 3) a final state associated with the real 
state of fatigue at the end of the task. Hockey (2013) also proposed a very interesting view of 
the process of fatigue and postulated that this phenomenon appears as soon as the task begins 
with two main stages to be distinguished. Firstly, there is an early-onset inhibitory response to 
task engagement
1
. This very early fatigue is experienced as a vague sense of cognitive 
discomfort and is characterized by rapid subtle disruption of performances. This phenomenon 
mostly appears at the very beginning in response to task in which rapid and homogenous 
stimuli are experienced. Secondly, there is a later fatigue, which Hockey referred to as “strain”. 
This represents an effort-driven process triggered by the conflict opposing wanting to maintain 
the current task goal and performances versus the will to disengage. In this step, the individual 
experiences feelings of effort, stress and, in turn, aversion to pursue the task. This distinction 
between early-onset and later strain will be explained later in this chapter in the Three phases 
of the work decrement function (Figure 3).  
 
                                                          
1 In this context, “inhibitory response” does not refer to the classical executive inhibition function (e.g., the ability to 
inhibit dominant response). Rather, Hockey (2013, p.71) uses these terms to refer to the phenomenon of habituation 
consisting in a reduced response to repeated event patterns that are found not to be of value to the individual. 
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Cognitive Fatigue and Related Feelings 
As abovementioned, fatigue is difficult to define because of related feelings. 
Boredom is the phenomenon the most argued against fatigue by fatigue dementors, particularly 
in the case of fatigue induced by a long-lasting task. These two related concepts are compared 
in Box 1. Besides boredom, fatigue may also appear in combination with anxiety, depression, 
or apathy. According to Hockey (2013), if it is useful to distinguish fatigue from anxiety, he 
also recognized that these two feelings often occur in parallel to form the classic strain pattern 
associated with an effortful response to demanding work (Hockey et al., 1996). In the 
Compensatory Control Model (CCM; Hockey, 1997) that will be developed further in this 
chapter, anxiety is the response to a perceived threat which occurs when demands are 
unexpectedly high. Anxiety is also considered as the precursor of fatigue in such situations, 
but only when sustained effort is recruited to meet these demands. According to Kuppuswamy 
(2017), fatigue, apathy and depression are defined by a significant reduction in self-initiated 
voluntary action which calls on two systems: the motivational system to self-initiate, and the 
executive (sensorimotor) system that delivers voluntary action. Given the sensorimotor system 
is rather preserved in fatigue, apathy and depression, she proposes that these three feelings rely 
on the motivational system which also comprises two subsystems: the directional and the 
activational systems. While the directional system determines the choice of directing one 
particular behavior towards or away from a stimulus, the activational system informs action 
(Salamone et al., 2016). In apathy and depression, patients are not interested in performing 
actions while they are able to do it. By contrast, in fatigue, individuals are still willing to act 
but feel unable to perform. Based on this distinction, Kuppuswamy proposed that apathy and 
depression are primarily caused by dysfunction of the directional system while she defined 
fatigue as “a percept arising primarily from alterations within the activational systems that 
inform voluntary action” (Kuppuswamy, 2017, p.2241). 
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Mental Workload and the Active versus Passive Fatigue Hypothesis 
A factor that is likely to influence cognitive fatigue is the intensity of the work or 
activity, which is known as workload. Initial theories of mental workload were derived from 
the energy depletion hypothesis
2
 according to which human cognition has a limited resource 
                                                          
2 This hypothesis will be entered into more details in the section “Initial Models of Cognitive Fatigue”. 
Box 1. Fatigue and Boredom 
Are performance decrements during a fatigue-inducing task really attributable to cognitive 
fatigue or rather to task disengagement due to boredom? The distinction between these two 
feelings has raised debate among researchers for a while. As soon as in 1937, Myers 
differentiated between mental fatigue and boredom but recognized that these two feelings 
may affect performance in a similar way. Specifically, he defined boredom as “the outcome 
of a failure to find interests which can maintain spontaneous or voluntary attention” (p. 
298), while fatigue was “a general impotence to concentrate attention and to act 
purposefully, intelligently and creatively” (p. 299). Barmack (1937) proposed that boredom 
developed in task situations under low intrinsic motivation, and represents a state of 
conflict between remaining in the situation and wanting to get away from it. This state of 
conflict was assumed to be partially relieved by a state of disengagement or withdrawal.  
 
“Overload Triggers Fatigue, Underload Triggers Boredom” 
Some other authors distinguished between fatigue and boredom by opposing their 
respective assumed causes: overload versus underload. Welford (1968) suggested that 
fatigue occurs as a consequence of information overload (i.e., a level of arousal which is 
too high), and considered decrements as the consequence of increased “neural noise” under 
the sustained stimulation of demanding tasks. By contrast, he proposed that boredom was 
caused by underload (i.e., a level of arousal which is too low), brought about by inadequate 
environmental stimulation. In a similar vein, O’Hanlon (1981) has suggested that boredom 
is a response to repetitive or monotonous situations. Finally, Bartley and Chute (1947) also 
related boredom to monotony of the environment and fatigue to the perception of 
inadequacy to manage the task. This distinction finds echo in a more recent proposal 
distinguishing between different types of fatigue: active versus passive fatigue. 
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supply that is depleted after a period of work (Hockey, 2013). It was thus primarily assumed 
that performance decrements during mental activities were due to excessive demands (i.e., 
high workload) that outweighed the limited information processing capacity. In agreement 
with this view, some studies have shown that performances decrease to a larger extent in a 
high workload condition as compared to a low workload condition (Borragán et al, 2017; 
Schmidtke, 1976). However, this unilateral hypothesis has been challenged by authors that 
differentiate between different types of cognitive fatigue. 
In this regard, Hancock and Desmond (2000) distinguished between active versus 
passive fatigue. According to these authors, active fatigue can be induced by tasks in which 
sustained and prolonged demands involve continuous perceptual or motor adjustment (e.g., 
driving in high-density traffic). By contrast, passive fatigue would be triggered by vigilance 
tasks (see Box 2) requiring a monitoring system with few adjustments (e.g., driving on a 
roadway with little traffic and using automated system). Such a lack of demands for long-
lasting periods induces a state of inactivity. This linkage between vigilance and underload is 
not new. Indeed, some authors (Manly et al. 1999; Robertson et al., 1997; Stuss et al. 1995) 
already stated that vigilance decrement is due to attentional withdrawal of the supervisory 
attentional system because of underarousal caused by insufficient workload. Related to this 
proposal, Pattyn et al. (2008) found that performing a vigilance task was associated with a lack 
of variation of sympathetic activation – classically linked to overload – as well as an increase 
of parasympathetic activation – classically linked to underload. These results pointed towards 
task disengagement and thus, to the underload hypothesis to explain vigilance decrements. 
As introduced in Box 1, it has also been proposed that cognitive fatigue may result 
from either cognitive overload (active task-related fatigue) or cognitive underload (passive 
task-related fatigue) triggered by monotony (May & Baldwin, 2009). This proposal echoes the 
Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) according to which the function linking 
performances to arousal level follows an inverted U-shaped curve, meaning that underarousal 
but also overarousal are detrimental for performance. Similarly, cognitive fatigue may be 
triggered not only by very demanding (i.e., high workload) but also by very unchallenging (i.e. 
low workload) tasks (Matthews & Desmond, 2002; Saxby et al., 2007). For example, Shigihara 
et al. (2013) showed that participants in their experiment became slower as a function of the 
time spent on the task (30 minutes) in the low-demanding (0-Back) but not in the high-
demanding (2-Back) condition. In parallel with this slowdown in processing speed for the 0-
Back condition, the authors also found that the feeling of sleepiness increased after performing 
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the 0-Back but not after the 2-Back condition. It was concluded that the 0-Back, because of its 
easiness and inherent boredom, triggered a cognitive underload state (May & Baldwin, 2009), 
which in turn, led to a withdrawal of the attentional system and to impaired performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective versus Subjective Fatigue 
If establishing a definitive definition of cognitive fatigue remains to be done, a 
consensus seems to exist on a particular aspect. Indeed, there is a general agreement according 
to which cognitive fatigue can be divided into two distinguishable aspects: objective fatigue 
(or fatigability) is used to describe declines in task performances – such as response times or 
accuracy – while subjective fatigue (or perceived fatigue) refers to the feeling of a deteriorated 
ability to engage in mental activities (Bailey et al., 2007; Gergelyfi et al., 2015; Lorist, 2008). 
Box 2. Sustained Attention and Vigilance 
Sustained attention and vigilance refer to different tonic attentional states that are 
erroneously interchangeably used in the literature. These states are triggered as a function 
of the rate of information to be processed (Borragán et al., 2016, unpublished thesis). 
Vigilance is induced by monotonous context in which stimuli are unpredictable and 
infrequent. This type of manipulation leaves the cognitive system in an under-arousal 
activation or underload state in which attention fluctuates. In van Zomeren and Brouwer’s 
(1994) model of attention, vigilance (which the authors called alertness) refers to the ability 
to quickly react to a recurrent stimulus that is presented at irregular intervals. This 
attentional process is classically assessed by the Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT; 
Dinges & Powell, 1985) or the Mackworth’s Clock test (1948).  
Sustained attention is induced by continuous and rapid flow of information to be 
processed. According to van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994), sustained attention 
characterizes one’s abilities to maintain an attentional investment during relatively long 
periods in order to react to frequent stimulations. In this condition, the cognitive system is 
in high arousal or overload state. 
Based on these definitions, it has been proposed that cognitive overload is more linked to 
sustained attention while cognitive underload is more related to vigilance, task monotony, 
and boredom (Hancock & Desmond, 2000). 
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Regarding objective impairments, cognitive fatigue has been associated with declines in 
executive functions such as response inhibition (Kato et al., 2009), task switching (Lorist et 
al., 2009), working memory updating (Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b; Hopstaken, 2016), 
perseveration (van der Linden et al., 2003), as well as action monitoring (Boksem et al., 2006; 
Lorist et al., 2005). It is also associated with diminished attentional capacities such as sustained 
attention (Dorrian et al., 2007; Lim et al., 2010), divided attention (van der Linden & Eling, 
2006), and psychomotor vigilance (Gui et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2010). Cognitive fatigue is also 
more likely to impact goal-directed attention, as manifested by reduced top-down control, 
increased distractibility, and difficulties ignoring irrelevant stimuli (Boksem et al., 2005). 
Likewise, cognitive fatigue has also been found to impact goal-directed planning and 
preparation (Lorist et al., 2000; Lorist, 2008, van der Linden et al., 2003). By contrast, 
automatic bottom-up processes seem to better resist cognitive fatigue (Langner et al., 2010). 
As above-mentioned, these cognitive fatigue-related impairments will be presented in more 
details in Chapter 2 that is dedicated to experimental studies in the young population. 
Regarding subjective feelings of fatigue, these may include the sensation of 
weariness, increasing sense of effort, mismatch between expended effort and actual 
performance, or exhaustion (Kluger et al., 2013) but sometimes also an aversion in pursuing 
the current activity or task (Hockey, 1997; Holding, 1983; Lorist et al., 2000). Subjective 
feelings can be assessed by subjective scales indexing how people feel at a particular time 
point of the experiment. In this regard, the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Akerstedt & 
Gillberg, 1990; Kaida et al., 2006) is recommended to assess sleepiness and simply consists in 
a 9-point scale to fill according to one’s immediate feeling of alertness. Similarly to the KSS, 
the Stanford Sleepiness Scale (SSS; Hoddes et al., 1972) can also be used to assess the degree 
of alertness and progressive steps in sleepiness at different time points over the course of an 
experiment. 
 Also often employed in research studies, visual analogue scales (VAS) are used to 
assess current moods and consist in pair of words (e.g., Fresh/Exhausted; 
Motivated/Demotivated; Relaxed/Stressed; Low Effort/Many Effort) placed to the left and to 
the right sides of an horizontal line with a cursor to move towards the corresponding adjective 
(for example, see Lee et al., 1991 for VAS for Fatigue; Borg, 1998 for VAS for Exertion; see 
for example Tanaka et al., 2014a for VAS for Sleepiness). More related to effort assessment, 
the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) is a unidimensional mental workload 
assessment procedure that is built upon the notion of effort exerted over a task. People are 
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required to rate different current aspects of mental fatigue (e.g., difficulty keeping attention on 
the task, difficulty exerting further effort in the task) on seven vertical lines, within the interval 
0 to 150 (from “not at all” to “extremely”). The fatigue subscale of the Profile of Mood States 
questionnaire (POMS; McNair et al., 1971) consists of seven adjectives used to describe 
fatigue (i.e. worn-out, listless, fatigue, exhausted, sluggish, weary and bushed) that have to be 
answered on a 5-point scale.  
Besides these momentary scales assessing fatigue at a particular time (e.g., before or 
after an experimental task), there also exist questionnaires measuring self-reported cognitive 
fatigue experienced in daily life activities. As the reader will appreciate, most of these 
subjective fatigue scales have primary been developed and validated for pathological 
populations. For example, the Fibro Fatigue Scale (Zachrisson et al., 2002) is a 12-item scale 
used in fibromyalgia and CFS patients. Likewise, the Chalder Fatigue Scale (CFQ-11; Chalder 
et al., 1993) was initially developed to assess chronic fatigue symptoms within clinical 
populations but was revised and is now more widely used to measure the severity of tiredness. 
Likewise, many scales have been built to assess severity and impact of fatigue in cancer 
patients, such as the Multidimensional Fatigue Inventory (MFI; Smets et al. 1995) and the 
Brief Fatigue Inventory (BFI; Mendoza et al., 1999). Several scales have also been developed 
in the context of MS condition, such as the Fatigue Scale for Motor and Cognitive functions 
(FSMC; Penner et al., 2009) particularly relevant to assess cognitive and motor fatigue in MS 
patients or the Fatigue Impact Scale (FIS and MFIS; Fisk et al., 1994) that comprises a 
physical, a cognitive, and a psychosocial subscale.  
As previously mentioned, most of these scales were designed as tools for evaluating 
fatigue in patients with particular conditions. These scales thus provide good reliability and 
validity in clinical populations. However, they may have a limited sensitivity in the evaluation 
of “normal fatigue” experienced by healthy individuals and that is not associated with 
significant functional impairments. Regarding scales more often used in healthy population, 
the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS; Johns, 1991) assesses daytime sleepiness and comprises 
eight items related to daily live activities for which the participant has to estimate on a 4-point 
(from 0 to 3) scale his or her probability of dozing off or falling asleep while engaged in these 
different activities. Sharing a similar conceptual background with the ESS, the Brugmann 
Fatigue Scale (BFS; Mairesse et al., 2017) has been proposed to assess mental and physical 
fatigue but it focuses specifically on rest propensity. This scale comprises eight items (four 
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related to mental fatigue and four related to physical fatigue) for which participants had to 
determine their need to rest after having been engaged in the proposed activity.  
Finally, the Pittsburgh Fatigability Scale (PFS; Glynn et al., 2015) has been 
developed to assess perceived fatigability in older people. It is a 10-item scale in which 
participants are asked to rate the imagined fatigue level, from a score of 0 (no fatigue) to 5 
(extreme fatigue), that would arise from implication in activities of specific duration and 
intensity. The scale comprises both a physical and a mental fatigability subscore. 
However, it is important to underline that objective and subjective cognitive fatigue 
would rather be independent processes that are not systematically correlated (DeLuca, 2005). 
Indeed, performance decrements can appear in the absence of subjective feelings and vice 
versa. According to Hockey (2013), the subjective feeling of fatigue should even be considered 
as the primary marker of the state of fatigue, before performance decrement which is not 
always found in experimental studies.  
 
Initial Models of Cognitive Fatigue 
In his notorious book entitled “The Psychology of Fatigue”, Robert Hockey (2013) 
retraces the history of cognitive fatigue, from its first dominant views as an energy failure ‒  
the so-called energy depletion hypothesis ‒ inherited from the late nineteenth century’s 
industrialization context, to the incorporation of more recent concepts, leading to a more 
comprehensive picture of cognitive fatigue that encompasses motivational control mechanisms 
regulating current goal evaluation and the deployment of effort. Therefore, I will base the 
following lines on Hockey’s proposal of fatigue history, starting with the energy depletion 
hypothesis and the principle of homogeneity. I will also present the ego-depletion framework 
in its first conception as well as in its more evaluated view, followed by the three stages of the 
Compensatory Control Model (Hockey, 1997, 2011, 2013). Afterwards, I will present the most 
influential models of cognitive fatigue stressing the voluntary control of the individual which 
assesses the costs and rewards of maintaining a particular behavior, I will also illustrate models 
presenting mental effort as opportunity costs as well as models linking cognitive fatigue to the 
dopaminergic influence on prefrontal and subcortical regions. Finally, I will present models 
trying to predict how acute fatigue may transform into chronic or pathological fatigue.  
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The Energy Depletion Hypothesis 
From an historical point of view, the second half of the nineteenth century is 
characterized by the Industrial Revolution, which strongly emphasized the concept of energy 
as a central purpose in machine functioning but also as the cause of limited production. In such 
a work context, the relationship work  energy depletion describing machine functioning 
progressively expanded to mental and physical activities of human beings (Rabinbach, 1990). 
Therefore, some factory-based expressions ‒ “I’m depleted”, “I lack energy”, “I’m exhausted”, 
or “I have no fuel” ‒ started to characterize human fatigue. This general view according to 
which fatigue is due to work performing was referred to by Hockey (2013) as the work-fatigue 
hypothesis. Regarding the research field, most paradigms were designed following the 
working-derived idea of people performing a task during a long-lasting period without break, 
which has progressively made popular the pursuit of performance decrement as the proof of 
fatigue. 
Two mains topics animated the historical context of the study of fatigue: the time 
course of fatigue as well as the generality – or transfer – of fatigue to other activities. These 
issues led to the development of two still currently used approaches: the continuous work 
approach (Bills, 1937; Robinson, 1923) allowing the assessment of decrements in the long-
lasting fatiguing task itself as a function of the time spent on a task (what we classically call 
Time-on-Task), and the probe approach allowing the assessment of decrements induced by a 
primary task – referred to as the loading task –  on a separate probe task which is often 
administered before and after the fatiguing task (Hockey, 2013). The comparison of these two 
approaches will be entered more into details in Chapter 2.  
However, whether the continuous work approach or the probe approach was adopted, 
the common feature of the fatiguing task was generally its long duration and the 
characterization of fatigue was always the performance decrements. For example, in an attempt 
to mathematically represent the development of fatigue – performance decrease – as a function 
of the time spent on a task, researchers such as Emil Kraepelin (1902) tried to model what they 
called the work curve. As a consequence, fatigue was primarily regarded as being characterized 
by performance decrements with only few interest allocated to its subjective dimension. After 
Kraepelin, one of the most recognized investigation of the work curve was that of Arai (1912), 
which administered to herself challenging arithmetic problems during uninterrupted 12-hour 
periods. Even if the results have been somewhat challenged by general practice effects (i.e., 
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improvements) over the four days as well as questions about the time of day effect,  her study 
showed decrements as indexed by increases in time spent to solve a problem with Time-on-
Task (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Arai’s (1912) Data. This graph shows the time taken for mental arithmetic problems over 12-
hour days. From The Psychology of Fatigue: Work, Effort, and Control (Hockey; 2013). Reproduced 
with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. Copyright.   
 
 
The Principle of Homogeneity 
Robinson and Bills (1926) further claimed that performance decrements in long-
lasting tasks were primarily due to the homogeneity of the task. This principle of homogeneity 
states that fatigue will be induced by highly repetitive task while tasks that possess varying 
features are less likely to suffer from Time-on-Task or to transfer to other tasks. In agreement 
with this principle, other researchers found evidence of performance decrement in 
homogeneous long-lasting tasks as compared to varying tasks (Noll, 1932; Poffenberger, 
1927). Likewise, complex monitoring tasks have been shown to be less prone to performance 
decrement (Adams et al., 1961) because they are complex, varying, and not monotonous. More 
recently, Ackerman and Kanfer (2009) also administered their participants long-lasting 
batteries made of many different types of tests and did not find any performance decrement as 
a function of the session length.  
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If there was a slowdown in the fatigue literature during the second half of the 20th 
century, the scientific interest emerged for vigilance tasks. In 1943, Mackworth was interested 
in signal detection decrements undergone by radar operators on anti-submarine patrols 
(Hockey, 2013). In that context, Mackworth (1948) decided to build the well-recognized 
Mackworth Clock-Test. It consists very simply in a pointer traveling the face of a clock at 
regular steps separated by 1 second interval. However, at random intervals, the pointer travels 
the usual distance twice (i.e., “double jump”). The instruction given to the participant is to 
press a key as accurately and quickly as possible when he detects a double jump. As a measure 
of the time spent on the task (more than 2 hours), vigilance was found to decrease as attested 
by diminished number of correctly detected targets (hits) and increased mean of reaction times. 
However, the very reason behind performance decrement in vigilance tasks has been 
discussed. While some authors relate decrements in vigilance task to homogeneity triggering 
underarousal and disengagement (Deese, 1955; Welford, 1968) as supported by the passive 
fatigue hypothesis (Hancock & Desmond, 2000; May & Baldwin, 2009), other have 
hypothesized that vigilance rather implies a certain level of mental effort (Grier et al., 2003; 
Warm, Parasuraman & Matthews, 2008).  
According to Hockey (2013), what is common between the work performance and 
the vigilance literature is that performance decrements can be explained by two common 
processes. The first one is called habituation and can be defined as an inhibitory response to 
repeated events with a low value for the individual. This process can be related to the principle 
of homogeneity above-mentioned.  The second one is the effortful control of alertness which 
involves executive functions to maintain orientation to the task goal (top-down control) and 
reduces the habituation effect. However, even in the presence of top-down control of attention, 
processing long-lasting, rapid, and very homogenous stimuli may still reduce the maintenance 
of task goal and reorient attention towards higher valued stimuli.  
 
The Ego-Depletion Framework 
We also find reminiscence of the “energetic” view in the first theories of the ego-
depletion framework. Indeed, the well-recognized theory in the field was that proposed by Roy 
Baumeister and his followers: the resource model of self-control. According to this model, 
self-control – the fact of engaging in controlled, willing action – will consume a limited inner 
resource or energy capacity (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994; 
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Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Once the resource is empty, one 
becomes what is usually called ego-depleted and subsequent self-control attempts are 
compromised. To echo the probe approach mentioned earlier, the ego-depletion framework 
has commonly used a sequential task paradigm to show that exerting self-control at Time 1 
(e.g., inhibiting the temptation to eat cookies) weakens self-control capacity (e.g., performing 
mental challenges) at Time 2 (Baumeister et al., 1998; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).  
Some authors have tried to specify the nature of the inner resource and linked it to 
blood glucose levels. It was showed that engaging in self-control consumed glucose, leading 
to an ego-depleted state (Gailliot et al., 2007) but also that ingesting glucose counteracted the 
ego-depletion effect (e.g., Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). Baumeister also claimed that 
glucose was the basis of “willpower” and that exerting self-control, which depletes the inner 
resource, weakens willpower. Likewise, it was also suggested that sustaining performance in 
a Time-on-Task paradigm consumed energy, diminishing the supply of lactate (Killeen et al., 
2016). Such findings of consumptions in blood glucose were also found in task requiring high 
effort such as that involving incongruent trial processing in a Stroop task (Fairclough & 
Houston, 2004).  
However, initial interpretations in terms of energy loss has been questioned. Indeed, 
it was shown that the difference in glucose consumption by the brain between low demanding 
as compared to high demanding tasks were relatively small and never led to energy depletion 
(Gibson, 2007; Raichle & Mintun, 2006). According to Hockey (2011), if glucose oxidation is 
inherent to brain functioning, there is no direct evidence that fatigue is triggered by glucose 
depletion. Indeed, some studies did not find evidence of increased glucose oxidation during 
long-lasting demanding tasks (Marcora et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, Muraven and Slessareva (2003) showed that motivation was able to 
counteract the ego-depletion effect at Time 2, challenging the concept of a finite resource 
capacity. Therefore, the ego-depletion framework got away from the energy depletion 
hypothesis to go towards the integration of motivational aspects. Inzlicht and Schmeichel 
(2012) proposed a renewal of the ego-depletion model: the Process Model of Ego Depletion. 
In this model, the authors proposed that exerting self-control at Time 1 will induce a shift in 
motivational orientation as well as in attentional focus that interact to weaken self-control at 
Time 2 (see Figure 2). More precisely, the shift in motivation goes from exerting voluntary 
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control towards more gratifying and rewarding activities for the individual. Likewise, shift in 
attention goes from cues signaling control towards more rewarding cues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Process Model of Ego-Depletion. Self-control exertion at Time 1 leads to self-control 
failure at Time 2 by inducing shifts in motivation away from exerting control and towards self-
gratification as well as shifts in attention away from cues signaling control and towards cues of reward. 
Adapted from Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012). 
 
 
As the ego-depletion field questioned the energy depletion hypothesis, Hockey 
(2013) also strongly argued that the initial view of cognitive fatigue as being due to a loss of 
energy with work performing (the work-fatigue hypothesis) has dramatically weakened and 
distracted the research field. According to Hockey, a challenge to the energy depletion 
hypothesis is its few arguments to explain the relationships between performance decrement ‒ 
objective cognitive fatigue ‒ and feelings of fatigue – subjective fatigue. If we adopt the energy 
depletion view, since the individual becomes completely resource depleted after a period of 
work, he should systematically show performance decrement. However, performance 
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decrement are not systematically detected in fatiguing tasks and objective and subjective 
fatigues are often uncorrelated (Poffenberger, 1928; Thorndike, 1900).  
Hockey (2013) explained this lack of correlation as follows: if there is no deployment 
of effort, performance will decrease but there is no feeling of fatigue. By contrast, highly 
motivated individuals will provide controlled effort, leading to the maintenance of task goals 
and performances but also to increased subjective feelings of fatigue. Therefore, it is not the 
workload itself that triggers fatigue, but rather the deployment of high efforts to meet task 
demands (see Box 3). In agreement with this view, Earle (2004) found that for a given 
workload level, feelings of fatigue were higher when large effort strategies were deployed as 
compared to low effort strategies (see also Earle et al., 2015 for similar conclusions). 
However, even if it has been questioned to some extent (see Hockey, 2011, 2013), it 
is worth mentioning that the energy depletion hypothesis is still up to date and continues to 
animate the research field.  Close to this view, the Attention-Resource Model (Davies & 
Parasuraman, 1982; Warm et al., 2008) also proposes that sustaining attention control exhausts 
underlying mental resources (Maclean et al., 2010). Likewise, the resource depletion account 
attributes vigilance decrement to the depletion of resources necessary for task performance 
(Ariga & Lleras, 2011; Hancock & Warm, 1989; Mackworth, 1948). Interestingly, it has been 
proposed that the resources necessary to maintain vigilance performance are renewable and 
are able to self-recover if the system is allowed to rest. According to Finkbeiner et al. (2016), 
people that criticize the resource theory account do not take into consideration this renewable 
nature of cognitive resources. 
 The Effort‐Recovery Model (Meijman & Mulder, 1998), initially created in the 
context of fatigue at work, proposes that rest breaks allow to counteract increased fatigue 
associated with high work demands. Rest breaks are assumed to decrease fatigue, improve 
performance, and restore energy levels that vanished during high work demands by 
temporarily disengaging the individual from task demands (Meijman & Mulder, 1998). 
Accordingly, breaks have proven beneficial in many domains. They reduce the risk of 
accidents in industry (Tucker et al., 2003), improve productivity and job satisfaction 
(Dababneh et al., 2001; Zacher et al., 2014) as well as employees’ daily work engagement 
(Kühnel et al., 2017). Breaks during school improve test performance (Sievertsen et al. 2016) 
and well-being (Blasche et al., 2018). Laboratory studies using “breaks paradigms”, in which 
breaks are granted at some time points during the task, have found positive effect of breaks on 
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cognitive performance (Arnau et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2015; Phipps-Nelson 
et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2014). Some authors have even resorted to breaks paradigms with the 
sole aim to support the resource depletion account (Finkbeiner et al., 2016; Ross et al., 2014). 
For example, Helton and Russell (2015) tested different types of breaks (i.e., rest breaks and 
breaks implying cognitive activities) and found that rest breaks were the most beneficial, 
suggesting that a complete break from task-related process enables cognitive resources to 
recover, which sustains the depletion hypothesis. Without going into details, some authors also 
propose that not only rest breaks but also other types of breaks such as relaxation or physical 
activity (Blasche et al., 2018) may be beneficial. The Attention Restoration Theory (ART; 
Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) also proposes that being presented with natural scenes 
or biological movement is beneficial for attention restoration (Herzog et al., 1997; Kaplan, 
1995). Based on this proposal, studies have investigated different types of breaks such as 
making participants look at a green (natural) versus concrete rooftop (Lee et al., 2015) or 
looking at dog (natural) versus robots videos (Finkbeiner et al., 2016). 
Moving away from the energy depletion hypothesis, other authors have proposed 
interpretations of fatigue that emphasized the relevance of the goals for the individual. Bartley 
and Chute (1947) underlined the importance of taking the attitude and desire towards a task 
into account. Similarly, Thorndike (1914) claimed that the low intrinsic attractiveness of a task 
may trigger task disengagement. Therefore, it has progressively become clear that other factors 
such as the intensity (or workload), the variety, the meaning of the work, or the motivation 
were also useful in the comprehension of the phenomenon. 
 
In the following sub-sections, I will present some influential models of cognitive 
fatigue incorporating one or several factors – motivation (see Box 3), voluntary control of goal 
selection, costs/benefits calculation, opportunity costs, effort discounting (see Box 3), or the 
dopaminergic system ‒ that can be involved in the triggering of cognitive fatigue, below and 
beyond the time course aspect and the energy depletion hypothesis. I will also present an 
alternative or “outsider” model according to which effort does not necessarily increase the 
rewarding value of its product but can be considered as rewarding per se by certain individuals.  
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Motivation, Costs/Benefits Calculation, and Goal Selection 
 
Voluntarily Controlled Effort 
As for the ego-depletion framework, the cognitive fatigue literature has begun to 
encompass other interpretations in term of mental effort. For example, some authors claimed 
that effort is strategically set up by executive functions (Moray, 1967) and serves to maintain 
the task at hand under the focus of attention (Kahneman, 1973). Contrary to the “absence of 
control and awareness” inherent to the energy depletion hypothesis, some authors have 
underlined the voluntary or controlled aspect of effort. A well-speaking example is the fact 
that effort is generally provided to a certain extent but never to its maximum. Likewise, a 
looseness in the deployed effort to perform a low-demanding task that follows a high-
demanding task has often been reported (Stark et al., 2000; Young & Stanton, 2002). As 
Box 3. Demand, Effort, Motivation, and Effort Discounting 
Demand 
A property of a stimulus that determines how much mental or physical labor will be required 
(i.e., level of difficulty or challenge), such as the weight of an object that needs to be pushed. 
Related to, but distinct from effort, which corresponds to the amount of labor the organism 
engages in. 
Effort 
Intensification of either mental or physical activity in the service of meeting some goal (e.g., 
increasing the force applied to an object). Related to, but distinct from, demand or difficulty, 
which corresponds to a property of the stimulus not of the organism. 
Motivation 
A (psychological) force that drives behavior and that consists of a direction (e.g., a goal) 
and an intensity or amplitude with which this direction is pursued (i.e., effort). 
Effort discounting 
Decreased liking (or valuation) of objects that are contingent on effort. In other words, the 
more effort something requires, the less organisms value it. 
From Inzlicht et al.’s glossary (2018, p.10) 
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mentioned by Hockey (2013), these phenomena were referred to as the “willing to spare 
capacity” (Kalsbeek, 1968). 
Hockey (1997) also underlined the role of controlled mental effort to maintain task 
goals against distractors. Bartley (1943, p.161) also considered that “the basis of fatigue is 
conflict and frustration”. Bartley and Chute (1947) also considered fatigue as being triggered 
by conflict between goals. Theories of cognitive control have also underlined the resolution of 
conflict to select and maintain goal (Botvinick & Braver 2015; Botvinick et al., 2001). All 
these ideas stress the volitional or willing character of the fatigue feeling, more likely triggered 
by increased reluctance rather than becoming unable. 
Based on these considerations, Hockey (2013) proposed three possible degrees of 
fatigue as a function of the strategy (Table 1). The acceptance of interruption leads to 
performance decrement but minor feelings of fatigue; the manageable resistance to 
interruption allows maintaining good performance at the expense of increased effort and 
feelings of fatigue; and the strain mode leads to slight performance decrement with sustained 
high effort and high level of fatigue, which may develop into aversion.  The three modes are 
(or are not) associated with after-effects on post-task activities.  
 
 
Table 1  
Possible Patterns of the Fatigue Response to Work Tasks 
Mode Subjective state 
Performance 
decrement 
After-effects 
Acceptance of interruption Minor (transient) fatigue Yes No 
Manageable Resistance to 
interruption 
Increasing effort and 
fatigue 
No Yes 
Strain Sustained high effort and 
fatigue; aversive state 
Slight Yes 
Note. Adapted from Hockey (2013). 
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Hockey (2013) also reinterpreted the work curve previously presented as three 
processes operating in cascade (see Figure 3). The first process is habituation because a rapid 
drop in performance – within the first few minutes –  is often observed in tasks were rapid and 
homogenous stimuli are experienced (Chapman & Nolan, 1916; Phillips & King, 1916). The 
second process was called strain – such as the strain mode – and represents compensatory 
effort to counteract the loss of attractiveness induced by the long-lasting task. In this phase, 
the individual may have to increase its effort to maintain task goals and stabilize its 
performance. It is this increase in effort that would be responsible for the feeling of fatigue. 
Finally, disengagement – which can be linked to the acceptance mode – is an optional phase 
that may occur if the individual decides to not maintain the task goal anymore because it 
requires too much effort that are not evaluated as sufficiently rewarding. Interestingly, Hockey 
also proposed that disengagement does not necessarily means leaving the task but it can 
represent the strategy of an individual that accepts to perform at a lower level in order to reduce 
the costs associated with effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Three Phases of the Work Decrement Function. Adapted from Hockey (2013). 
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Far from the energy depletion account, Hockey’s work (1997, 2011, 2013) has 
provided the cognitive fatigue literature with a completely different view which relates fatigue 
to failures in control management of the current goal.  
Goals management is thus a central key concept in Hockey’s work. Accordingly, he 
defined goal as “the desired behavior or outcome which any control system is designed to 
achieve” and considered motivation as the guide of goal-directed behavior, assessing the ratio 
between costs and benefits of competitor actions. Each goal is therefore pursued according to 
its rewards and its costs. Obviously, personal and meaningful goals (want to) are higher valued 
with lower perceived costs. If costs increase, the individual will deploy efforts to maintain the 
goal and performance because the benefits are high. On the contrary, imposed tasks or 
activities (have to) are generally low valued and, if costs increase, the individual may not 
deploy further effort to maintain performance and seek for an alternative preferred goal. 
Fatigue is thus considered as an adaptive function that allows the individual redirecting its 
actions towards higher valued ones according to one’s motivational priorities.  
According to Hockey, cognitive demands or workload are not basically responsible 
for fatigue. Instead, it is the deployed mental effort – seen as a controlled response to the 
perception and appraisal of demands – that triggers fatigue. Also, it is assumed that the 
possibility to exert control over work moderates the importance of fatigue effects, even under 
high workload (Hockey & Earle, 2006; Karasek, 1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). Hockey 
has proposed a Compensatory Control Model (CCM) in order to conceptualize his ideas of 
control management and conflicts between goals. I will only briefly describe the first version 
of the model and enter into more details for the second and the third versions, which are more 
elaborated.  
 
The Compensatory Control Model: 1st version  
The Compensatory Control Model (CCM) was initially built up in the context of 
performance under stressors and high workload (Hockey, 1993, 1997, 2005) and integrates the 
idea of a central executive or supervisory system (Norman & Shallice, 1986) to control effort. 
This model was thus more specifically dedicated to the understanding of task performance and 
effort. Fatigue was not directly part of the model and was considered as the result of increasing 
effort. This first conceptualizing represented control as two levels:  a lower level (Loop A, in 
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blue in Figure 4) dedicated to routine performance and an upper level (Loop B, in red in Figure 
4) that regulates both task goals and effort via the supervisory controller. In this model, overt 
performance is driven by internal states, which in turns, determine output criteria for behavior 
(i.e., how fast, how much, or how long to work, the order of actions, etc.). The action monitor 
serves to compare and adapt the current activity with the target/desired output. The lower-level 
Loop A represents automatic control routines for well-learned skills and does not require effort 
regulation to maintain performance. By contrast, the higher-level Loop B is needed as soon as 
discrepancy between performance and desired output is too large to be resolved by routine 
corrections. In this case, the effort monitor is sensitive to increasing control demands in the 
lower loop and accounts for subjective effort in the face of increased task demands. This 
perception of change in external load (or strain) makes control to shift towards a higher-level: 
the supervisory controller. However, the model does not predict that effort will automatically 
be increased to meet task demands. Rather, the prediction of this model when the individual 
has to manage increased strain is twofold: the individual can increase his effort to maintain 
performance or he can maintain or reduce his effort, which leads to performance decrements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. First Version of the Compensatory Control Model (CCM) of Performance Regulation. 
Loop A represents routine regulatory activity and Loop B represents effort-based control relying on the 
supervisory controller. Adapted from Hockey (1997). 
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This first model of Compensatory Control considered executive functions (i.e., the 
supervisory controller) as a single and undifferentiated entity responsible for both goal and 
effort management. Hockey extended this first model to propose a more elaborated 
representation of the links between the executive functions as well as the localization of 
fatigue.  
The Compensatory Control Model: 2nd version  
This model (Figure 5) posits that a reference goal (G) is maintained via direct 
feedbacks from overt performance. Similarly to the first version of the CCM, small deviations 
between the goal and the outcome can be adjusted by the implementation of automatic routine 
procedures while higher deviations require the central executive (executive functions) to exert 
controlled effort. When executive functions are activated due to the maintenance of 
performance being threatened, the effort monitor can require the effort control to implement 
one of these two solutions: (1) increase the effort budget and stabilize performance, which 
increases costs; (2) maintain the effort budget and impair performance, which minimizes costs. 
The second solution is submitted to the goal selection component which (3) maintains the goal 
at lower performance or (4) changes the goal according to one’s current motivational needs 
(g1, g2…). According to this model, the feeling of fatigue would be relieved when the 
discomfort or conflict triggered by the imbalance between the current goal and the outcome 
(overt performance) is resolved. Therefore, the model also predicts that changing one’s goal 
could be as efficient as taking a rest since goal activation will return to its maximum.  
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Figure 5. Second Version of the Compensatory Control Model. This model shows expanded 
executive functions and goal management options. Adapted from Hockey (2011). See text for 
explanation. 
 
 
As compared to the first version, this second version of the motivational control 
theory of fatigue modelled two distinct functions for goal management and effort control, 
where effort was only considered as an optional mechanism. Indeed, increased effort is only 
required when goal maintenance is compromised and feelings of fatigue were considered as 
the result of this optional increased effort. However, Hokey later argued that fatigue is likely 
to start at the very beginning of the task, in the form of a feeling of cognitive discomfort 
triggered by alternatives that compete against the current task goal (Hockey, 2013). Since such 
effect occur before the need to deploy effort, the previous consideration of fatigue as being 
only the result of increased effort appeared to be insufficient.  
Moreover, Hockey (2013) also newly claimed that there exist two types of task 
interruptions. On the one hand, fatigue may be considered as an emotion and adaptive function 
that allows the individual to leave the current activity and reconsider alternative goals 
according to its motivational priorities. When the current task goal is no longer valued, the 
costs associated with increased effort become greater than the benefits and executive control 
will allow a switch in attention from the current task goal to other competitor goals that are 
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preferred and more meaningful for the individual. Hockey referred to this first type of 
interruption as the top-down motivational regulation. On the other hand, Hockey also proposed 
that lower level events such as bodily needs or external events may also lead to an automatic 
interruption, which Hockey referred to as bottom-up distraction.  
Also, based on neuroimaging evidence that the PFC was more dedicated to goal 
maintenance while the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more linked to conflict detection 
and outcome evaluation (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Sarter et al., 2006), 
Hockey’s newest model distinguishes not between two but three executive processes: goal 
regulation,  effort management, and performance evaluation (i.e., conflict detection), which  
was not represented as a separate function in previous versions of the model.  
 
The Compensatory Control Model: 3rd version  
In his third version of the model (Figure 6), the current task goal (G) is maintained 
by a first executive process: the goal regulation. Minor deviations between the goal and the 
outcome are detected by the action monitor that receives negative feedback, and can be 
automatically managed in the lower control loop by routine procedures. According to Hockey, 
these subtle disturbances might be responsible for the early-onset of fatigue that takes the form 
of feeling of cognitive discomfort. 
However, major deviations may also occur. They could be due to two different 
sources: 1) top-down source such as competitor goals (g1, g2,…) that are more valued by the 
individual; 2) bottom-up distraction such as cognitive events, somatic events and 
environmental events. These more important conflicts are detected in a higher control loop by 
the second executive process: the performance evaluation. This function assesses threats to 
the current goal and sends signal to the goal regulator to reinstate the goal.   
The model also assumes that the individual defines an initial effort budget (reference 
level) to the task. If the deployed effort remains in the limits of the allocated budget, no 
supplementary executive action is needed. However, if the quantity of effort exceeds the 
budget, performance evaluation has to recruit an increase in budget from the third executive 
function: the effort regulation system. As already mentioned, it is the deployed effort to meet 
task demands that would be responsible for the strain-induced fatigue in the higher control 
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loop, which is more important than the early-onset of fatigue that take place in the lower loop. 
If the costs are evaluated to be too high relative to the expected benefits, the increased effort 
budget will not be granted and there will be two possible endings:1) to maintain or reduce 
effort at the expense of performance; 2) to abandon the current goal to favor a competitor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Third Version of the Compensatory Control Model. Compared to the previous version, this 
model assumes three distinct executive processes – goal regulation, performance evaluation, and effort 
regulation – in the upper loop. In addition to top-down interruptions (competitor goals), this new model 
also takes bottom-up distractions (cognitive, somatic, and environmental events) into account as potential 
sources of interruption. Adapted from Hockey (2013). See text for explanations.  
 
 
After this detailed presentation of Hockey’s contribution, I will turn to models 
integrating new proposals about mental effort. The first two models also comprise the idea of 
costs/benefits computation towards a particular activity or behavior but with different 
conceptions of effort. The first one proposes that putting increased effort into an activity will 
eventually discount the rewarding value of that activity. The second one proposes that 
performing a cognitive activity is likely to increase the so-called opportunity costs (i.e., the 
fact of not being able to perform alternative activities). The third one is a little bit an “outsider” 
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in the sense that effort is considered as adding value to the activity instead of reducing its 
rewarding worth. Afterwards, I will move towards models integrating the dopaminergic system 
and related cerebral areas to the costs/benefits (or effort/reward) evaluation and towards 
models predicting pathological fatigue. I will then close this chapter by presenting some 
confounding variables that are relevant to take into account when planning to study cognitive 
fatigue. 
 
Cognitive Fatigue as Effort Discounting 
Müller and Apps (2018) proposed a neurocognitive account of the multidimensional 
nature of fatigue and how it impacts motivation. According to these authors, fatigue increases 
with sustained effort and partially decreases with rest. The rate of fatigue also depends on the 
intensity of the effort. Furthermore, the authors claimed that motivation is a domain-general 
process characterized by costs/benefits assessment, and modulated by fatigue. This framework 
is mostly based on the well-recognized concept of discounting effort according to which effort 
cost assessment will diminish the value of the reward (see Box 3; Apps et al., 2015; Bonnelle 
et al., 2015; Chong et al., 2017; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool et al., 2010; Le Heron et al., 2017; 
Shenhav et al., 2013; see also Westbrook et al., 2013 and Westbrook & Braver, 2015 for the 
cognitive effort discounting (COGED) paradigm). Therefore, as fatigue rises, people’s 
evaluation of effort costs increases, which consequently decreases the subjective value of the 
reward: it is said that the reward value is discounted by effort. When the reward is devalued, 
motivation declines in parallel with performance impairments. The fact that exerting effort 
renders subsequent actions more effortful can be understood thanks to cognitive control 
theories (see Box 4).  
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Based on the cognitive control account, Müller and Apps (2018) proposed that as 
fatigue increases, overcoming the increased costs requires a greater intensity control signal to 
reach optimal signal-to-noise ratio in the neuronal population dedicated to the behavior. Since 
providing a greater intensity control signal is effortful, it devalues the rewards associated with 
action. The authors also proposed a model in which they integrated the abovementioned 
notions by representing connections between cerebral areas coding for neuronal fatigue with 
those assessing the costs/benefits ratio of a particular behavior (Figure 7).  
According to this model, fatigue arises with sustained effort within circuits that are 
recruited during a cognitive or physical task. These circuits comprise interoceptive (posterior 
insula (PI)), sensorimotor (premotor cortex (PM), supplementary motor area (SMA), and 
somatosensory cortex (Somat)), as well as widespread cognitive areas (Figure 7). The authors 
also proposed that these “fatigued “systems – or systems susceptible to neuronal fatigue – have 
connections with areas dedicated to goal-directed behavior such as dorsal ACC, DLPFC, and 
anterior insula (AI). These higher-level areas underpin the costs/benefits evaluation of a 
particular behavior to determine if it is worth exerting or not. In this view, fatigue serves to 
decrease the value attributed to exerting subsequent efforts (i.e., discounting effort) as 
compared to exerting alternative actions.  
Box 4. Cognitive Control Account 
According to the cognitive control framework, attaining the optimal signal-to-noise ratio for 
a particular cognitive operation in a population of neurons is effortful. Moreover, repeatedly 
performing a cognitive operation (as it is the case in fatigue paradigms) may lead to neuronal 
adaptation (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Therefore, increasing fatigue would lead to a 
decrease in the signal-to-noise ratio of a population of neurons, which is referred as neuronal 
fatigue. This cost (i.e., reduction in signal-to-noise ratio) can be overcome by the execution 
of a greater intensity control until information is appropriately processed (Kurzban et al., 
2013; Manohar et al., 2015; Shenhav et al., 2017) at the expense of greater mental effort. 
Consequently, if exerting effort for a particular cognitive operation (or behavior) 
subsequently leads to a greater cost for performing the same operation (or behavior), its 
rewarding value will decrease. This theory may explain why fatigued people are less prone 
to engage in effortful behavior which was previously highly valued.  
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Figure 7. Proposed Systems in the Brain Underlying Motivational Fatigue. Fatigue can arise in 
interoceptive and sensorimotor systems (including but not limited to green and yellow areas) as well as 
in cognitive areas widespread across the brain. These three categories of areas are the “fatigued circuits” 
with extended effort during a cognitive or physical task. The DLPFC, the AI, and the dorsal ACC form 
a core “goal-directed” circuit evaluating the costs and benefits of exerting effort into behaviors. 
Connections between interoceptive, sensorimotor and cognitive systems to the goal-directed 
costs/benefits circuit allows fatigue to increase the weighting of effort costs in subsequent costs-benefits 
evaluations. Consequently, people are less motivated to exert effort, leading to performance decrements 
and in the degree to which actions are valued. Premotor cortex (PM), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), anterior insula (AI), posterior insula (PI), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), 
supplementary motor area (SMA), somatosensory cortex (Somat). Reprinted with permission from 
Müller and Apps (2018).   
 
 
With reference to cognitive control theories, this model can be summed-up as follows: 
as fatigue increases in regions involved in task performance, greater input into those regions 
is required to obtain the same output. This change in how much effort will be required to 
perform a task is monitored within other regions – insula, DLPFC, and dACC. This network 
is also involved in the costs/benefits evaluation of effort. Thus, the monitoring of task 
executing regions by this network will serve to increase the costs associated with exerting 
subsequent effort. Therefore, neuronal fatigue within regions involved in task performance 
will impact subsequent motivation through the insula, the dACC, and DLPFC network. In 
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agreement with this model, Chong et al. (2017) carried out a study in which people had to 
choose to exert effort for a reward while varying the intensity of the effort. Their results 
showed that the insula, the dACC, and the DLPFC were involved in the effort-discounted value 
of rewards. 
 
Mental Effort as Opportunity Cost  
According to Kurzban et al. (2013), certain mental processes cannot be allocated to 
multiple purposes at the same time. This is what the authors defined as the adaptive problem 
of simultaneity. The solution to simultaneity resides in prioritizing among possible 
computations – that is, identifying which of the various actions or computations is worth 
performing. The authors illustrated this problem in foraging organisms, which can feed in only 
one patch at a time and must decide when to stay in their current patch and when to search for 
a new one (Charnov, 1976). Solving the problem of prioritization requires the assignment of 
costs and benefits to the different options. Feeding at the current patch carries opportunity 
costs: the value of the next-best alternative (i.e., searching a new location).  
The allocation of mental processes to a task (X) carries opportunity costs equal to the 
value of the next-best use of those mental processes (doing other tasks A, B, C,…) because the 
systems required for the task (X) cannot be simultaneously used for alternatives (A, B, C,…). 
Based on previous work (Boksem et al., 2005; Boksem & Tops, 2008; Botvinick, 2007; 
Hockey, 2011; Kool et al., 2010; Lorist et al., 2005), Kurzban et al. (2013) proposed that the 
conscious experience of mental effort results from mechanisms measuring the opportunity 
costs of the current task, motivating the reallocation of computational processes away from the 
present task and toward the next best alternative (Kurzban, 2010).  
Organisms solve the prioritization problem by estimating the utilities of different 
possible actions, and then selecting the action that has the maximal expected utility. As an 
example, consider a research participant asked to perform math calculations with the 
possibility of having his or her smartphone nearby. The model predicts that doing math in the 
presence of the smartphone will be perceived as more effortful than in the case of the 
smartphone was absent, because the opportunity cost of performing math is higher in presence 
of the smartphone. If the experimenter leaves the room, the participant will reassess the utility 
of doing the math problems, probably cease this activity and shift to his smartphone. 
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In the same vein of ideas, there also exist cases in which a person will finally decide 
to divide her processing capacity between two actions – the current action and the next-best 
action – rather than restraining to only one. This is exactly what the model of Kurzban et al. 
(2013) is trying to predict.  
 
The following equation represents how the utility – or marginal value gained – of 
performing two tasks at once (e.g., math and smartphone) varies as a function of the utility of 
performing only one task (math) and the utility of performing only the other (smartphone), 
when doing two tasks at once achieves a fixed fraction (β) of the utility of doing each task 
separately: 
𝑈(𝑎1, 𝑎2) = 𝛽 × (𝑈(𝑎1, 𝑎1) + 𝑈(𝑎2, 𝑎2)) 
where a1 and a2 represent two tasks; U(a1,a1) is the utility of doing only task a1; U(a2,a2) is the 
utility of doing only task a2; and U(a1,a2) is the utility  of doing tasks a1 and a2 simultaneously; 
β is an index of diminishing marginal utility. 
  
The relative utility (RU) of the next-best action (a2) is defined as the fraction of its utility by 
the utility of the first best action a1, 
𝑅𝑈(𝑎2) =
𝑈(𝑎2, 𝑎2)
𝑈(𝑎1, 𝑎1)
 
 
The conditions under which a person should allocate their processing capacity simultaneously 
to both tasks is expressed as follows: 
𝑈(𝑎1, 𝑎2) > 𝑈(𝑎1, 𝑎1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛽 + 𝛽 × 𝑅𝑈(𝑎2) > 1 
 
Figure 8 also illustrates when a person should divide their processing capacity between two 
actions rather than restraining to only one. This is the case when the relative utility of the next-
best action (RU(a2)) is high, and when there is diminishing marginal utility to devoting 
processing capacity entirely to one task (i.e., β is high). When the marginal value gained from 
dedicating capacity to the best task – the utility of doing only the first task – is less than the 
marginal value gained from dividing processing capacity – the utility of performing both tasks 
simultaneously –, then processing capacity should be divided between the two tasks. 
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Figure 8. Mental Effort as Opportunity Cost. This model tries to predict when people should focus 
attention on only the first best action or to divide attention between two actions. This choice is determined 
by the relative utility (RU) of the next-best action but also by the fractional value (β) one gains when 
dividing processing capacity. Under low opportunity costs, people will devote processing capacity to 
only the first best action. However, with increasing opportunity costs, people will feel an increased sense 
of effort and be motivated to divide their mental processes between the two best actions in a way that 
reduces performance, moving from position x to position y. Reprinted with permission from Kurzban et 
al. (2013). 
 
 
Similar to this model, some other interpretations of human choice come from 
optimization theories implemented in the artificial intelligence field. For example, it has been 
proposed that the best algorithm determining choice is the one that maximizes the value of 
computation (VOC), which is the difference between the expected utility gained from its 
computation minus the expected cost of its required resources (e.g., time of computation). 
Lieder et al. (2014) have applied this optimality principle to human cognition, proposing that 
individuals select cognitive strategies based on their relative VOC (Griffiths et al., 2015; 
Lieder & Griffiths, 2015; Lieder et al., 2012, 2014). In other words, people should rationally 
perform a costs/benefits analysis comparing the advantages of a selected cognitive strategy 
and the cost its computations entails (Lieder et al. 2014). Following this principle, mental effort 
should be deployed to achieve an optimal balance between the expected utility of its outcome 
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(e.g., performance accuracy) and the opportunity cost of its required time (Shenhav et al., 
2017).  
In the same vein, Shenhav et al. (2013) have also proposed the expected value of 
control (EVC) theory in which control signals are specified along two dimensions: an identity 
dimension (e.g., what to attend) and an intensity dimension (e.g., how strongly to attend) that 
influence the likelihood of obtaining reward, or avoiding punishment. These factors define an 
overall reward rate at the expense of a certain cost with increasing control intensity. Therefore, 
the EVC is defined as the difference between the expected reward rate and the expected cost 
associated with a given configuration of control signals. Similar to the VOC model, the optimal 
control allocation is the one that maximizes the EVC. 
 
An Alternative Framework: Effort Adds Value 
The concept of effort has been somewhat renewed by Inzlicht et al. (2018) in their 
paradox of effort theory. As the authors explain, effort has long been considered costly, felt 
difficult or aversive, and linked to feelings of anxiety, stress, fatigue, and frustration. Effort is 
often avoided and the volition to exert effort is known to decrease after having already exerted 
a certain amount of effort (Inzlicht et al., 2014). However, Inzlicht et al. (2018) newly proposed 
that effort can also add value and be experienced as rewarding per se. The authors took the 
example of crafted objects that we effortfully assemble (e.g., IKEA furniture) and that are 
more valued than preassembled ready-to-use ones (Norton et al., 2012). It is also the case for 
people appreciating effortful challenges such as climbing huge mountains: these challengers 
would value their activity for the required effort. This view is a little bit different from that 
according to which people will deploy effort in order to get high reward and minimize costs. 
Instead, this model predicts that people will value rewards to a greater extent if these rewards 
have required a certain effort.  
In the same vein, the martyrdom effect also suggests that value of an action can 
increase from its anticipated effort (Olivola & Shafir, 2013). For example, the willingness to 
contribute to a charitable cause increases when the fundraising process is expected to be 
painful and effortful: people often prefer taking part into challenges such as running 5-miles 
rather than easier activities such as attending a picnic or simply give money from home. 
Another pattern that would explain the volition of people to exert effort is the learned 
industriousness. According to this latter one, if effort is constantly paired with reward, a 
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conditioned association will be created, and people become more willing to deploy that effort 
(Eisenberger, 1992). Finally, the authors also evoke the need for cognition, which describes 
people’s intrinsic tendencies to engage in cognitive activities (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  
Most of the time, effort is sought because it increases the value of its product (Kruger 
et al., 2004) rather than the value of the effort itself. However, the authors proposed an 
alternative view according to which people can also seek effort because the effort itself possess 
a rewarding value (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kaufman, 1999; Loewenstein, 1999). Accordingly, 
Inzlicht et al. (2018) have represented a function according to which increasing effort intensity 
will depend on the increase of the product of effort (Figure 9 A) or on the increase of the value 
of effort itself (Figure 9 B).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Two Alternative Formulations for the Positive Valuation of Effort. This figure represents 
what has been suggested by previous work (represented by prev) as well as by this alternative framework 
(represented by alt) for the case in which the product of effort is rewarding (A) and for the case in which 
the effort itself is valued as an intrinsic reward (B).  
According to previous work, the expected value (EV) of effort (EVprev; dark blue lines) is the difference 
between the expected product of the effort (Product(effort)prev; dark green lines) and the cost of exerting 
effort (Cost(effort); red lines). The individual can select their optimal effort investment by setting the 
effort intensity that maximizes its EV (unbroken vertical arrow). According to the alternative framework, 
there are two ways of valuing effort: (A) as an amplification in the value of the effort’s product with 
increasing effort intensity (from dark green to light green values), and/or (B) as an amplification of the 
value of the effort intensity itself. Each of these alterations (A and B) results in an alternate set of expected 
value of effort (EValt; broken blue lines) and corresponding changes in the optimal level of effort (broken 
vertical arrow). Reprinted with permission from Inzlicht et al. (2018). 
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Fatigue, Dopamine, and the Reward System 
The neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) plays an important role in high level cognitive 
functions such as working memory and cognitive control. Several neuropsychological studies 
have suggested a direct association between altered dopamine transmission in the prefrontal 
cortex and cognitive deficits (Brozoski et al., 1979; Müller et al., 1998). Some authors have 
also postulated a non-linear relationship – an inverted U-shaped relation – between cerebral 
dopamine and cognitive performance in working memory tasks (Figure 10; Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011; Cools & Robbins, 2004; Goldman-Rakic et al., 2000).  In other words, an 
intermediate – optimum – level of dopamine is needed for an efficient cognitive functioning, 
while too much but also too little dopamine would be deleterious (see Tunbridge et al., 2006 
for a review).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Inverted U-Shaped Relationship between Working Memory Performance and Cerebral 
Dopamine Levels. This function shows that an optimal DA level is required for high working memory 
functioning, while too much or too little DA is deleterious. Adapted and simplified from Goldman-Rakic 
et al. (2000) as well as Cools and D’Esposito (2011). 
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Dopamine is a neurotransmitter belonging to the catecholamine family and is the 
precursor of adrenalin, and noradrenalin. From a functional point of view, dopamine plays a 
role in goal-directed behavior. Dopaminergic neurons origin from the midbrain to project 
towards different cortical and subcortical regions (Li et al., 2009). In the human brain, the 
dopaminergic system is divided into three main routes (Figure 11). The nigrostriatal pathway 
connects the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), located in the ventral midbrain to the dorsal 
striatum in the forebrain, more precisely the caudate nucleus and putamen. The mesolimbic 
pathway – also called the reward pathway – takes its roots in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
in the midbrain and extends to cerebral limbic regions: accumbens nucleus, amygdala, 
hippocampus, and ACC.  Finally, the mesocortical pathway also starts in the VTA to project 
towards the neocortex: orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex (OFC), the mid DLPFC, and the 
cingulate cortex (Li et al., 2009; Manard & Collette, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The Three Main Dopaminergic Pathways. The nigrostriatal pathway (in black) starts from 
the substantia nigra to reach the striatum; the mesolimbic and mesocortical pathways, often called the 
meso-cortico-limbic pathway, both start in the ventral tegmental area (VTA). The mesolimbic pathways 
(in red) then projects towards limbic regions (accumbens nucleus (NAc), amygdala, hippocampus, 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)) while the mesocortical pathway (in blue) projects towards the neocortex 
(orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex (OFC), mid dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and cingulate 
cortex).  
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Given the implication of dopamine in the reward system as well as in prefrontal areas, 
this neurotransmitter has revealed to be very relevant in explaining cognitive fatigue, so much 
that several authors have built their theoretical model based on a dopaminergic hypothesis. For 
example, cognitive fatigue has been associated with a down-regulation of the dopaminergic 
system in striato-thalamo-cortical fibers (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000, 2004; Lorist et al., 2009). 
Likewise, fMRI studies on patients with MS – the most frequently used model of cognitive 
fatigue – have consistently shown abnormal activation or connectivity strength in BG and PFC 
(DeLuca et al., 2008; Finke et al., 2015; Tartaglia et al., 2008). Dopamine in midbrain areas 
has also been suggested to preserve motivation during fatigue onset (Moeller et al., 2012). 
Lorist et al. (2005) also suggested that the consequences of fatigue, such as failures in 
monitoring, can be explained by inadequate levels of DA transmission in the striatum and 
ACC. Chaudhuri and Behan (2000) also proposed that inadequate DA level in BG, which 
disrupts the integration of perceived reward, is linked to fatigue in several diseases. Similarly, 
Dobryakova et al. (2013) assumed that fatigue might occur as a result of reduced DA 
availability in the BG, leading to reduced firing of striatal DA neurons in response to a 
rewarding outcome. 
 
Costs/Benefits Calculation 
In agreement with most of the previous presented models, Tops et al. (2004) proposed 
that mental fatigue can be viewed as an effort/reward imbalance: if the task effort is believed 
to result in sufficient reward, people will continue the task. By contrast, when the task effort 
is higher than the reward, the motivation starts to disappear and people show task-
disengagement as well as feelings of fatigue. Similarly, Boksem and Tops (2008) claimed that 
people are basically motivated by obtaining rewards but also by avoiding punishment. In this 
view, people will expend energy if costs are low and rewards are high. In the case of long-
lasting cognitive tasks, the expended energy will progressively become greater than the 
reward, and motivation will eventually drop. From an evolutionary point of view, the feeling 
of fatigue can be considered as “a drive to abandon behavior” (Boksem & Tops, 2008, p.126) 
which is useful for the individual because it will make them disengage from the task as soon 
as the energetic costs are excessive as compared to the provided benefits. Interestingly, 
Boksem and Tops built their framework of cognitive fatigue strongly based on the neural 
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“reward system” driven by dopamine. Their model can be summed-up as follows (see also 
Figure 12): 
The OFC is known to integrate information from different sensory inputs but also to 
estimate the reward value of stimuli (Kringelbach, 2005; Walter et al., 2005). Similarly, the 
basolateral amygdala (BLA) is known to process the appetitive values of stimuli such as 
positive reinforcement (Cardinal et al., 2002) but also aversive values of stimuli such as 
negative reinforcement and punishment (LeDoux, 1996; Seymour et al., 2007). The insula is 
known to encode the aversive value of events such as the consequences (i.e., costs and 
punishments) of our decisions (Small et al., 2001; Nitschke et al., 2006). These three structures 
thus assess the appetitive/rewarding and aversive/punishing value of stimuli or events.  
This reward-related information is conveyed from these three structures to the ACC, 
which will goal-direct behavior in a way that is expected to lead to the highest reward and the 
lowest aversive outcomes. The implementation of this calculated strategy into the appropriate 
behavior is underpinned by projections from ACC to the NAc. When the outcome of a behavior 
is better or worse than expected, dopaminergic projections from the VTA increase the 
appropriate neuronal pattern in the PFC and the ACC by strengthening connections that lead 
to this rewarding behavior, or reduce the neuronal activation in the case of unsuccessful 
behavior. In addition to the appetitive/aversive evaluation of outcome to bias behavior, 
decision-making also takes the energetic costs triggered by the behavior into account. In this 
view, the insula would code the current physiological state and energetic resources while the 
ACC would code the estimated effort to reach the expected reward. Afterwards, ACC 
projections towards the BLA and the NAc modulate the energy dedicated to the behavior. 
In conclusion, a particular behavior will be implemented if the change from the 
current state to the future state is highly valued, both in terms of appetitive/aversive 
consequences but also in terms of energetic costs for the body. An increase in perceived effort 
as compared to the expected rewards will result in a down regulation of DA activity in NAc 
and midbrain DA, creating the feeling of fatigue that drives the organism to abandon behavior 
that is valued too costly as compared to its benefits. 
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Figure 12. Cognitive Fatigue as Costs and Benefits Calculation. The OFC, BLA, and insula code the 
appetitive and aversive value of stimuli or actions. This information is transmitted to the ACC, which 
goal-directs behavior in the most rewarding and least punishing direction. The implementation of this 
strategy into behavior is underpinned by ACC projections towards the NAc. When outcomes are better 
or worse than expected, the VTA relays this information to the PFC and the ACC, strengthening 
connections to promote the rewarding behavior or inducing extinction in case of unrewarding behavior. 
In addition to the reward/punishment evaluation, decision-making also assesses the energetic cost linked 
to the execution of the behavior. The current physiological state and energetic resources are coded by the 
insula while the estimated effort to reach the expected reward is coded by the ACC. Afterwards, ACC 
projections towards the BLA and the NAc modulate the energy dedicated to the behavior. Therefore, a 
particular behavior will be implemented if it is highly valued, both in terms of rewarding/punishing 
consequences but also of bodily energetic costs. ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; BLA = Basolateral 
Amygdala; CeA=Central Nucleus of the Amygdala; OFC = Orbitofrontal Cortex; PFC = Prefrontal 
Cortex; NAc = Nucleus Accumbens; VTA = Ventral Tegmental Area; BFB = Basal Forebrain; DA = 
Dopamine. Adapted from Boksem and Tops (2008). 
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A Neurocomputational Model of Effort 
In their neurocomputational model of effort, Verguts et al. (2015) tried to model how 
effort, underpinned by the limbic loop (see Box 5), can be optimally allocated as a function of 
reward, cost, and task difficulty. 
The authors started by defining a first utility function as:  
𝑈(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑)  − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
where E(reward) stands for the expected reward.  
Given that E(reward) can be expressed as a function of effort and task difficulty and that the 
effort cost can be expressed as a function of effort level, this first equation was rewritten as: 
𝑈(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) = 𝑟
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡
− 𝑐 ∙ 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 
where r and c represent expected reward and cost, respectively. 
 Since the effort that maximizes the previous equation is the optimal effort, it and can be 
expressed as a function of reward (r), cost (c), and task difficulty: 
Box 5. Limbic System and Limbic Loop 
Limbic System: set of regions involved in emotional processing from sensory inputs. They 
comprise the thalamus, the anterior hypothalamus, the hippocampus, the amygdala, and the 
cingulate gyrus. This system also has strong interconnections with VTA, BG, PFC, and ventral 
striatum (VS; including the nucleus accumbens). 
Limbic Loop: originates in ACC and projects towards the VS (particularly the nucleus 
accumbens), the ventral pallidum (VP), and the thalamus, which in turn projects to ACC, 
closing the loop. The mesolimbic pathway – or the reward pathway – also projects into the 
limbic loop, in particular from the brainstem (VTA) towards ACC and VS (Pierce & 
Kumaresan, 2006). Therefore, it has been proposed that the limbic loop processes reward 
(Croxson et al., 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 
2007). Interestingly, Verguts et al. (2015) also proposed the limbic loop as the neural substrate 
of effort.  
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𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = √
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 ∙ 𝑟
𝑐
− 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 
In this model, the authors proposed that reward and cost feedback (detected by the 
VTA in Figure 13) is used for learning a stimulus-action association in the motor loop, but 
also for choosing when and whether to invest effort in the limbic loop (ACC, VS, VP, and 
thalamus in Figure 13).  
Learning to exert effort is thus supported by dopaminergic projections from the VTA 
towards the ACC and the value (Reward/Cost) is represented by the dotted line in Figure 13. 
The ACC codes the stimulus value [V(s)] and values of actions (a) for a given stimulus [Q(s, 
a)]. In this model, effort consists in increasing signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in cortical areas 
(Cohen et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2005), which the authors called boosting, taking two 
possible values:  Boost or No Boost (a or a’).  
One of these options is chosen in ACC according to this rule: 
Pr(a) =
exp (Ɣ 𝑄𝑛
𝜋(𝑠, 𝑎))
∑ exp(Ɣ 𝑄𝑛𝜋  (𝑠, 𝑎′))𝑎′
 
In other words, the probability of choosing an option (a) will be determined as a 
function of the value of this option relative to the value of an alternative option (a’). When the 
Boost option is chosen, the Boost value [Q(s, B) in Figure 13] in ACC is activated. Otherwise, 
the No-Boost value [Q(s, no B] in Figure 13) in ACC is activated. This information is 
transmitted from the ACC to the VS (nucleus accumbens) (Basar et al., 2010; Heimer et al., 
1997), from the VS to the VP and to the thalamus, and back to the ACC to activate the boosting 
unit in the ACC (B in Figure 13) with value ACCBoost. Finally, this activation of the boosting 
unit (B) modulates the choice for an appropriate action (“Actions” box in Figure 13). 
An action k is chosen according to this rule:  
Pr (𝑘) =
exp(𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑘
𝑆𝑅
𝑖 𝑥𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑘′
𝑆𝑅
𝑖 𝑥𝑖)𝑘′
 
where xi = 1 if stimulus i is presented and xi = 0 if stimulus i is not presented; and where wSR 
represents neural network weights between a stimulus and action representation. This 
stimulus-representation association is assumed to be already acquired by previous learning. 
88 
 
 In other words, the probability of choosing an action (k) depends on the neural 
network weight between the stimulus i and the representation of action k relative to the neural 
network weight between the stimulus i and the representation of an alternative action k’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. A Neurocomputational Model of Effort. The dashed line represents reward and cost 
feedback that influences both the motor loop and the limbic loop. In the limbic loop, the ACC codes the 
stimulus value [V(s)] and values of options for a given stimulus: Q(s, B) or Q(s, noB). When the Boost 
option is chosen, the unit Q(s, B) is activated in the ACC. This information is transmitted from ACC to 
the VS, VP and thalamus, and back to the ACC to activate the boosting unit (B). This activation modulates 
the choice for an appropriate action in the Actions box. The activation of a particular action also depends 
on the neural network weight (wSR) characterizing the association between the stimulus and that action. 
This weighed association is assumed to have been previously learned through reward and cost feedback 
on the motor loop. Adapted from Verguts et al. (2015). 
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Models of Pathological Fatigue 
To close this first chapter, I will present three influential models that have been built 
in the first place in order to understand pathological fatigue such as that experienced by people 
with CFS. However, these models are also used in some paper discussions to explain 
underlying mechanisms that would take place in normal conditions of cognitive fatigue.  
 
Co-Conditioning Theory 
According to the co-conditioning theory (Tanaka & Watanabe, 2010), fatigue can be 
defined as a homeostatic and functional impairment caused by overwork and/or stress. When 
an organism becomes fatigued, an alarm signal (i.e., inhibitory system) may occur to prompt 
the individual to take a rest and to avoid further overwork. After repetitive experiences of 
overwork/stress, the organism may express the alarm signal as well as the fatigue sensation in 
response to an unconditioned stimulus (impaired homeostasis) that has been paired with the 
conditioned stimulus (overwork/stress or the expectation of overwork/stress). For example, if 
hormonal reactions (e.g., cortisol release) have been linked several times to overwork/stress, 
then the next manifestation of these hormonal actions will push the organism to experience 
fatigue even in the absence of overwork/stress. Therefore, the individual will be tempted to 
rest or diminish his activity before he really stands in situation of overwork/stress. The 
threshold that triggers the alarm signal and the fatigue sensation is also lowered, what is called 
central sensitization. In patients with CFS, this conditioning is preserved even after the 
homeostatic and functional disturbances have gone and may explain the persisting alarm signal 
to take a rest and the severe fatigue sensation experienced. 
 
Dual Regulation System of Fatigue 
A little bit after the proposition of the co-conditioning theory, Ishii et al. (2014a) went 
a step further and proposed a dual regulation model of fatigue. In this model, mental workload 
activates the mental facilitation system (see Figure 14), which the authors defined as a neural 
circuit interconnecting the limbic system, the BG, thalamus, and frontal cortex. An increase in 
motivational input (i.e., increased dopaminergic drive) to this facilitation system serves as a 
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compensatory mechanism to maintain task performance in the presence of mental fatigue. 
However, prolonged or excessive activation of this facilitation system may cause impaired 
energy metabolism and oxidative damage, leading to a disruption and difficulties in driving 
this system adequately. 
In parallel with the facilitation system, mental workload also activates the mental 
inhibition system (presented in the previous model), which has been postulated to play the role 
of a biological alarm signal under conditions of fatigue and requires us to take a rest to avoid 
disrupting homeostasis (Boksem & Tops, 2008; Tanaka & Watanabe, 2010). This inhibition 
system comprises the insular cortex (IC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and 
activation of this system impairs cognitive task performance. However, similarly to the 
facilitation system, overactivation of the inhibition system is dysfunctional. Indeed, according 
to the Co-Conditioning Theory (Tanaka & Watanabe, 2010), repeated and prolonged mental 
workload causes activation of the mental inhibition system through central sensitization and/or 
classical conditioning (Tanaka & Watanabe, 2010). Consequently, the organism may express 
the alarm signal even in the absence of mental workload. In other words, there is an 
overactivation or an abnormal use of the inhibitory system, which has been found in CFS 
patients (Tanaka et al., 2006). 
The balance between the activation of the two – facilitation and inhibition – systems 
determines whether performance of the cognitive task is impaired, maintained, or improved. 
This model also assumes that there exists three causes of acute mental fatigue: 1) insufficient 
activation of the mental facilitation system; 2) enhancement of the mental inhibition system; 
and 3) a combination of the two first causes. Similarly, there are three causes of chronic mental 
fatigue: 1) disruption of the mental facilitation system; 2) central sensitization/classical 
conditioning of the mental inhibition system; 3) a combination of the two. These alterations 
result in severely reduced cognitive task performance that are present in CFS. 
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Figure 14. Dual Regulation System of Fatigue. Acute mental workload activates the mental facilitation 
system underpinned by a thalamic-frontal loop that maintains or improves cognitive task performance. 
In parallel with this, mental workload also activates the inhibition system underpinned by the IC and the 
PCC that impairs task performance. Repeated and prolonged mental workload triggers dysfunction of the 
facilitation system due to impaired energy metabolism or oxidative damage but also overactivation of the 
inhibition system through central sensitization or classic conditioning. These alterations in the dual 
regulation system result in severely reduced cognitive task performance that are common in chronic 
mental fatigue. Adapted from Ishii et al. (2014a). 
 
 
Perceived Effort as a Lack of Sensory Attenuation 
Finally, Kuppuswamy (2017) built her model based on the hypothesis that fatigue 
(both physical and cognitive) should be considered as a single construct and is an inference in 
the first place. In order to illustrate the basic idea of how human beings perceive effort, she 
decided to base her model on the active inference framework of sensorimotor control in order 
to explain perceived motor effort (i.e., physical fatigue). However, the author assumed that 
similar principles are also at play in the experience of cognitive fatigue and further proposed 
that this framework may also explain pathological fatigue.  
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According to the active inference framework (Brown et al., 2013), outputs from the 
cortico-motor system are in the form of descending predictions (efferents) while inputs from 
the somatosensory systems are ascending sensory inputs (afferents) (Figure 15). The 
comparison between descending proprioceptive predictions and ascending sensory inputs lead 
to sensory prediction errors.  
To perceive the consequences of our movements, we have to be aware of sensory 
errors. By contrast, to be able to engage in movement (e.g., muscle contraction), there is a 
necessary transient attenuation in the precision of prediction errors (i.e., attenuation in 
ascending prediction errors) reporting the information that no movement has been produced. 
In other words, we have to transiently keep our attention away from sensory errors signaling 
that we are not moving. This function of decreasing the precision of sensory prediction errors 
is commonly referred to as sensory attenuation. Sensory attenuation has been demonstrated in 
the force matching task. When one is required to match an externally applied force, one 
typically underestimates the force we produce and classically produces a higher force (Shergill 
et al., 2003). This overshooting results from the attenuation of the intensity of the sensory 
consequences of a self-generated motor act, which results in a given force being perceived as 
less forceful. Under circumstances of normal sensory attenuation, proprioceptive prediction 
errors from muscle contraction are suppressed, which our brain interprets as “less or no effort”. 
By contrast, in the absence of sensory attenuation, the same muscle contraction will be 
accompanied by higher prediction errors (i.e., the fact that no movement or weak movement 
has been elicited), which the brain interprets as “the movement requires more effort than 
expected.”  
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Figure 15. Perceived Effort as a Lack of Sensory Attenuation. The descending commands from the 
brain specify sensory predictions (efferents) that are compared with the incoming sensory signals 
(afferents). The comparison between these two pieces of information gives rise to sensory prediction 
errors. To attend or not to attend to the sensory prediction errors, which drive motor output, depends on 
the precision the brain affords them. When precision is high, the sensory attenuation is low, which leads 
to high perceived effort. On the contrary, when precision is decreased, the sensory attenuation is high, 
which results in perceived effortlessness. In conditions of impaired sensory attenuation, incongruent 
perceived effort may arise, leading to feeling of fatigue. Adapted from Kuppuswamy (2017). 
 
 
This model may also explain pathological fatigue which is characterized by a report 
of high effort in performing simple activities of daily living that normally require low levels 
of effort. Indeed, under dysfunctional sensory attenuation, the brain is unable to ignore the 
afferent somatosensory consequences of movement, and everyday motor actions are 
experienced as effortful. Prolonged experience of high perceived effort could therefore 
eventually lead to the report (or symptom) of chronic pathological fatigue. 
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Confounding Variables of Cognitive Fatigue 
Before entering into Chapter 2, which will be dedicated to the presentation of 
empirical studies of cognitive fatigue in young people, I will identify a set of variables that are 
likely to interfere with the results that can be drawn from experimental studies and should thus 
be taken into account by researchers in the field. 
Firstly, as mentioned by Hockey (2013), one of the major variable that we should be 
aware of in cognitive fatigue studies is practice effect or learning. That is, in absence of 
extended practice before the real recording of performance, the evolution of performance will 
typically show improvement in the first time blocks of tasks before impairment later in the 
session. 
Secondly, Hockey (2013) also mentioned that some studies have already shown a so-
called “end-spurt” in which better performance is observed in the very last time period of a 
task as compared to previous periods of reduced effectiveness. This phenomenon appears when 
the end of the task is in sight. Therefore, studies nowadays do not inform research participants 
of the duration of the protocol and take care of the environment (e.g., no clock or watch, or 
smartphone allowed in the testing room).  
Thirdly, it is also worth mentioning here that sleep disturbances are potential 
confounding factors of cognitive fatigue (Akerstedt et al., 2004). For example, some studies 
using a sleep deprivation protocol to induce fatigue have found evidence of cognitive 
impairments (Asplund & Chee, 2013; Duffy et al., 2009; Lim & Dinges, 2008; Martella et al., 
2011; see also McCoy & Strecker, 2011 for a review on effects of different types of sleep 
disturbances on cognition). Therefore, sleep quality must be taken into account in cognitive 
fatigue studies. 
 Fourth, some cognitive functions as well as cognitive fatigue have been found to vary 
as a function of the time of day (Blain et al., 2016; Esposito et al., 2014). Therefore, well-
informed studies impose a fixed moment during the day to carry out experimental studies (e.g., 
all sessions start at 9 a.m.) or pay attention to balance morning and afternoon sessions between 
the different conditions of their experiment. Related to this issue, it has also been shown that 
performing a task at ones optimal time of day depending on chronotype prevents performance 
decrement to a certain extent (Lara et al., 2014). Importantly, chronotypes tend to shift to an 
“earlier” pattern with advancing age (Roenneberg et al., 2004). Therefore, it seems important 
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to take both the distribution of chronotype and the time of day into account, most importantly 
when age groups are compared. 
 Fifth, several studies have also shown that the effect of caffeine improves cognitive 
functions and modulates fatigue (Azevedo et al., 2016; Klaassen et al., 2013; Lorist & Tops, 
2003; van den Berg et al., 2019). Therefore, most experimental studies require their 
participants to refrain from caffeine consumption at least during the day of the experiment.  
Finally, the effect of lighting is also likely to interfere with the global ergonomics (Hu 
et al., 2018), which renders this factor important for long-lasting tasks.  
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Intermediate Summary  
To sum-up, cognitive fatigue has first been associated with the energy depletion 
hypothesis according to which people progressively become exhausted because their limited 
energy supply vanish after having performed a long-lasting work. This idea has been somewhat 
questioned but still remains up to date and is demonstrated in studies showing that rest breaks 
relieve cognitive fatigue. Afterwards, models have explained cognitive fatigue by integrating 
the notion of voluntarily controlled effort invested in the task. It is the case when people 
compute the costs/benefits or effort/reward balance to decide whether or not to deploy effort 
in a particular behavior or task. Using a somewhat different view of the costs/benefits 
hypothesis, Müller and Apps (2018) proposed that the deployed effort may discount the value 
of rewards. According to the opportunity cost model (Kurzban et al., 2013), effort arises from 
the existence of many other options that the individual is not allowed to perform, sometimes 
pushing the individual to share its mental capacity between two activities depending on their 
relative utility. Finally, dopaminergic inputs from the VTA as well as some other cerebral areas 
(e.g., BG, ACC, OFC) have been postulated to underpin cognitive fatigue (Boksem & Tops, 
2008) and effort (Verguts et al., 2015).  
This Thesis work is aimed at investigating cognitive fatigue in young, middle-aged, 
and older people. To this end, three studies using either the Time-on-Task approach (Study 1 
and Study 2) or the Probe approach (Study 3) were implemented. Therefore, the next chapter 
will be dedicated to the presentation of studies having investigated cognitive fatigue in the 
young population. The two following chapters will be dedicated to the presentation of models 
of cognitive and cerebral aging (Chapter 3) and to studies having investigated cognitive 
fatigue in middle-aged and older people (Chapter 4).  
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Chapter 2: Empirical Studies in Young People 
This chapter will begin with the presentation of the Time-on-Task and the Probe 
approaches, followed by the presentation of empirical studies having used one or the other 
approach. Studies using the Time-on-Task approach are divided into behavioral, 
electroencephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG), neuroimaging, brain 
connectivity, and motivation-related studies. Experiments using the Probe approach are less 
numerous than Time-on-Task studies. The corresponding section is divided into behavioral 
and neuroimaging probe studies. The Probe approach part also comprises a section about 
workload, which has been essentially investigated using this approach. Finally, we present a 
section devoted to studies interested in the subjective feelings of fatigue. As previously 
mentioned, the two first studies (behavioral data) of this Thesis work were based on the Time-
on-Task approach while the third study (fMRI data) was based on the Probe approach.  
Time-on-Task and Probe Approaches 
As well explained by Hockey (2013), researchers belonging to the fatigue field, 
already in the nineteenth century, have been interested in two main questions about the effects 
that work triggers on fatigue. The first one is related to the time course of fatigue: how does 
performance vary – or to what extent is performance impaired – as a function of the continuous 
time spent on the task? Secondly, researchers have also been interested in the specificity of the 
fatigue state. In other words, are fatigue effects specific to the task that induced them or are 
they transferable to any other cognitive activities? These two types of questions have led to 
two experimental approaches in the cognitive fatigue literature: the continuous work method – 
or Time-on-Task paradigm – and the probe method (Hockey, 2013). In the first approach, a 
cognitive task is generally administered to the participants for a relatively long-lasting period 
of time that can range between a few minutes to several hours. The second approach implied 
to start the experiment by administering a first so-called loading task followed by a probe task 
in order to test whether induced fatigue by the first task is transferable to the second task. The 
probe task can also be administered before (as a baseline measure) and after the loading task 
(experimental condition) as well as before and after a control task (control condition). 
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Obviously, one or the other approach will be favored as a function of the question of 
interest. The first one serves to answer questions about how long is it necessary to perform the 
same task to undergo its fatiguing effect. Or, as it is the case in my first experimental study, to 
answer questions such as “Will a long-lasting task trigger differential fatigue effects as a 
function of the different age groups being studied?”  The second approach is aimed at 
determining whether performance on the probe task is weakened by the previous performance 
of the loading task. Regarding the energy depletion hypothesis previously presented in 
Chapter 1, it was believed that work had a general effect on the body’s limited energy supply, 
leading to the assumption that fatigue triggers general effects and impairs all subsequent 
mental activities (Kraepelin, 1902). However, there was also an alternative prediction of the 
energy depletion hypothesis according to which fatigue effects were transferable only to 
functions that were depleted by the loading task. In this sense, Robinson (1923) proposed that 
impairments are observable only for probed mental operations sharing the same task 
requirements as the loading task. This probe approach was originally appraised in the context 
of ego-depletion, according to which a limited inner resource is depleted by exerting self-
control overtime. This framework also proposed that exerting self-control on a primary task 
will impair the capacity of exerting self-control on a subsequent task (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 
2012). Similarly, it has been proposed that transfer effects are possible when the two tasks are 
underpinned by similar neural substrates (van der Linden & Eling, 2006; van der Linden et al., 
2003). Evidence for the specific effect of fatigue would be in agreement with the motivational 
hypothesis according to which performance impairment are primarily due to a loss of interest 
and a motivation drop. Indeed, if a general fatigue effect would not allow any recovery from a 
change between the loading and the probe task, a specific fatigue effect will result in a certain 
degree of recovery because motivation is reset. 
In the following lines, readers will be presented with different experimental (e.g., 
behavioral, neuroimaging, electrophysiological) studies that based their protocol on one of 
these two – continuous versus probe – approach. However, for the sake of clarity, it is 
important to mention at this stage that the two approaches are sometimes used in combination 
in the same study. Therefore, it is likely that one study that I will present under the subheading 
“Time-on-Task” would have correctly been presented under the subheading “Probe approach”. 
For example, the continuous approach can be used as the primary task for the probe approach 
to induce fatigue in participants before administering them with the probe task. In this case, it 
is possible to assess both Time-on-Task effects on the long-lasting task as well as transfer 
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effects on the probe task. The continuous approach is also used between two sessions of 
resting-state fMRI to investigate the cerebral changes induced by performing a long-lasting 
task. Likewise, the continuous approach can be used between two assessments of subjective 
feelings. In those cases, the authors are not interested in transfer effects as such but rather in 
how much cerebral activity (or subjective feelings) have been altered (or modified) by the 
long-lasting task.  
Above and beyond these two main approaches, we can also differentiate between 
different subtypes of studies. Noteworthy, there are studies trying to target the motivation 
during the task to be performed by proposing incentives to the participants. These types of 
studies are often used in the context of the continuous approach to test whether, after a certain 
amount of time, performance decrements can be relieved by some rewarding financial 
incentives (Boksem & Tops, 2008). Therefore, some of these studies will be presented in the 
“Time-on-Task approach” section.  
Beyond the time spent on the task – or temporal fatigue hypothesis -, certain authors 
also assume that task difficulty or workload demands – referred as the cognitive load 
hypothesis – are also likely to trigger cognitive fatigue. These studies manipulate task demands 
and assume that “higher the cognitive load, higher the cognitive fatigue” (Borragán et al., 
2017). 
However, there exists an alternative view that distinguishes between different types 
of cognitive fatigues (Hancock & Desmond, 2000; May & Baldwin, 2009). According to these 
authors, cognitive overload (or active task-related fatigue) but also cognitive underload (or 
passive task-related fatigue) are likely to trigger cognitive fatigue. Generally, researchers 
resorting to this type of studies assess cognitive fatigue by administering two task conditions 
to their participants: a high load versus a low load. These high and low conditions can also be 
used in the context of the probe approach to test whether there is a differential transfer effect 
as a function of the loading (high versus low) task. In this manuscript, I will present studies 
that investigated the cognitive load hypothesis in the “Probe approach” section. 
Finally, I will close Chapter 2 by presenting results focusing on subjective fatigue. 
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Time-on-Task Approach 
In these last few years, the concept of cognitive fatigue has particularly emerged in 
the literature bearing on the young population. From a behavioral point of view, many studies 
using a Time-on-Task paradigm to induce cognitive fatigue have shown that fatigued people 
are characterized by increases in reaction times and/or reduced accuracy (Boksem et al., 2005, 
2006; Fan et al., 2019; Faber et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2018; Hopstaken et al., 
2015a ; Hopstaken et al., 2015b; Hopstaken et al., 2016; Kato et al., 2009; Lorist, 2008; Lorist 
et al., 2009; Lorist et al., 2005; Lorist et al., 2000; Möckel et al., 2015; Petruo et al., 2018; 
Shigihara et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2016).  
For example, Trejo et al. (2005) required their participants to perform mental 
arithmetic problems continuously during 3 hours until they felt exhausted and found increased 
RT with Time-on-Task. Cognitive fatigue induced by a 3 hour visual attention task has also 
been shown to alter the ability to focus one’s attention on the task at hand and to enhance 
distractibility and difficulties ignoring irrelevant information (Boksem et al., 2005). Using a 
Flanker task during 2 hours, Faber et al. (2012) also showed that cognitive fatigue disrupted 
selective attention and was associated with difficulties suppressing irrelevant information. 
Other studies have shown that cognitive fatigue induced by a 2 hour continuous task is 
associated with a reduced action monitoring as well as a decrease in response preparation as 
indexed by inadequate adjustments of behavior after errors (i.e., the inability to use previous 
information to reconfigure task set) (Boksem et al., 2006; Lorist, 2008; Lorist et al., 2005; 
Lorist et al., 2000).  
In addition to these very long-lasting paradigms, it is also worth mentioning that tasks 
of shorter durations can also trigger performance decrements (Mizuno et al., 2014; Smolders 
& de Kort, 2014). It is for example the case for the Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT) that 
has been shown to trigger increased RTs as well as subjective feelings of fatigue in participants 
performing it during only 20 minutes (Gui et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2010).  
 
Electroencephalographic and Magnetoencephalographic Studies 
Historically, cognitive fatigue has mostly been investigated using 
electroencephalographic (EEG) and Event-Related Potential (ERP) measures, because of the 
feasibility of these methods for long-lasting recording. Since EEG has a high temporal 
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resolution, these studies have particularly used the Time-on-Task paradigm – as compared to 
the probe method  –   to assess task-related changes (Arnau et al., 2017; Boksem et al., 2005, 
2006; Fan et al., 2019; Guo et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2018; Hopstaken et al., 2015a; Hopstaken 
et al., 2016; Käthner et al., 2014; Kato et al., 2009; Lorist, 2008; Lorist et al., 2009;  ; Lorist et 
al., 2005; Lorist et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2016; Möckel et al., 2015; Papadelis et al., 2007; Petruo 
et al., 2018; Tanaka et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016; Wascher et al., 2014).  
For example, the increase in theta (i.e., 4-7 Hz) and lower-alpha (i.e., 8-10 Hz) band 
power has been classically linked to cognitive fatigue installation (Arnau et al., 2017; Boksem 
et al., 2005; Borghini et al., 2014; Craig et al., 2012; Papadelis et al., 2007; Wascher et al., 
2016). In the same vein, decreased arousal and alertness during high demanding attentional 
activities have been associated with increase in the 6-10 Hz band (Klimesch, 1999; Oken & 
Salinsky, 1992).  
Regarding changes in ERPs under cognitive fatigue, Boksem et al. (2005) showed an 
association between the automatic reorientation of attention to irrelevant stimuli with a larger 
negativity in the N1 latency range. As this N1 reorienting effect did not change with Time-on-
Task, the authors suggested that goal-directed attention (top-down) is negatively affected by 
mental fatigue, while stimulus-driven attention (bottom-up) remains unaffected. However, 
certain studies did not show any differential impact of mental fatigue between controlled 
versus automatic processes (Lorist, 2008). Otherwise, a reduction in the error-related 
negativity (Ne/ERN) amplitude has been considered a marker of impaired action monitoring 
underlaid by the ACC (Boksem et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2019; Lorist et al., 2005) while the 
decrease in contingent negative variation (CNV) would be the sign of the inability to slow 
down after committing an error (Boksem et al., 2006). In 2015, Hopstaken et al. (2015a) 
required their participants to perform a 2-hour N-Back task and showed a significant decrease 
in P3 amplitude with Time-on-Task. Wascher et al. (2014) used a spatial stimulus-response-
compatibility task for 4 hours. The results showed that occipital alpha power increased rapidly 
and reached its maximal amplitude after 1 hour already, whereas frontal theta continuously 
increased with Time-on-Task. Therefore, occipital alpha was related to task disengagement 
while frontal theta was suggested to represent increased effort to maintain performance and 
the resort the executive control capacities. 
 Very interestingly, the ERP methodology has also been able to show the temporality 
of compensatory mechanisms under cognitive fatigue. Wang et al. (2016) administered a 
modified cued version of the Stroop task (Cohen et al., 1999) during 160 minutes to young 
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participants and showed that a late ERP component from an anterior frontal region followed 
an inverted U-shaped curve as a function of the time spent on the task (Figure 16). In other 
words, the amplitude of that late component progressively increased during the first 80 minutes 
of task (compensation phase) to maintain performance and then progressively decreased 
during the last 80 minutes (decompensation phase). Moreover, the error rate as well as long 
RT trials (RT longer than 2s.) were similar to the beginning time block during the 
compensation phase but significantly increased during the decompensation phase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Wang et al. (2016)’s Data. A. ERP amplitude of a late ERP component (640–1272 ms) in 
the anterior frontal region following an inverted U-shaped curve with Time-on-Task. The compensation 
phase (blue shaded) took place between 0-80 min and the decompensation phase (pink shaded) during 
the subsequent 80-160 min. B. Percentage of error rate during compensation and decompensation 
phase. Adapted from Wang et al. (2016). 
 
Some studies using magnetoencephalography (MEG) have also shown changes in 
neural activities that are caused by performing cognitive fatigue-inducing tasks (Ishii et al., 
2013, 2014b, 2014c, Ishii et al., 2015; Tanaka et al., 2014a, 2014b). For example, Ishii et al. 
(2013) administered three 25-minute sessions of 0-Back and 2-Back tasks and showed reduced 
alpha band power in the occipital region with Time-on-Task. This reduction was significantly 
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greater in the 2-Back as compared to the 0-Back task. Also using an N-back task, Tanaka et 
al. (2014a) showed that cognitive fatigue induced by a 10-minute 2-Back task resulted in a 
post-task increase in beta band power in the prefrontal brain area, which had previously been 
associated with diminished alertness and arousal (Okogbaa et al., 1994). Ishii et al. (2014b) 
administered their participants with a decision experiment in which they performed reverse 
Stroop test trials
3
 and were intermittently asked to decide whether they wanted to take a rest or 
continue. In the control condition, participants also performed Stroop trials but were instructed 
to press a key intermittently without making any decision. The results showed that levels of 
decrease in theta, alpha, and beta band power were greater in experimental trials ‒ when the 
participant opted to rest ‒ than those in control trials and that the DLPFC and the PCC were 
implied in the decision to rest in the presence of fatigue. 
 
Other Physiological Markers Used in these Studies 
Besides electrophysiological measures such as EEG, other physiological markers 
have been linked to cognitive fatigue. Several studies have shown association between eye-
related measures (e.g., blink duration, proportion of long blinks, blink frequency, or pupil size) 
with drowsiness (Caffier et al., 2003), vigilance drops (McIntire et al., 2014), load and effort 
(Beatty, 1982; Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), as well as cognitive fatigue 
(Gergelify et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2018; Herlambang et al., 2019; Martins & Carvalho, 2015; 
Tian et al., 2019). For example, baseline pupil diameter (Hopstaken et al., 2015a; Hopstaken 
et al., 2016) as well as stimulus-evoked pupil dilation (Hopstaken et al., 2015b) have been 
found to decrease with Time-on-Task. Some studies (e.g., Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Murphy et 
al., 2014) have provided evidence that the LC–NE
4
 system regulates task engagement and is 
correlated to changes in pupil dynamics. Two modes of the LC–NE system have been proposed 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005): the phasic mode is characterized by intermediate baseline levels 
of NE and strong stimulus-evoked bursts of NE release. This mode supports high task 
engagement and has been associated with an intermediate pupil diameter and large stimulus-
evoked dilations (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011). In the tonic mode, both 
                                                          
3 Participants had to indicate the meaning of the presented word (“red”, “blue”, or “yellow”) regardless of the ink 
color.  
4 LC-NE is the abbreviation for locus coeruleus-central norepinephrine.  
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baseline and stimulus-evoked levels of NE are high. Therefore, this mode is associated with 
reduced task engagement, increased pupil diameter, and lowered relative stimulus-evoked 
dilations.  Interestingly, Cazzoli et al. (2014) showed that oculomotor markers can be used to 
distinguish between different sources of fatigue (chronotypical factors versus Time-on-Task 
induced fatigue). These authors showed that performing a free-visual exploration task for 
about 25 minutes at non-optimal time of the day triggered a significant increase in the mean 
visual fixation duration during the task. By contrast, the mean saccadic speed progressively 
decreased throughout the duration of the task, but was not influenced by the lack of 
synchronicity between chronotype and time of the day. Finally, some studies have focused on 
aircraft pilots or car drivers, showing, for example, that the percentage of time the eyes closed 
during a specific period as well as blinking frequency amplitude increased monotonically with 
increasing fatigue or sleepiness (Bergasa  et al., 2006; Galley et al., 2003; Zhang et al 2019).   
Autonomic nervous system (ANS)
5
 variables have also been linked to cognitive 
fatigue (Mizuno et al., 2011; Pattyn et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2019; Zhang & Yu 2010). 
Drowsiness has been linked to decreased heart rate (HR) values during driving tasks (for a 
review, see Borghini et al., 2014). Likewise, it has been shown that HR decreases while heart 
rate variability (HRV) increases with cognitive fatigue (Egelund, 1982; Mascord & Heath, 
1992). In 2015, Gergelyfi et al. administered their participants with a 120-minute Sudoku task 
and found that subjective feeling of fatigue increased and performance worsened in parallel 
with increased blink rate and HRV. Melo et al. (2017) required their participants to perform a 
Go/NoGo task for 50 minutes and found a decrease in parasympathetic activity (rMSSD and 
pNN50) with Time-on-Task. Moreover, frequency-related measures of HRV (LF/HF) were 
linked to self-reported scales of attention and drowsiness. As mentioned earlier, several studies 
have constantly shown that EEG is a reliable physiological indicator of cognitive fatigue 
(Jagannath & Balasubramanian, 2014; Lal & Craig, 2001, 2002). Likewise, 
electrocardiography (ECG) has been used as a measure of ANS to detect driver fatigue (Jiao 
et al., 2004; Lal & Craig, 2001; Li et al., 2003). However, these techniques have some practical 
                                                          
5 ANS controls involuntary functions and is divided into sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system. Heart rate 
variability (HRV) may be described as the time difference between two successive heartbeats. Recognized HRV 
indicators are the following: time domain indicators comprise NN.mean (mean of normal to normal interval), rMSSD 
(root mean square of successive differences), PNN50 (the proportion of NN50 divided by total number of NNs), and 
frequency-domain indicators comprise TP (total spectral power), HF (high frequency from 0.15 Hz to 0.4 Hz), LF 
(low frequency from 0.04 Hz to 0.15 Hz), VLF (very low frequency from 0.0033 Hz to 0.04 Hz) and the LF/HF ratio 
(Huang et al., 2018). 
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limitations (electrode to fix on the scalp or on the subject’s body, skin preparation, etc.). 
Consequently, researchers have progressively sought for material fitting real-life situations. In 
this regard, capacitive ECG (cECG) is a non-contact method
6
 to record the cardiac activity. 
Using this technique during a 120-minute simulated driving task, Balasubramanian and 
Bhardwaj (2018) have shown that both LF (an index of sympathetic modulation) and HF 
(index of parasympathetic modulation) increased while the LF/HF ratio decreased with Time-
on-Task. This finding is similar to results from other studies in which LF/HF decreased in 
drowsy state (Byeon et al., 2006; Sun & Yu, 2014), while it increased in greater mental 
workload or alertness (Sato et al., 1998). Also in a wish to develop smarter device, Huang et 
al. (2018) equipped their participants with a wearable ECG during an 80-minute quiz 
comprising logical problems and memory tests and found that TP and LF were the most 
important indicators of cognitive fatigue. 
Finally, not directly linked to cognitive fatigue (because no fatiguing task was used) 
but still relevant to this work, Spangler et al. (2018) were able to show that rMSSD measured 
during 5 minute during rest (participants watched a grey screen while remaining still and 
relaxed) was inversely related to the ex-Gaussian parameter τ (tau)
7
 extracted from the RT 
distribution of a short Stroop task. The authors interpreted this result as people with high 
baseline HRV can better prevent attentional lapses. 
 
Neuroimaging Studies 
From a cerebral functional point of view, some neuroimaging experiments have also 
investigated brain activities during a long-lasting cognitive task (Asplund & Chee, 2013; Coull 
et al., 1996; De Joux et al., 2013; Derosière et al., 2015; Gui et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2016; Lim 
et al., 2010; Paus et al., 1997; Sturm et al., 1999; Tajima et al., 2010). Globally, these studies 
show that decreased activation of fronto-parietal areas is associated with cognitive fatigue. For 
example, Lim et al. (2010) required their participants to perform the PVT continuously for 20 
                                                          
6 While estimating driver fatigue, cECG electrodes are fixed on the surface of the seat upholstery and not required to 
be fixed on the subject’s body. 
7 The ex-Gaussian distribution will be entered into details just before the Experimental part of this work because it is 
the basis of the first research article presented. In short, the ex-Gaussian function is characterized by three parameters 
(μ (mu) and σ (sigma) represent the Gaussian component while τ (tau) represent the exponential component). τ is an 
index of the density of extreme RTs made by the participant.  
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minutes in combination with arterial spin labeling (ASL) perfusion fMRI. Their results showed 
that decreased cerebral blood flow (CBF) in a right-lateralized fronto-parietal network between 
pre-task and post-task rest was correlated with performance decline. The authors claimed that 
fatigue has a persistent effect on the fronto-parietal network classically associated with 
attentional functioning and assumed this network would mediate Time-on-Task effects. 
Likewise, Gui et al. (2015) also adopted the PVT during 20 minutes to investigate changes in 
the amplitude of low-frequency fluctuation (ALFF) of the resting-state blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) time courses
8
. The results showed decreased ALFF in DMN regions after 
as compared to before the task but also that pre-test resting ALFF in the DMN (PCC and 
medial prefrontal cortex) predicted subjects’ subsequent performance decline. In other words, 
the higher the initial ALFF in DMN regions – representing more flexibility in reallocating 
brain resources from task-negative to task-positive network –, the more stable the behavioral 
performance during the 20-min PVT. This hypothesis was also supported by a trend for a 
negative correlation between activation increase in a region belonging to the fronto-parietal 
network (middle frontal gyrus) and reaction time increase during the task.   
Using positron emission tomography (PET), Paus et al. (1997) found that performing 
a continuous 60-minute auditory vigilance task was associated with decreased activity in the 
thalamus, frontal, parietal, and temporal areas in the right hemisphere. Coull et al. (1996) 
investigated selective versus non-selective attention tasks using PET and found performance 
decline parallel with decreased activity in the right fronto-parietal network with Time-on-Task 
during the non-selective task. In their review of PET studies, Sturm et al. (1999) identified a 
network comprising right frontal, parietal, thalamic, and brainstem areas to be co-activated 
with alerting and orienting attention. It was thus suggested that the classical decreased CBF in 
those regions may be explained by reduced alertness with Time-on-Task. Tajima et al. (2010) 
required their participants to perform a 35-minute fatigue-inducing task twice and identified 
the medial orbitofrontal cortex to be positively correlated with subjective sensation of fatigue 
measured directly after the PET session.  
Contrary to studies showing fatigue-related decreases in the fronto-parietal network,  
Lim et al. (2016) administered the Blocked Symbol Decoding Task (BSDT) during about 14 
                                                          
8 ALFF is defined as the total power within the frequency range between 0.01 and 0.1 Hz, and thus measures the 
strength or intensity of low frequency oscillations of resting-state BOLD time courses. It is a marker of regional 
spontaneous neural activity changes. 
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minutes in-scanner and showed increased activity in fronto-parietal areas as well as decreased 
deactivation in the DMN with Time-on-Task. The authors suggested that Time-on-Task would 
only trigger decreased fronto-parietal activity in simple tasks as it is the case for binary 
decision paradigms (target versus non-target). By contrast, they claimed that more complex 
tasks – like theirs – would rather trigger increased activity of the fronto-parietal network, 
allowing sustaining controlled attention during a long-lasting period. Regarding the decreased 
deactivation in the DMN, it has been suggested that the failure to suppress activity in this 
network while performing a cognitive task would reflect disengagement from the task at hand 
(Weissman et al., 2006). Given DMN activity is linked to mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 
2009), this result was also in agreement with studies showing that mind-wandering parallels 
Time-on-Task (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
 
Connectivity Studies 
As Qi et al. (2019) mentioned in their paper reporting the last new insights from the 
Brain Connectome project, the univariate analysis approach was generally employed in the 
studies summarized above while the interconnectivity between brain regions and the integrity 
of the cortical network under cognitive fatigue was not investigated at this point. As previously 
presented in Chapter 1, Ishii et al. (2014a) showed that mental fatigue is not only caused by 
impaired activity in task-related brain regions, but also modulated by mental facilitation and 
inhibition systems that regulate the activity of task-related brain regions. Therefore, network 
analysis seems also very relevant for studying the neural mechanisms of mental fatigue (Qi et 
al., 2019). 
Some connectivity studies have tried to identify how brain networks were modulated 
by Time-on-Task effect (Giessing et al., 2013; Gui et al., 2015; Lorist et al., 2009; Sun et al., 
2014a; Sun et al., 2014b; Taya et al., 2018; ten Caat et al., 2008). Using a Go/No-Go task, 
Giessing et al. (2013) aimed at investigating brain functional reorganization associated with 
attentional task performance. The results showed that Time-on-Task impaired behavioral 
performance and led to less efficient network topology (i.e., increasing clustering and shorter 
connection distance). As previously mentioned, Gui et al. (2015) used a PVT continuously for 
20 minutes with  ALFF to identify brain regions that were vulnerable to cognitive fatigue. 
Their connectivity analyses showed reduced anti-correlation between the PCC and the right 
middle PFC after the task, suggesting that task-positive and task-negative networks mediate 
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Time-on-Task effects. Taya et al. (2018) investigated the changes in topology of subnetworks 
of resting-state fMRI after cognitive fatigue induction by a visual oddball task taxing selective 
attention. Their results suggested that fronto-parietal subnetworks have a flexible topological 
architecture allowing compensation for impaired performance triggered by cognitive fatigue. 
In 2009, Lorist et al. used EEG coherence as a measure of synchronization between 
neural networks in a paradigm in which participants performed a continuous 2-hour task 
switching. The results showed higher coherence value in the fronto-parietal network for switch 
trials, as compared to repetition trials. However, the results also showed a widespread and non-
specific effect of mental fatigue on EEG power and coherence across multiple frequency 
bands. This increase in neuronal activity and stronger synchronization did not favor efficient 
behavioral performance. According to the authors, this non-specific and widespread effect on 
power and coherence measures of Time-on-Task can be explained by the action of the 
dopaminergic system. Accordingly, decreased dopamine levels in mentally fatigued 
participants would be responsible for increased noise levels, which in turn, increase power and 
coherence. These increased parameters further negatively affect the quality of information 
processing. Sun et al. (2014a) used a 5-minute PVT to assess changes in functional 
connectivity in the lower alpha EEG band power. The results showed a global reshape of the 
topology in cortical connectivity networks under fatigue state. Furthermore, there was an 
asymmetrical pattern of connectivity in fronto-parietal regions with higher connectivity on the 
right hemisphere associated with sustained attention. Interestingly, significant decrease with 
cognitive fatigue were observed in left, but not right, fronto-parietal connectivity. This study 
showed that changes in functional network connectivity due to cognitive fatigue are already 
observable with a relatively short time scale.  
Similar disintegrated network topology have been reported in fatigue studies that used 
simulated driving paradigms (Kong et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2017). However, in comparison 
with cognitive task paradigms in which subjects were typically required to perform the 
prolonged execution of various cognitive tasks, prolonged driving mostly reduced alertness 
ability. In order to investigate fatigue-related mechanisms between these two types of 
cognitive activities, Dimitrakopoulos et al. (2018) compared the topological alterations of 
functional brain networks in the theta EEG band between two fatigue-inducing tasks: a 1-hour 
low-intensity simulated driving versus a high-demanding half-hour PVT. If both paradigms 
impaired behavioral performances, PVT and simulated driving were related to different 
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network reorganizations. While a common disrupted global integration was revealed in both 
fatigue tasks (i.e., increased path length, a measure of parallel information efficiency), 
simulated driving was also associated with increased local segregation (i.e., increased 
clustering). This result supports the fact that connectivity analyses may help identify different 
network topologies between different types of fatigue such as active (i.e., the PVT task) versus 
passive (i.e., simulated driving) task related fatigue (May & Baldwin, 2009).  
 
Motivation by Rewarding Incentives 
Rewarding incentives have been associated with better performances in tasks 
requiring executive functions. For example, Krebs et al. (2010) showed in a Stroop task that 
stimuli linked to the delivery of monetary reward were answered faster than non-rewarding 
stimuli. This phenomenon also seems to play a role in situations of prolonged demands, 
suggesting that motivation is one of the key mechanisms to maintain performance in a long 
time course (Sarter et al., 2006). Lorist et al. (2009) used a 2-hour switching task to induce 
cognitive fatigue followed by a motivational manipulation which consisted in social 
comparison and monetary incentives to perform well for 20 additional minutes. This resulted 
in a slight nonsignificant decrease in EEG coherence but more efficient behavior. Interestingly, 
Boksem et al. (2006) investigated whether increasing motivation could allow recovering 
performance on a 2-hour monitoring task (a modified version of the Simon task). In order to 
modify motivation, the authors told the participants that they would receive financial reward 
if they belonged to the best performers. The results showed that this monetary incentive 
improved their performance. Thus, this experiment shows that motivation can modulate 
performance under fatigue. However, it also appeared that participants did not react in the 
same way to motivation. Indeed, participants chose a strategy focusing on speed or accuracy 
but did not improve both speed and accuracy. It was thus suggested that fatigue is probably 
more than an effort/reward imbalance and involves adaptive strategies that are under the 
voluntary control of the individual to keep performance at an acceptable level under adverse 
internal circumstances. This assumption was further supported by a study of the same group 
(data not published) in which participants were told that accuracy was more rewarding than 
speed. Indeed, participant increased their accuracy but not speed after the motivation phase.  
Similarly, Hopstaken et al. (2015a, 2015b) administered their participants a 2 hour 
N-Back task and showed decreased performance, decreased pupil diameter – index of 
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psychophysiological arousal – as well as increased subjective fatigue with the time spent on 
the task. However, all measures improved after participants were informed that the remaining 
duration of the experiment will depend on their performance. In 2016, Hopstaken et al. 
changed their paradigm a little bit to investigate mental fatigue as induced by a long-lasting 
cognitive task (N-Back) containing task-unrelated distractor stimuli (human faces). The results 
showed that task engagement and performance decreased with Time-on-Task. Like in their 
previous studies, they increased motivation by the same “remaining-time” incentive. 
Afterwards, task engagement and performance were restored and irrelevant stimuli were 
ignored. In the same vein, Herlambang et al. (2019) administered their participants with a 2.5 
hour working memory task containing 14 blocks that alternated between monetary reward and 
non-reward. The results showed that accuracy in the rewarding blocks remained constant while 
it declined in the non-rewarding blocks. Furthermore, the non-rewarding blocks were also 
associated with more distraction, less cognitive effort, more eye blinks, and fewer saccades.  
The global pattern of above results strongly suggests that, even after a long-lasting 
continuous performance, resources may not be completely depleted as it was proposed by the 
energy depletion hypothesis. Instead, these results are rather in agreement with the 
costs/rewards imbalance (Boksem & Tops, 2008; Tops et al., 2004) and opportunity cost 
theories (Kurzban, 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013). With increasing Time-on-Task, the rewards of 
the experimental task stay the same while the opportunity cost of not engaging in other possible 
activities increases (Kurzban et al., 2013). This results in an imbalance between the costs and 
rewards of the task and eventually leads to disengagement. However, certain types of 
incentives may reset motivation and restore performance to a certain extent. 
Probe Approach 
As previously mentioned, the probe approach has been originally used in the context 
of ego-depletion and then progressively extended to the cognitive fatigue domain. Studies 
resorting to this approach are interested in the question of “are fatigue effects specific and 
transferable only to the fatigued process or are they general and transferable to any cognitive 
function?” 
In this regard, van der Linden et al. (2003) found that, after having performed a 2-
hour cognitively demanding task (a scheduling task), participants displayed more preservation 
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on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) as well as prolonged planning time on the Tower 
of London (TOL), suggesting impaired executive functioning under cognitive fatigue.  
Another well-recognized and cited study in the field is that of Persson et al. (2007) 
who required their participants to perform a probe task (verb generation) with high (MANY) 
or low (FEW) interference
9
 before and after a working memory task (Sternberg task) with high 
(HIGH) and low (LOW) interference conditions. Regarding transfer effect, the process-
specific hypothesis assumes that performance changes between pre- and post-task will depend 
on the specific cognitive processes (i.e., a high level of interference) required by the loading 
and the probe tasks. For the probe task, interference resolution index (IR-scores) were 
computed in pre- and post-task by subtracting the RTs of FEW interference trials from that of 
the MANY interference trials. Afterwards, transfer effects were assessed by a 2 (HIGH, LOW) 
x 2 (Pre, Post) ANOVA on the IR-scores. The results showed that IR-scores increased after 
the loading task (Sternberg) in the HIGH interference group but not the LOW interference one 
(Figure 17 A). The authors concluded that high interference conditions of the working 
memory (Sternberg) and verb generation tasks were mediated by a common resource-limited 
cognitive mechanism. To ascertain the specificity of this transfer effect between the working 
memory task and the probe task, the same authors conducted a second experiment in which 
the probe task was identical (verb generation) but the loading task was replaced by the stop-
signal task which also comprised HIGH (i.e., high proportion of stop trials) and LOW (i.e., 
low proportion of stop trials) conditions. However, this task does not tax exactly the same 
cognitive process than the verb generation task. Indeed, the stop-signal is more related to 
response inhibition and has been associated with right, rather than left, inferior prefrontal 
function (Aron et al., 2003) while the verb generation task is more related to interference 
resolution per se. According to their hypothesis, the authors did not find evidence of transfer 
effect between these two tasks that tax different functional mechanisms and rely on different 
neuronal substrates (Figure 17 B). 
 
 
                                                          
9 For the verb generation task, participants had to generate silently a verb in response to a visually presented noun (see 
Persson et al., 2004).  In the MANY condition, participants were presented with nouns having several appropriate 
associated responses (e.g., BALL—THROW, KICK, BOUNCE) while in the FEW condition, participants were 
presented with nouns having one dominant response, or only a few associated responses (e.g., SCISSORS—CUT). 
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Figure 17. Persson et al. (2007)’s Data. Mean interference resolution scores as a function of group 
(High/Low interference), and time (Pre/Post loading task). A. Sternberg as loading task and verb generate 
as probe-transfer task; B. Experiment 2—Stop-signal as loading task and verb generate as probe-transfer 
task. Reprinted with permission from Persson et al. (2007). 
 
Besides Time-on-Task paradigms, some studies investigating brain activity have also 
used the probe method (Esposito et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2010; Nakagawa et al., 2013; Persson 
et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2014b). As previously mentioned, an ASL perfusion fMRI study 
showed that a prolonged PVT task was associated with a decrease in the right fronto-parietal 
attentional network during post-task rest and correlated with performance decline (Lim et al., 
2010). Otherwise, Persson et al. (2013) administered their participants with the same protocol 
as Persson et al. (2007) in order to investigate transfer effects between a loading task 
(Sternberg) with high and low interference condition and a probe task (verb generation) during 
fMRI acquisition. The results of this study showed that the high level interfering condition – 
as compared to the low interfering condition – triggered impaired performances but also a left-
to-right shift in activated cerebral regions. This pattern of activation resembles that of older 
people in situation of cerebral compensation: a reduction in regions normally recruited for the 
task in parallel with an increased activation in normally non-recruited regions for that task 
(Persson et al., 2004; Reuter-Lorenz, 2002). Therefore, the authors proposed the possibility 
that a classically observed pattern of activation in older people is also present in cognitively 
fatigued young people. In 2014, Esposito et al. required their participants to perform an 
intensive training of 4 hours (theoretical training and sustained practice with a flight simulator) 
followed and preceded by an N-Back task as well as resting-state fMRI. As compared to the 
control condition in which participants were free to choose their activities, the intensive 
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training increased resting-state activity in the early visual processing and to a lesser extent in 
the DMN networks while it decreased activity in the front-parietal executive network. The 
early visual network has been previously associated with EEG alpha rhythm (Mantini et al., 
2007), particularly in exhausted states (Boksem et al., 2006; Kamei et al., 1998; Schrauf et al., 
2011). Considering that alpha oscillations represent inhibition of cortical processing 
(Pfurtscheller et al., 1996; Worden et al., 2000), the increased resting-state activity in this 
network after a period of induced fatigue pointed towards increased inhibition of the neural 
activity in the early visual system implied by exhaustion. The authors proposed that cognitive 
fatigue does not necessarily alter resting-state activity in task-positive or task-negative 
networks because it would have implied an opposite pattern between early visual and DMN 
networks. Rather, they claimed that cognitive fatigue is more likely to affect resting-state 
activity of networks that are associated with sensory inhibition or excitation (as is the case for 
the visual network) as well as networks associated with intrinsic or extrinsic neural processes 
(as is the case for the DMN and the fronto-parietal networks). Nakagawa et al. (2013) used 
visual and auditory divided attention tasks with low and high attentional loads in fMRI. They 
found fatigue-induced deactivation from pre to post-session on task-related activity in the 
frontal, temporal, occipital, and parietal cortices, in the cerebellum and in the midbrain for 
both the low and the high conditions of their attentional task. Moreover, a significant 
interaction effect was found in the midbrain (i.e., more deactivation in the high-load 
condition). According to the authors, this larger deactivation in the midbrain may reflect the 
suppression of the negative feedback system that normally triggers recuperative rest in the face 
of overload to maintain homeostasis. The authors assume that suppressing this system can be 
seen as a compensatory effort against fatigue-induced performance deteriorations in many 
situations at the expense of comfort. Otherwise, this system has been postulated to be 
underlined by the striato-thalamo-cortical loop connecting the neostriatum with the prefrontal 
cortex (Boksem & Tops, 2008; Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000) and interacts with midbrain 
dopaminergic neurons to flexibly modulate resource allocation (Krebs et al., 2012). Failures 
in dopaminergic input to the striato-thalamo-cortical loop have been linked to failures to 
integrate motivational input and in turns, to cognitive fatigue (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000; 
Dobryakova et al., 2013; Lorist et al., 2009). 
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Workload 
Somehow related to the probe approach are studies investigating the influence of the 
workload level on cognitive fatigue (Borragán et al., 2017; Käthner et al., 2014; Nakagawa et 
al., 2013; Shigihara et al., 2013). In a very interesting study, Borragán et al. (2017) based their 
design on the Time-based Resource-sharing model (TBRS; Barrouillet et al., 2004) which 
proposes that the available time to process cognitive demands is responsible for inducing 
cognitive load. Therefore, they assumed that limiting the time available to process cognitive 
demands should increase cognitive load, eventually increasing cognitive fatigue. In this 
experiment, the authors administered their participants with the Time Load Dual Back (TLDB) 
which is a dual task combining the classic N-Back working memory updating task (Kirchner, 
1958) with an interfering task (odd/even decision task). In the TLDB, digits and letters are 
alternatively displayed and participants are instructed to either (a) indicate if the letter is the 
same as the previous letter (1-Back task), or (b) indicate whether the digit is odd or even. To 
manipulate the limited time to process information, the stimulus time duration (STD) can be 
adjusted to be long versus short, leading to the low versus high cognitive load conditions
10
. 
The results were in agreement with the hypothesis and showed that task performance was 
globally higher in the low load condition, as compared to the high load one. Moreover, there 
was also an interaction between Time-on-Task and cognitive load showing that performance 
decreased faster with Time-on-Task in the high load condition as compared to the low one. 
Therefore, shortening the available time to process information – i.e., increasing time pressure 
– increased cognitive load, which in turn triggered higher levels of cognitive fatigue. However, 
there was a dissociated effect of the cognitive load on subjective fatigue and sleepiness as 
assessed by VAS. While subjective fatigue increased more in the high load condition than in 
the low condition, the subjective sleepiness increased more in the low condition than in the 
high one. The authors proposed that the low condition was too easy to process, leading 
participants into a cognitive underload state and to a feeling of boredom accompanied by 
higher subjective sleepiness. This explanation supports the existence of different types of 
fatigue that is further assumed in the following experiment.  
In Chapter 1 I presented the overload versus underload theory (Hancock & 
Desmond, 2000; May & Baldwin, 2009). Accordingly, very high demanding but also very low 
                                                          
10 This STD is calculated on an individual basis in a pre-test session in order to create low and high condition that 
are adjusted to each participant. 
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demanding tasks are likely to trigger cognitive fatigue. A very well speaking study is the one 
of Shigihara et al. (2013) who aimed at investigating two types of cognitive fatigue by 
administering their participants with 0-Back and 2-Back tasks continuously for 30 minutes. 
Moreover, participants were also required to perform the Advanced Trail Making Test 
(ATMT; Kajimoto et al., 2007)
11 
during 30 minutes as well as to fill-in subjective scales just 
before and just after the N-Back session. Performance decrements on the ATMT, as indexed 
by increased error count after as compared to before the N-Back session, were found after both 
the 0-Back and the 2-Back. However, decreased performances (i.e., increase in mean RT) 
during the N-Back session were found in the 0-Back but not in the 2-Back condition. 
Moreover, the level of sleepiness was greater after having performed the 0-Back but not after 
the 2-Back. The authors explained this surprising result by the fact that there exist two types 
of cognitive fatigue respectively triggered by cognitive overload or cognitive underload. In 
this case, a possible explanation is that boredom triggered by the easiness of the low-
demanding 0-Back did not elicit enough interest and deployed effort, leading to task 
disengagement. As an alternative explanation, the authors also proposed that the cognitive 
underload triggered by the 0-Back activated the inhibition system, which in turn, altered task 
performance and enhanced subjective feeling of sleepiness.  
Contrary to the above mentioned studies, Borragán et al. (2016) used a probe 
approach in order to test positive rather than negative transfer effects. Indeed, their hypothesis 
was that diminished cognitive control, triggered by cognitive fatigue, will eventually facilitate 
procedural sequence learning. The authors administered their participants with high and low 
cognitive load conditions of the TLDB as the fatiguing loading task, followed by a visuo-motor 
procedural learning task:  the Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT). In agreement with their 
hypothesis, RTs in the SRTT were faster following the high load condition of the TLDB as 
compared to the low load condition. The authors proposed that the high load condition has 
triggered diminished cognitive control resources that normally oppose automatic procedural 
learning. 
 
                                                          
11 Contrary to the classical TMT, the ATMT is presented on a laptop display and participants use touch sensor screen 
instead of paper-pencil.  
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Subjective Cognitive Fatigue  
As mentioned earlier, it is informative to distinguish between objective cognitive 
fatigue (i.e., performance decrements) and subjective sensation of fatigue (Kluger et al., 2013). 
According to Hockey (2013), the subjective sensation of fatigue should even be considered the 
first marker of cognitive fatigue. Most of the above-mentioned studies have used subjective 
fatigue scales in their protocol and I will describe some of these results in the following lines. 
By performing a visual attention task for 3 hours, participants in Boksem et al.’s 
(2005) study reported evidence of increased aversion to continue task performance with the 
time spent on the task using VAS. Interestingly, this aversion to continue a task has been 
previously thought to be a very reliable marker of mental fatigue installation (Hockey, 1997; 
Holding, 1983; Meijman, 2000). Moreover, increase in alpha power in this study correlated 
with the increase in subjective fatigue. By contrast, Ishii et al. (2013) found that decreased in 
alpha power due to a long-lasting N-Back task was related to subjective fatigue level as 
assesses by VAS. Hopstaken et al. (2015a) found that after 2 hours performing an N-Back task, 
participants reported higher level of subjective fatigue: task engagement decreased with Time-
on-Task, as assessed by the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993). Kato et al. (2009) found an increase of 
subjective fatigue on the mental symptoms subscale of the Fatigue Scale (Chalder et al., 1993) 
after a 60-min performance on a Go/NoGo task. Likewise, Guo et al. (2016) found that after 
performing a 63-minute dual visual task, the mean in KSS (Akerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) 
increased from the first time interval (0-35min.) of task to the second interval (36-60min.). As 
previously presented, Borragán et al. (2016) administered their participants with the TLDB 
comprising a high and a low load conditions followed by the SRTT as the probe task. 
Interestingly, RTs in the SRTT were less impacted after the high load condition as compared 
to the low load condition, which the authors explained by a facilitation of sequential procedural 
learning under decreased cognitive control. However, scores on VAS for fatigue were found 
to be higher after the high load condition as compared to the low load condition, suggesting 
that performing the TLDB under high cognitive control triggered more cognitive fatigue than 
under lower cognitive control. Tanaka et al. (2014a) used MEG to investigate the neural 
activity associated with cognitive fatigue induced by a continuous attentional task during 10 
minutes. Their results showed that increased beta-frequency band power in the right middle 
frontal gyrus was negatively associated with subjective mental stress but positively associated 
with boredom and sleepiness, as assesses by VAS. In 2018, Guo et al. required their 
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participants to perform a simulated driving task (driving group) during 90 minutes or to watch 
videos (control group) and showed that only the driving group reported higher level of 
subjective fatigue after the experiment as assessed by the Profile of Mood States Short Form 
(POMS-SF; Chen et al., 2002). 
However, it is important to note that increases in subjective fatigue level are not 
always associated with declines in objective performance. As already presented, Tajima et al. 
(2010) found a positive association between activity in medial orbitofrontal cortex during a 
35-minute ATMT and subjective sensation of fatigue using VAS. However, while subjective 
level of fatigue increased during the time course of the fatiguing task, performance was not 
altered. In the same vein, Gergelyfi et al. (2015) found that after performing 120 minutes of 
Sudoku, people reported higher subjective fatigue on a modified version of the 
Multidimensional Fatigue Inventory (MFI; Gentile et al., 2003) and Intrinsic Motivation 
Inventory (IMI) but that people with large increases in subjective fatigue also tended to show 
better performance on a working memory task that followed each Sudoku block. Likewise, 
Esposito et al. (2014) investigated scores on the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993) and on an N-Back task 
after participants had performed an intensive training condition versus a leisure control 
condition. The results showed that the sustained performance in the training condition induced 
an increased self-reported level of exhaustion compared to the control condition. Moreover, 
they also found a significant increase of mental effort expenditure to maintain the same 
performances (i.e. same error rates) in the N-Back task after the training condition than after 
the control condition. This pattern of result – performance maintenance parallel with increased 
mental effort – is in agreement with Hockey’s framework. Finally, Herlambang et al. (2019) 
used an original paradigm in which they alternated between rewarding and non-rewarding 
blocks during a 2.5 hour working memory task. While subjective feeling of fatigue, as assessed 
by VAS continuously increased with Time-on-Task, the level of mental effort alternated 
between higher and lower deployed effort as a function of the reward and non-reward blocks. 
Moreover, even if participants experienced subjective fatigue, accuracy remained stable in the 
rewarding blocks and declined in the non-rewarding blocks.  
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Chapter 3: Models of Cognitive and Cerebral Aging  
Cognitive Modifications in Normal Aging  
It is now well-established that normal (or healthy) aging is associated with cognitive 
decline (Craik & Salthouse, 2000), particularly in tasks involving “fluid” mental operations 
such as executive functions (EFs) (De Beni & Borella, 2015; Podell et al., 2012; Salthouse et 
al., 2003; West, 2000). For example, aged people have been shown to experience difficulties 
in inhibition, shifting, problem resolution, as well as strategic planning (Crawford et al., 2000). 
Related to the EFs, working memory has also been related to fluid operations, suggesting its 
weakening with advancing age (Kirova et al., 2015; Solesio-Jofre et al., 2017; Van der Linden 
et al., 1994). By contrast, “crystallized” mental operations such as vocabulary or general 
knowledge decline in the very last stage of life or remain preserved forever (Jones & Conrad, 
1933; Kaufman et al., 1989).  
Moreover, although high level cognitive functioning globally decreases in efficiency 
with age, all functions are not impaired to the same extent, with some remaining well preserved  
(Borella et al., 2009; Collette & Salmon, 2014; Cona et al., 2013; Ludwig et al., 2011; 
Salthouse et al., 2003; Taconnat & Lemaire, 2014; Vallesi et al., 2010). For example, it has 
been showed that older people have difficulties maintaining and manipulating two mental 
plans in working memory but not alternating between these plans (Kray et al., 2004; 
Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Regarding the function of updating in working memory, aged 
people would encounter difficulties specifically suppressing irrelevant (i.e., not relevant 
anymore) information from working memory while their storage abilities are maintained (De 
Beni & Palladino, 2004). Likewise, in the inhibitory domain, voluntary/intentional abilities are 
known to show an age-related decrease while automatic inhibition remains efficient (Collette 
et al., 2009; Hogge et al., 2008). Besides the EFs, age-related cognitive modifications are 
observable in other domains: processing speed, mathematical reasoning, memory, language, 
visuo-spatial abilities (Harada et al., 2013; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Salthouse, 2009). 
 
Analytic versus General Approach of Decline 
All these abovementioned cognitive impairments can be seen according to two 
different theoretical approaches. The analytical approach claims that cognitive aging directly 
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impairs the cognitive components for which decreased performances are observed. For 
example, a more important interference effect in a Stroop task will be interpreted as a deficit 
in conflict monitoring or interference resolution in older people. By contrast, the global 
approach suggests that age-related cognitive differences are explained by general factors 
ranging from diminished working memory resources (Craik et al., 1990) to sensorial function 
integrity (Li & Lindenberger, 2002). Somewhat related to this global approach, some 
influential frameworks have also suggested that the age-related decline in most cognitive 
functions can be primarily explained by a limited number of “proxy” cognitive functions such 
as processing speed – the processing speed hypothesis (Salthouse, 1996) – or inhibitory 
impairment – the inhibitory hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  
 
Processing Speed and Inhibition Hypotheses 
Today, processing speed is well-recognized to decrease with age (Albinet et al., 2012; 
Cona et al., 2013; Manard et al., 2014; Salthouse, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2000; 
Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Salthouse et al., 2000). Slowdown in 
processing speed has been shown to explain age-related performances decreases in other 
functions such as inhibition (Verhaeghen & De Meersamn, 1998), episodic memory (Fastenau 
et al., 1996), or language (Waters & Caplan, 2001). Therefore, processing speed seems to be 
the most influent mediator between age and fluid cognition (De Ribaupierre & Lecerf, 2006; 
Salthouse & Meinz, 1995). 
Against the processing speed hypothesis, inhibitory abilities have also been suggested 
to explain some age-related effects in various cognitive tasks (e.g., Borella et al., 2007; Borella 
et al., 2006; Persad et al., 2002). According to Hasher and Zacks (1988), inhibition is one of 
the first cognitive processes to decline with age (see also Persad et al., 2002; Radvansky et al., 
2005) and would be a major source of working memory impairment in aging people. Inhibition 
would be useful, on the one hand, to filter information that can potentially reach working 
memory and, on the other hand, to limit competition between several responses during the 
process of the output. In agreement with this view, Miyake et al. (2000; see also Friedman et 
al., 2011; Friedman et al., 2008) proposed that all EFs involve an inhibitory capacity to 
suppress task-irrelevant distractors, which is considered to be a basic unit of working memory 
or executive functioning by certain authors (e.g., Dempster & Corkill, 1999; Zacks et al., 1996) 
but also as a “fundamental regulatory mechanisms” (Hasher et al., 2007) of cognition.  
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In agreement with these two hypotheses, my first study (Gilsoul et al., 2019; see 
Appendix 1) aimed at investigating to what extent decreased executive performance 
associated with normal aging could be influenced by a lower efficiency of some non-executive 
processes also prone to decline in normal aging. The two principal mediators we investigated 
were processing speed and attention (based on the model of van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994) 
with the hypothesis that a slowdown in processing speed and/or weaker attentional functions 
may ‒ at least partially  ‒  explain executive difficulties associated with normal aging. To this 
end, we administered 104 young and 71 older participants with a large battery of executive, 
attentional and processing speed tasks. Mediation analyses were performed to test whether 
processing speed and attention would mediate the effect of age on inhibition, shifting, 
updating, and dual-task coordination. Our results showed that attention variables had only 
slight age effects and almost no mediating effect. By contrast, processing speed was found to 
be an important mediator of age with significant partial mediation found for shifting, updating, 
and dual-task coordination. In a more exploratory way, based on Hasher and Zacks (1988)’s 
hypothesis, we also investigated if inhibition could be a potential mediator and found it to 
partially mediate the age effect on the other three executive functions.  
 
Frontal-Executive Aging Hypothesis  
According to the executive-frontal aging hypothesis, the aging process triggers 
cerebral neuroanatomical changes that are particularly marked in the frontal lobes, in parallel 
with PFC functioning decline (West, 2000). It is thus assumed that cognitive functions that are 
underpinned by the PFC would be the first to decline with age, as compared to cognitive 
functions relying on other cerebral regions (West, 1996). Following this view, the executive 
control would be one the first functions to be altered in normal aging (West, 1996, 2000). In 
agreement with this hypothesis, some studies have shown that aging is associated with frontal 
neuroanatomical modifications. For example, Lindberg (2012) found a reduction in volume of 
brain areas that are situated in the frontal lobes, this reduction being more important in 
prefrontal regions, such as the OFC, than in limbic regions such as the ACC or the 
hippocampus (Isingrini, 2004). Likewise, performance decreases in working memory have 
already been associated with reduction in right-lateralized cortical regions including medial 
orbitofrontal gyrus as well as inferior and superior frontal gyri (Nissim et al., 2017). Age-
related declines in EFs have also been shown to correlate with white matter reduction in certain 
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cerebral regions (O’Sullivan et al., 2001). While decreases in processing speed and working 
memory seem related to white matter reduction in anterior regions, decreases in inhibition and 
flexibility have been linked to reduction in posterior regions (Kennedy & Raz, 2009). 
However, if the executive-frontal aging hypothesis may explain some evidence found 
in studies (De Beni & Borella, 2015; Podell et al., 2012; Salthouse et al., 2003; West, 2000), 
it is not sufficient to support the whole set of cognitive deficits that are commonly attributed 
to the aging process. Indeed, some cognitive functions that are underpinned by other cerebral 
regions also decrease in efficiency with aging. For example, it has been shown that visuo-
spatial attention, principally relying on parietal cortex, undergoes efficacy decline with age 
(see Greenwood, 2000 for a review). Furthermore, it has progressively become apparent that 
the executive functioning could not be only attributed the frontal lobe. Cerebral imaging 
studies converge to the conclusion that the EFs imply frontal as well as parietal regions (see 
Collette & Van der Linden, 2002 for a review). For example, Manard et al. (2016) have shown 
that age-related executive performances were associated with grey matter volume decrease in 
anterior, posterior as well as subcortical regions. Therefore, it has become clear that other 
theoretical frameworks were necessary to take all age-related cerebral and cognitive 
modifications into account.  
Beyond the “local-regional” approach that focused on the frontal lobe, other authors 
have attempted to explain age-related cognitive functioning – decreases as well as maintenance 
– in terms of cerebral networks that expand beyond the frontal lobe. In this sense, the concept 
of reserve has become very interesting to account for age-related compensatory mechanisms. 
 
Cerebral Reserve, Cognitive Reserve, and Compensation Hypotheses 
According to Stern (2002), the concept of reserve is twofold, comprising passive 
models – brain reserve and threshold – as well as active models – cognitive reserve. Many 
authors have proposed passive models such as the brain reserve (Katzman, 1993), the neuronal 
reserve (Mortimer et al., 1981), or the threshold model (Satz, 1993). The latter one is well 
established and proposes that there exist individual differences in brain reserve capacity 
(BRC), namely brain size and synapse quantity. According to this model, there is a critical 
threshold of BRC below which clinical or functional manifestations emerge. Therefore, a 
particular brain lesion will not lead to the same clinical deficit in patients, depending on their 
respective BRC. In brief, passive models are essentially quantitative and assume fixed cut-off 
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of brain matter below which functional impairment will occur (Stern, 2002). However, these 
models are not able to explain individual differences in how the brain processes cognitive or 
functional tasks following brain damage. 
Besides passive models, Stern (2002) developed the concept of active models of 
reserve – cognitive reserve hypothesis – in which the brain is considered to actively attempt to 
compensate for brain damage or increasing cognitive demands. In that context, Stern (2002, 
2009) proposed that cognitive reserve can be divided into two components: the neural reserve 
and the neural compensation. 
First, the neural reserve refers to a more flexible and efficient utilization of brain 
networks or cognitive strategies that are less prone to disruption. The neural reserve component 
encompasses two possibilities: differences in recruitment of the same network and differences 
in the ability to recruit alternate networks. Regarding differences in recruitment of the same 
network, a well-recognized response to increasing task difficulty is increased activation of 
areas involved in an easier version of the task and/or the recruitment of additional brain areas 
or networks (Grady et al., 1996; Grasby et al., 1994; Gur et al., 1988; Rypma et al., 1999).  For 
a given difficulty, more skilled individuals typically show less task-related recruitment than 
less skilled individuals. It is also proposed that a person with more neural reserve will show 
increased and/or additional recruitment of brain areas and networks at a higher difficulty level 
of the task. Regarding differences in the ability to recruit alternate networks, Stern (2002) 
suggested that a person with more neural reserve may rely on a large array of networks to solve 
a problem. As an analogy, a mathematician might be able to solve a math problem in many 
different ways, while a less skilled individual might have only one possible solution. 
Second, the neural compensation refers to the utilization of alternative cerebral 
networks and strategies that are not normally used by healthy brains (or young brains), to 
compensate for brain damage (or normal aging) when habitually implicated cerebral areas are 
altered. What really distinguishes between neural reserve and neural compensation is the fact 
that a different network, not normally used for the task at hand, will be recruited by the more 
impaired group as compared to the unimpaired group in case of neural compensation.   
According to the cognitive reserve hypothesis, two patients having the same amount 
of BRC but different levels of cognitive reserve will not show the same functional impairment 
after a brain lesion. The patient with more cognitive reserve can tolerate a larger lesion before 
126 
 
undergoing some clinical deficits. In that context, the critical threshold at which functional 
manifestations arise varies from one individual to another, depending on their flexibility or 
efficiency in recruiting cerebral networks. The concept of cognitive reserve thus helps explain 
the finding of many studies that higher levels of intelligence, education, and occupational 
attainment are good predictors of better resistance to brain damage before experiencing clinical 
and functional deficits: these people process tasks in a more efficient manner. Regarding 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), Stern (2009) also proposed that people with high cognitive reserve 
can wait until a more advanced level of cerebral AD pathology before experimenting clinical 
deficits, as compared to people with lower cognitive reserve. However, once a certain 
threshold of cerebral lesions is reached, people with high cognitive reserve will experiment 
more abrupt clinical declines given the pathology will have spread to a larger extent.  
Besides patients with brain damage, cognitive reserve is also present in healthy people 
and underpins a more flexible and efficient utilization of brain networks or cognitive strategies 
in response to increased cognitive demands (neural reserve) or the recruitment of alternative 
networks to compensate for healthy age-related difficulties (neural compensation). The 
cognitive reserve hypothesis may thus help explain the intra and inter-individual heterogeneity 
that is commonly found in neuropsychological evaluation in older people (Calso, 2017). A 
classical hypothesis is that people with a higher level of cognitive reserve would better resist 
to age-related effects and would have better cognitive performances as compared to aged 
people with a lower level of cognitive reserve. For example, Roldán-Tapia et al. (2012) showed 
better performances on executive and intelligence subtests in aged people with a high cognitive 
reserve, as indexed by the educational level, the occupational attainment, and the vocabulary 
level. A main factor of cognitive reserve in older people is the educational level (see Bennett 
et al., 2003; Meguro et al., 2001; Springer et al., 2005) but it has also been suggested that 
different factors of cognitive reserve would differentially impact executive processes (Hultsch 
et al., 1999; James et al., 2011; Le Carret et al., 2003; Shimamura et al., 1995). 
 
Cerebral Compensation versus Dedifferentiation Hypotheses 
The idea of cognitive reserve (Stern, 2002, 2009) have echoed in other theoretical 
framework aimed at explaining age-related cognitive performance and activity. In this regard, 
three main ideas have motivated the neurocognitive aging research.  
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Firstly, age-related decreases in cerebral activation  – as compared to that of younger 
people – accompanied by poor performances have classically been attributed to under-
utilization of cognitive strategies but also, from a structural point a view, to cerebral atrophy 
(Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008). If those underactivations associated with poor performances 
seemed relatively trivial to interpret, determining whether age-related cerebral overactivations 
are beneficial, detrimental, or useless was much less straightforward and has been the focus of 
many research (Reuter-Lorenz & Lustig, 2005). Therefore, as a second idea, increases in 
cerebral activity in older people associated with weaker performances than that of young 
people have been interpreted as the result of inefficient utilization of cognitive strategies as 
well as resulting from a dedifferentiation process due to impaired specificity and selectivity of 
neuronal systems (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008). Thirdly, age-related increases in brain 
activation parallel to equivalent performance to that of young people have been considered as 
compensatory processes (Cabeza, 2002; Cabeza et al., 2002; Cabeza et al., 2004; Reuter-
Lorenz & Lustig, 2005). This compensation hypothesis of age-specific overactivations further 
predicts that, even if performance is similar between young and older groups, overactivation 
across individuals in the older group should be correlated with higher performance (Reuter-
Lorenz & Lustig, 2005). 
The idea of neural reserve (Stern, 2002, 2009) has been applied in the CRUNCH 
hypothesis (compensation-related utilization of neural circuits hypothesis; Reuter-Lorenz & 
Cappell, 2008). This model assumes that, in general, older people show a higher recruitment 
of neural resources at a lower level of task demand as compared to young people, which allows 
them to achieve a similar performance level to that of young people. These age-related 
overactivations are interpreted as a sign of compensation only if older people reach the same 
level of performance as young people but also if the activation pattern in the older group is 
positively correlated with cognitive performance. However, the model also assumes that, as 
demands increase, a resource ceiling is reached. Once this threshold is passed, the older brain 
is not able to compensate anymore and performance as well as cerebral activation become 
weaker than that of young people (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. Patterns of Activation and Performance Levels Predicted by the CRUNCH. The left 
graph shows increased recruitment of neural resources in response to increasing task demand, which is a 
‘‘normal’’ neural response that is also evident in younger individuals. Moreover, the left graph also shows 
how, relative to young people, older adults show overactivation at lower task demands while they show 
underactivation at higher level of task demand within the same region of interest. According to the 
CRUNCH, compensatory recruitment at low demand enables older people to maintain an equivalent 
performance level to that of young people. The right graph shows how, as task demands increase, older 
adults reach a resource ceiling, and performance level becomes weaker than that of young people. 
Adapted from Reuter-Lorenz and Cappell (2008).  
 
 
 
More closely related to the neural compensation of Stern (2002, 2009), the PASA 
pattern (Posterior-Anterior Shift in Aging) has consistently been reported in the literature 
bearing on visual stimuli in normal aging  (Davis et al., 2008; Dennis & Cabeza, 2008; Grady 
et al., 1994). This pattern suggests that older individuals would compensate sensory deficits – 
that are underpinned by posterior areas – by recruiting areas such as PFC normally dedicated 
to higher level cognitive processes. Therefore, healthy aging brain would be characterized by 
a decrease in occipito-temporal activation in parallel with increased activity in anterior regions. 
From a more temporal point of view, another well-recognized pattern is the ELSA (Early to 
Late Shift in Aging) which is characterized by an early reduction in brain activity followed by 
a later increase in brain activity (Dew et al., 2012). 
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According to the HAROLD model (Hemispheric Asymmetry Reduction in Older 
Adults; Cabeza, 2002), cerebral activity of older people tends to be less lateralized than that of 
young people during cognitive tasks. For example, during working memory tasks, PFC activity 
is normally left-lateralized for verbal stimuli and right-lateralized for spatial stimuli (Smith & 
Jonides, 1997). In elderly people, however, the PFC appears to be bilaterally activated for these 
two types of tasks (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 2000; see Figure 19 left side).  The same pattern of 
focal, left PFC activity in young adults and bilateral PFC activation in older adults were also 
shown in verbal long-term memory (Cabeza et al. 1997, Grady et al. 1999; see Figure 19 right 
side). Similarly, cerebral activity underpinning inhibition is rather lateralized in the right 
hemisphere, including a network of prefrontal and parietal areas, in the young population 
(Garavan et al., 1999). By contrast, older people show a bilateral activation of this fronto-
parietal network (Nielson et al., 2002). Briefly, it seems that the engagement in cognitive tasks 
lead older people to recruit a similar network to young people as well as supplementary 
contralateral areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Hemispheric Asymmetry Reduction in Older Adults. (Left side) Left lateralized frontal 
engagement in young adults during a verbal working memory task; in older adults, an additional right 
frontal engagement is observed (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 2000).  (Right side) Right lateralized engagement 
in young adults and low-performing older adults during a long-term memory task, and bilateral frontal 
engagement in high-performing older adults (Cabeza et al. 2002). Reprinted from Park and Reuter-
Lorenz (2009) 
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The question raised by this model is when can hemispheric asymmetry reduction be 
interpreted as a compensatory mechanisms versus as dedifferentiation? The compensatory 
view has been supported by studies showing that bilateral activity in older people helped 
counteract age-related cognitive deficits  (Cabeza et al., 1997) or was associated with enhanced 
cognitive performance (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 2000). The dedifferentiation hypothesis has been 
supported by increases in correlations among different cognitive measures but also between 
cognitive and sensory measures with advancing age (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997). However, 
the compensation and dedifferentiation views are not necessarily exclusive. For example, 
Cabeza (2002) proposed that dedifferentiation can play a compensatory role in the aging brain 
in the sense that older people’s cognitive performance seems to benefit from a decrease in 
differentiation.  
Cabeza (2002) further proposes two possible origins for these hemispheric 
asymmetry reductions: the psychogenic origin and the neurogenic origin. The first one 
assumes that cerebral activity changes – namely, a more bilateral activity – in older people, as 
compared to young people –, would be due to modifications inside the cognitive architecture. 
In other words, cerebral activity changes because older people resort to different cognitive 
strategies to perform a task.  The second one assumes that cerebral activity changes are due to 
modifications inside the neuronal architecture: there are that functional modifications in 
cerebral regions as well as in their connections.  
 
Some other theoretical frameworks have also postulated compensatory mechanisms 
in normal aging but went a step forward by proposing more complex models that integrated 
several ideas from PASA pattern, CRUNCH, and HAROLD hypotheses. 
 
A First Model of Age-Related Compensation 
Cabeza and Dennis (2013; see Figure 20) proposed a model of age-related 
compensation according to which older people would attempt to compensate for their cognitive 
deficits by recruiting reserve neuronal resources, which will eventually lead to successful 
compensation or unsuccessful compensation.  More precisely, this model consists of three 
hypothetical constructs (represented by rectangles) and four measurable variables (represented 
by ovals). The neural resources component refers to the total capacity of the brain for cognitive 
processing and can be assessed using neuroimaging measures (e.g., MRI, DTI, PET). The 
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neural supply component refers to the amount of neural resources being deployed for cognitive 
processing and can be assessed using functional measures such as fMRI, ERPs, and MEG. The 
construct cognitive processing refers to the cognitive operations and strategies being 
performed (attention, memory, etc.) and is represented by behavioral performance (accuracy, 
response times). Finally, the construct task demands refers to the quantity and quality of 
required cognitive processing. This model proposes that resource reduction, classically 
observed in normal aging, leads to a decrease in neural supply, which in turn leads to a decline 
in cognitive processing. Consequently, older adults have difficulties coping with task demands. 
When cognitive processing implemented by the individual does not meet task demands, there 
is a mismatch. To meet task demands, older adults attempt to compensate (which is referred 
as “attempted compensation”) by recruiting reserve neural resources, which increases the 
neural supply component. This increase in neural supply may take the form of increased 
activity in the same brain regions or in alternative brain regions and/or as increased 
connectivity. To echo the CRUNCH model, the authors also proposed that “attempted 
compensation” is a natural response of the brain that can be encountered in young people to 
increase their neural supply in response to enhanced task demands (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 
2008). This attempted compensation to solve the mismatch between cognitive processing and 
task demands may lead to enhanced cognitive processing ( “successful compensation” ) versus 
no change or even worse performance ( “unsuccessful compensation “). According to Cabeza 
and Dennis (2013), it is important to distinguish between attempted compensation and 
successful compensation because different predictions in functional activity can be stated.  
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Figure 20. A Model of Age-Related Compensation. The model consists in three hypothetical constructs 
(rectangles) and four measurable variables (ovals). A mismatch between available cognitive processing 
resources and task demands leads to the recruitment of reserve neural resources, which increases the 
neural supply. It is referred as “attempted compensation”. The increase in neural supply may enhance 
cognitive processing and performance (“successful compensation”) or not (“unsuccessful 
compensation”). Regarding the relationships between measurable variables, dashed arrows 1 and 3 are 
inverted-U functions (as neural resources or task demands increase, activity/connectivity first increases 
but eventually declines). Dashed arrow 2 refers to relationships between activities in different brain 
regions. Dashed arrow 4 is critical for distinguishing between successful compensation and unsuccessful 
compensation. Finally, dashed arrow 5 refers to the link between brain resources (e.g., PFC volume) and 
task performance (e.g., executive control). Adapted from Cabeza and Dennis (2013).  
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The Scaffolding Theory of Aging and Cognition  
Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009) proposed the Scaffolding Theory of Aging and 
Cognition (STAC, Figure 21) as a neurofunctional account detailing the effects of age on 
cognition. According to this model, older people are affected by varying degrees of neural 
challenges and functional deterioration. Neural challenges are age-related structural changes 
in the brain including cortical thinning and regional atrophy, loss of white matter integrity, and 
dopamine depletion. Functional deterioration refers to age-related brain activity such as 
dedifferentiation of ventral-visual and motor areas (Bernard & Seidler 2012; Park et al. 2004; 
Voss et al. 2008), decreased memory-related recruitment of medial temporal lobe regions 
(Cabeza et al. 2004; Gutchess et al. 2005) and increased activation of the default mode network 
(Park & Reuter-Lorenz 2009; Reuter-Lorenz & Park, 2010).The level of cognitive function of 
an individual depends on both the consequences of these above-mentioned negative features 
but also on a beneficial process, which is referred in the model as compensatory scaffolding. 
Compensatory scaffolding can be considered a form of “positive” plasticity that accompanies 
aging since it counteracts the adverse effects of neural and functional declines. Examples of 
compensatory scaffolding include greater activation or additional recruitment of prefrontal 
brain regions (Davis et al., 2008; Gutchess et al., 2005), as well as bilateral recruitment for 
tasks normally requiring left or right lateralized activations (Cabeza, 2002; Cappell et al., 2010; 
Reuter-Lorenz et al., 2000; for a review, see Cabeza & Dennis, 2013). The neurogenesis is 
also considered in the model as a potential source of positive plasticity that may contribute to 
compensatory scaffolding (Fuchs & Flügge, 2014; Lövdén et al., 2013). According to this 
model, scaffolding is seen as a mediator between neural challenge/functional deterioration and 
the level of cognitive performance. Finally, it is also possible to enhance neural scaffolding 
activity by some explicit interventions that include various lifestyle activities such as exercise, 
intellectual engagement, new learning, and cognitive training. 
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Figure 21. The Scaffolding Theory of Aging and Cognition (STAC). According to this model, older 
people are affected by varying degrees of neural challenges and functional deterioration. Neural 
challenges are age-related structural changes while functional deterioration refers to age-related brain 
activity such as dedifferentiation of ventral-visual and motor areas, decreased recruitment of medial 
temporal lobe regions, and increased activation of the default mode network. The level of cognitive 
function of an individual depends on both the consequence of these above-mentioned negative features 
but also on a beneficial compensatory scaffolding. This latter concept is a form of positive plasticity that 
counteracts the adverse effects of neural and functional decline. Examples of compensatory scaffolding 
include greater activation or additional recruitment of prefrontal brain regions as bilateral recruitment for 
tasks that are normally left or right lateralized. Finally, scaffolding activity can also be enhanced by 
activities including exercise, intellectual engagement, new learning, as well as cognitive training 
interventions. Adapted from Park and Reuter-Lorenz (2009). 
 
 
A feature of this first version of the STAC model (Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009) is 
that it accounted for individual differences in cognitive functioning at one specific time point: 
the late adulthood. Interestingly, the same authors proposed a new version of the STAC 
(STAC-r; Reuter-Lorenz & Park, 2014) that integrates new developments in the field such as 
longitudinal influences on neural structure and function, genetic, health, as well as life-style 
variables that potentially influence cognition. Thus, the main feature of the revised model is 
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the assumption that not only aging but also life-course experience variables impact the 
structure and function of the brain, which affect the development of compensatory scaffolding. 
As compared to the first version, the STAC-r (Figure 22) incorporates two outcome 
variables: Rate of Cognitive Change and Level of Cognitive Function. The rate of cognitive 
change represents the importance of cognitive decline over time, which in turn influences the 
level of cognitive function. STAC-r also includes two new constructs that represent the 
combined contributions of life experiences, genetics, and environmental influences, operating 
to either enhance or deplete brain resources.  
The first construct ‒ called Neural Resource Enrichment ‒ includes variables that 
enhance brain structure or function such as intellectual and social activities, the educational 
level (Amieva et al., 2014), physical fitness (Head et al., 2012),  multilinguism (Alladi et al., 
2013), or enriched leisure activities (Landau et al., 2012). Neural enrichment could directly 
enhance or preserve brain structure and function by promoting efficient connectivity, 
increasing cortical thickness, or increasing synaptic density. Moreover, neural enrichment has 
also another pathway allowing increasing the capacity for compensatory scaffolding, 
providing additional protection against age-related neural deficits. Therefore, highly educated 
older adults with normal cognitive function are expected to support greater neural degradation 
than less educated older people (Stern, 2002, 2012). 
The second construct ‒ Neural Resource Depletion ‒ represents negative influences 
on brain structure, neural function and ultimately cognition. These factors comprise variables 
such as the APOE-4 gene (Slooter et al., 1998), amyloid and tau deposits (Mielke et al., 2014), 
vascular risk factors (de Frias et al., 2014), or stress (McEwen, 2007). 
In sum, the authors assume there are many beneficial and detrimental factors 
influencing the brain, some of them are predetermined by genetics whereas others are acquired 
(exercise, nutrition, intellectual engagement, etc.).  
In the original STAC model, brain structure and function were represented by neural 
challenge and functional deterioration, both of which were affected only by age-related 
detrimental influences. By contrast, STAC-r assumes a life-course perspective and proposes 
the possibility that brain structure and function change bi-directionally, reflecting both positive 
and negative effects of life-course experiences.  
The component called “Scaffolding Enhancement” of the first version is referred as 
“Intervention” in the STAC-r. This component represents the incorporation of the potential 
benefits of formal interventions, enhancing compensatory scaffolding and, in turn, cognitive 
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function. STAC-r also incorporates the possibility that these interventions have a direct 
influence on brain structure and function. Training could cause changes in neural structure 
through volumetric increases and network connectivity, or by affecting compensatory 
mechanisms. For example, some studies have found that post-training improvements in older 
adults are associated with reduced activity in regions that were overactive in pre-training, 
suggesting that training can also improve the efficiency of neural function (Heinzel et al., 2014; 
Meinzer et al., 2013).To engage in complex learning tasks or in enriched activities favors self-
initiated processing, which can stimulate plasticity and create neural scaffolds (Lövdén et al., 
2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. A Conceptual Model of the Scaffolding Theory of Aging and Cognition-revised 
(STAC-r). Adapted from Reuter-Lorenz and Park (2014). Details are in the text. 
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Brain Resources, Genetics, and Dopamine 
Other interesting theories about cognitive aging emphasize brain resource depletion 
that can manifest by neuronal death, synaptic loss, but also degradation of the dopaminergic 
system. These neuronal declines inherent to the process of aging have also been postulated to 
differ as a function of the genetic background of the individual. I will start by presenting a 
model focusing on age-related magnification of genetic effects on cognitive performance. 
Thereafter, I will come back on the inverted U-shaped curve linking DA levels to cognitive 
performance that was presented in the first part of the introduction (Chapter 1) but, in this 
case, the authors propose to add a genetic influence on the link between DA signaling and 
performance in normal aging.  
 
The Resource Modulation Hypothesis 
Several authors (for example, Lindenberger et al., 2008; Nagel et al., 2008) have 
postulated that genetic background effects on cognition should be magnified as soon as 
individuals undergo decreases in their brain resources. These latter comprise neurochemical 
(e.g., dopaminergic decline), structural (e.g., neuronal loss), as well as functional (e.g., 
inefficient use of cerebral network) resources. The resource modulation hypothesis claims that 
decreases in brain resources triggered by normal aging increases the effect of common genetic 
variations on cognitive performance (Lindenberger et al., 2008). Consequently, genetic 
polymorphisms should exert more important effects on cognitive functions in aging, as 
compared to young adulthood. In Figure 23, there is a nonlinear relationship linking brain 
resources and cognitive performances. This means that people possessing optimal brain 
resources will be characterized by high level performances and that inter-individual 
differences relying on genetic background will be weak. By contrast, genetic effects are more 
prone to trigger marked performance difference between individuals when brain resources 
move away from the optimal level, as it is the case in normal aging. 
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Figure 23. The Resource Modulation Hypothesis. This model posits that losses in chemical and 
structural brain resources associated with normal aging modulate the effects of common genetic variation 
on cognitive performance. The colored circles represent three different individuals possessing different 
genetic backgrounds (different combinations of genetic polymorphisms), from very beneficial 
background (blue individual) to less beneficial background (green individual) for cognitive task 
performance. For individuals with optimal brain resources – young people –, cognitive performances are 
high and relatively homogenous between the different individuals. By contrast, individuals moving from 
the top of the curve – older people –, are characterized by more varying cognitive performance between 
individuals as a function of their respective genetic background. Finally, individuals with important 
depletions in brain resources – such as in dementia – are all very low performing and homogenous. 
Adapted from Lindenberger et al. (2008).  
 
 
In addition to brain atrophy, neuronal death, or white matter deficits, the aged brain 
is also characterized by deficits in dopaminergic transmission in the PFC (Li, 2012, 2013; Li 
et al., 2001). These deficits include reductions in DA concentration, D1 and D2 receptor 
density, as well as DA transporter availability (Bäckman et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009) which 
mediate age-related cognitive deficits such as difficulties in working memory tasks (Braver & 
Barch, 2002). In agreement with this view, correlations between the DA system and cognitive 
performance have been shown for a variety of tasks in healthy aging (Bäckman et al., 2000; 
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Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; Volkow et al., 1998). In addition to DA disruption in the PFC, 
declines in striatal DA availability and transmission may also have an impact on frontal 
processes, given striatal projections towards PFC (Cummings, 1993; Eslinger & Grattan, 
1993). 
Similarly, Li (2012) suggested that different life stages are associated with different 
DA levels and thus, with different performance levels during cognitive tasks. While the most 
favorable period would range between 18 and 30 years, childhood and normal aging are 
characterized by lower DA levels. This author also proposed that life span affects 
neuromodulation, such a DA transmission, which may in turn influence genotype effects on 
cognition. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the relation between DA levels and 
cognitive performance has been suggested to follow an inverted U-shaped curve (Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011). Interestingly, Li (2012) further proposes that this nonlinear function also 
predicts that genetic effects on cognitive performance would be more important when DA 
signaling moves away from the optimal level. Non optimal levels are found in childhood, 
normal aging, following DA antagonist intake, but also in conditions of stress and stimulant 
consumption (see Figure 24; Li et al., 2010; Lindenberger et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Age and Genetic Effects on the Inverted U-Shaped Curve Linking Dopamine and 
Performance. This relationship between DA signaling and performance implies that the effects of 
dopamine-relevant genes may be more evident in life periods or conditions in which DA signaling is 
insufficient or excessive. Colored circles represent two different individuals possessing different genetic 
background, from very beneficial allelic variants (blue individual) to non-beneficial variants (purple 
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individual) for DA signaling. Genetic-related effects on cognitive performance are amplified when 
individuals move away from the optimal DA signaling level. Adapted from Li (2012).  
This model was supported by a study in which the authors administered young and 
older people with a spatial working memory task (Nagel et al., 2008). The results showed that 
older individuals with DA-beneficial gene alleles were more efficient in accuracy and response 
times than older participants with less DA-beneficial allelic variant. It was concluded that 
genetic effects on cognition were amplified in aging because allele-related differences were 
only observable in the older group but not in the young one. According to Nagel et al. (2008), 
normal aging that is associated with DA decline would trigger a shift towards the left side of 
the inverted U-shaped curve linking DA signaling and cognitive performance. Moreover, 
individual with less favorable allelic variants for DA system would be characterized by a more 
important left-sided slide. 
These evidence of DA disruption in normal aging is really relevant for this work given 
the well-recognized implication of the DA system in cognitive fatigue.  
Selective Engagement of Cognitive Resources 
 
Hess (2014) proposed a theoretical account characterizing the relationship among 
aging-related variations in cognitive resources, motivation, and engagement in cognitively 
demanding activities. According to his framework, normal aging is associated with an increase 
in the costs of cognitive activity (Hess & Ennis, 2012). These costs, in turn, are assumed to 
influence the motivation to engage in cognitively demanding activities. As a consequence, age-
related decreases in cognitive resources will influence the selection of processes in which older 
people will engage. Hess proposed that this motivated selection process is an adaptive function 
linked to changes in developmental goals associated with specific periods of life. In agreement 
with this view, the socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999) suggests that an 
increased perception of limited future time in older age results in a focus on emotional 
wellbeing, meaning that older people are more prone to choose stimuli promoting positive 
affect (e.g., social partners or activities). Older people seem thus to adjust goal priorities with 
changing life circumstances, selectively engaging in activities promoting resource 
conservation and maximizing performance in valued activities. 
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Therefore, according to this framework, the concept of self-relevance (e.g., perceived 
benefits, concerns, and meaningfulness) has an important influence on cognitive engagement 
in later life. The author hypothesized that self-related interest of a given task will play a role 
in determining engagement, and this to a larger extent in older adults than in young or middle-
age people. A very nice example comes from an experiment in which older people classically 
show impairment in reading speed in the presence of distracting text due to a decline in 
inhibitory function (e.g., Carlson et al., 1995).  However, when the passage to be read is 
rendered relevant to the age group, older adults’ reading speed and memory improve (Germain 
& Hess, 2007). In other words, the inhibitory function of older people is more efficient when 
personal relevance of the task is increased, this effect being weaker in the young group. 
According to Hess (2014), the motivation to engage in activities is determined, in 
part, by perceptions of the benefits of engagement relative to the costs, referred as benefit–cost 
ratios (BCRs). In this framework, costs represent effort expenditure or investment of mental 
energy. The individual will not engage in an activity if BCRs fall below his threshold of 
engagement or if the costs no longer justify expenditure of resources. At any given level of 
perceived benefit, greater costs will result in lower BCRs. Hence, tasks with low-to-medium 
perceived benefits have little chance to exceed the threshold of engagement for older adults 
(Figure 25). In other words, for reaching a given threshold of engagement (or level of BCR), 
older people need much more perceived task benefits than young people. Moreover, 
adjustments in the threshold of engagement may also occur, with older people exhibiting 
increases in the criterion (i.e., minimum BCR) as compared to young people. This threshold 
adjustment would be modulated by intrinsic motivation to engage in cognitively demanding 
activities as a function of its self-relevance for the individual.  
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Figure 25. Selective Engagement of Cognitive Resources. This graph represents benefit–cost ratios 
(BCRs) associated with a task that varies in level of costs (Low, Medium, High) and as a function of the 
age group. Costs for a same task are assumed to be lower for young than for older people. Resource 
engagement is more likely for tasks associated with BCRs above the engagement threshold. Two 
hypothetical engagement thresholds are also represented (High, Low), the High threshold being 
associated with aging. Increased costs and engagement thresholds (or BCR) in later life result in a 
reduction of tasks falling above the threshold for engagement as well as increasing levels of 
discrimination between tasks with high versus low-to-medium benefits. Reprinted with permission from 
Hess (2014). 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Studies in Older and Middle-aged 
People 
Empirical Studies in Older People 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is now well established that normal aging 
triggers diminished cognitive functioning efficiency (Collette & Salmon, 2014; Crawford et 
al., 2000; Salthouse et al., 2003; West, 1996; West, 2000). Fatigability in older people has been 
shown to disrupt the regulation of the inflammatory response following an acute cognitive 
stress (Lin et al., 2014) and has been linked to conditions like depression (Hayslip et al., 1990) 
but also to negative health consequences as the individual ages (Avlund et al., 2007). However, 
very few studies have investigated the process of cognitive fatigue in older ages.  
Precursor studies of cognitive fatigue having explored age-related differences are 
probably those investigating continuous vigilance tasks, such as the well-recognized 
Mackworth Clock-Test (Mackworth, 1948). As described in Chapter 1, this test consists very 
simply in a pointer traveling the face of a clock at regular steps and including infrequent double 
steps. The task of the participant is to press a key as accurately and quickly as possible when 
he detects these unexpected double steps. As a measure of the time spent on the task, attention 
is expected to decrease. Using this task in a longitudinal and multicohort study, Giambra and 
Quilter (1998) found that age did not affect the number of hits but that mean RTs increased 
from middle age (40-49 years) to older age (60-74 years). In a substudy from the previous one, 
the same team (Giambra et al., 1988) also assessed the strategy used during the task (ranging 
from “active/conscious involvement in the task” to “passive involvement in the task”) but did 
not find any difference in strategy between age groups.  
The following lines describe the most influential studies in the field which are “truly 
assessing” cognitive fatigue in older ages. Similar to the young population, studies presented 
here also rely on either the continuous approach or the probe approach. Sometimes, authors 
also resort to a combination of these two paradigms, allowing to test both Time-on-Task effects 
on the loading task as well as the impact of this long-lasting test on probed measurements. 
Among the existing studies in older people, Holtzer et al. (2011) administered a 
variant version of the Attention Networks Test (ANT) to older adults during about 35 minutes 
and showed that cognitive fatigue impacted the executive attention component while the 
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alerting and the orienting attentional processes were not impaired at all. According to the 
authors, this finding provides support to theoretical models that consider the frontal basal 
ganglia pathway as a core substrate of cognitive fatigue (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000, 2004). 
This finding in older people is also in agreement with findings in young people according to 
which top-down control is more likely to be affected by cognitive fatigue while stimulus-
driven bottom-up attention would remain unaltered (Boksem et al., 2005).  
In 2002, Falkenstein et al. administered young and older people with a 4-hour battery 
comprising the Go/NoGo paradigm that was presented in the first and in the last time block. 
The results did not show any Time-on-Task effect on task performance, neither in the young 
nor in the older group. However, the older group showed a reduced latency of the P3 
component linked to the Go trials, which was assumed to represent compensatory processes. 
By contrast, Wascher and Getzmann (2014) required their participant to perform an inhibition 
of return task and found higher Time-on-Task effect in the older as compared to the young 
group. This effect was attested by an increase in time needed to inhibit irrelevant information 
with time on task, specifically in older people.  
According to Wascher et al. (2016), it is worth mentioning that most working 
activities that require physical and cognitive effort also contain periods in which monotonous 
cognitive tasks have to be performed. Such periods can be related to the passive task-related 
fatigue previously presented (May & Baldwin, 2009). Therefore, the authors claimed that age-
related effects on passive fatigue should be of central interest because age affects frontal 
structures that are implicated in motivation to sustain performance in non-demanding 
situations (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Wascher et al. (2016) thus created tasks reflecting 
real workflow while remaining experimentally controlled.  Participants had to perform three 
tasks: a monotonous stimulus-response task (the Simon task), a self-paced cognitive task (the 
d2-task), and a physical task (moving and sorting boxes of different weights and sizes) in a 
repetitive sequence for about 4–5 hours. This paradigm was coupled with a mobile EEG 
continuously recording while participants were freely moving and dealing with the tasks. The 
results showed that subjective fatigue remained rather stable in younger adults during the entire 
shift but increased for older adults. However, this subjective fatigue was highly related to the 
task performed. After the monotonous task, fatigue ratings were substantially increased 
compared to the physical task and this pattern of results was more pronounced in the young 
group. Moreover, subjective feelings of demotivation by the monotonous task were observed 
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in the young but not in the older group. This enhanced impact of monotony in young people 
was also mirrored in behavioral and neurophysiological data. At the end of the shift, accuracy 
on the monotonous task was lower in young than in older participants. Regarding the EEG 
recording, young people showed increased alpha activity in this monotonous task, suggesting 
that younger adults might have switched to a state of attentional withdrawal. By contrast, older 
people seemed to deal better with monotony and cognitive fatigue markers in this group were 
more widespread across tasks. In particular, early synchronizations in the EEG might indicate 
that older adults were far more driven by external signals. Globally, while young people 
seemed more affected by monotony or passive task-related fatigue with Time-on-Task, older 
people rather showed decline executive control and processed information in a stimulus-driven 
manner. 
Similarly, Arnau et al. (2017) administered young and older people a cognitive task 
(Simon task) during 3 hours including breaks of various durations. Performance declined and 
spectral power in the theta, alpha, and beta range increased as a function of the time spent on 
the task but there was no significant difference between the two groups. However, EEG 
recording showed that frontal theta power became larger with Time-on-Task for older 
compared to young people, which was interpreted as compensatory processes. In young 
people, there was a saturation in occipital alpha suggesting impaired performance due to the 
monotony of the task. According to the authors, the absence of behavioral difference between 
young and older people could be explained by the triggering of two different types of cognitive 
fatigue in the two groups (May & Baldwin, 2009). Indeed, older participants might suffer more 
severely from a depletion of cognitive resources due to task demands with increasing Time-
on-Task compared to younger participants, which led them to resort to compensatory 
mechanisms to maintain performance. By contrast, young people experienced cognitive 
underload due to the monotony of the task. Therefore, compensation and higher motivation in 
older people versus lower motivation in young people may explain the lack of behavioral 
differences between the two groups.  
Very interestingly, Terentjeviene et al. (2018) made young and older men perform a 
2-hour Go/NoGo task that was preceded and followed by a large set of measures: 
anthropometric measurement, cortex excitability (TMS), hand-grip strength, prefrontal cortex 
activity (fNIRS during 5-minute rest and a switching task), cognitive functions, and self-
assessment questionnaires (comprising emotion, mood, and perceived workload). The results 
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evidenced more signs of cognitive fatigue in young as compared to older men. For example, 
RT length but also intraindividual variability (as measured by the CVRT) of the “Incorrect 
NoGo” increased with the time spent of the task only in the young group. Also, handgrip 
strength decreased more in young than in older men after the 2-hour Go/NoGo task. Moreover, 
even if both groups felt increased subjective fatigue after this long-lasting task, young people 
experienced more fatigue and effort but also drops of energy and intrinsic motivation as 
compared to older people. The authors thus concluded that psychological strain during the 2-
hour Go/No task was higher for young people than for the elderly, which is consistent with the 
results of  Wascher et al. (2016) as well as Arnau et al. (2017) showing that young people 
experienced more fatigue from a monotonous cognitive task than older people.  
Using a 160-minute cued Stroop task in a sample of older people, Burke et al. (2018) 
showed preserved accuracy but increased RTs, subjective fatigue, as well as pupil diameter 
with Time-on-Task. The maintenance of accuracy throughout the task was explained by a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff since older people are known to favor accuracy at the expense of speed 
(Salthouse, 1979).  
In 2019, Samuel et al. decided to extend to an older population their Stroop-EEG 
protocol of 2016 that focused only on young people (see Wang et al., 2016 in Chapter 2). 
Thus, they administered a group of 14 young people and a group of 16 older people the same 
cued Stroop task continuously for about 2 hours
12
 in parallel with high-density EEG. Regarding 
the young group, the authors were particularly interested in determining to what extent neural 
compensatory mechanisms classically found in older people can be generalized to neural 
responses of cognitively fatigued young people. Regarding older adults, compensatory 
mechanisms are engaged at baseline to counteract the deleterious effects of cognitive decline 
(Davis et al., 2008; Dew et al., 2012). However, if baseline performance is globally lower in 
older compared to young people, behavioral decreases with long-lasting tasks are not always 
observable in older people as compared to young people (Arnau et al., 2017; Falkenstein et al., 
2002; Philip et al., 1999; Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016). Therefore, the 
question was: how does the brain respond to cognitive fatigue in older people and is neural 
                                                          
12 As the authors themselves recognized, there was a noticeable limitation in their study. Indeed, the cued Stroop task 
was initially designed to be administered during 3 hours. However, due to technical issues or abandons, they finally 
administered the task during 160 minutes in the young group but only during 100 minutes in the older group. 
Therefore, Time-on-Task effects in the two age groups are not really comparable.  
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compensation the key to explaining the absence of performance deterioration in this group?” 
As in Wang et al. (2016), two times of interest (TOI) were analyzed: 1) an early period (150–
300 ms), in which sensory and early attentional processes are active (Atkinson et al., 2003; 
Weinstein, 1995); and 2) a late period (300–1000 ms) in which higher-order attention and 
conflict-related processing are active (Perlstein et al., 2006; West, 2003). The results in the 
young group showed that behavioral performance declined with Time-on-Task. Regarding the 
early component, ERP amplitude decreased in both occipital-temporal and central-frontal 
regions as a function of the time spent on the task, suggesting progressive impairments of early 
sensory and attentional discrimination processes. Similarly, ERP in occipital-temporal region 
during the late period decreased with Time-on-Task. By contrast, ERP in central-frontal 
regions during the late period increased with time-on-task. Interestingly, the rate of the early 
ERP amplitude decrease in occipital-temporal region (i.e. posterior decrease) and the rate of 
the late ERP amplitude increase in central-frontal regions (i.e. anterior increase) were 
correlated. This posterior decline followed by anterior increase is similar to the PASA 
compensation pattern observed in prior cognitive aging research (Davis et al., 2008), 
suggesting that sensory decline can be triggered by cognitive fatigue, and that the frontal 
compensatory activity can be recruited. Moreover, these rates of ERP changes predicted the 
rate of change in behavioral performance (CVRT): declining ERPs (impairment) were 
associated with impaired performances while increasing ERPs (compensation) were associated 
with the maintenance of task performance. In addition to the PASA pattern, the authors also 
concluded that young people exhibited the early to late shift activation (ELSA) pattern within 
the central-frontal region: decline in early neural processing was compensated by increase in 
late neural processing. Regarding the older group, however, there was no evidence of 
behavioral impairment (change in RT, error rate, or CVRT increase) with Time-on-Task. This 
result is in agreement with prior studies showing that older adults are able to maintain 
performance under cognitive fatigue (Arnau et al., 2017; Falkenstein et al., 2002; 
Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016). Neurophysiologically, early ERP amplitudes 
decreased with Time-on-Task, suggesting progressively impaired sensory and early attention-
related processing. However, late ERP amplitudes did not change with Time-on-Task, 
suggesting the absence of compensatory neural activity in the older cohort. Whether this 
absence of compensatory activity is due to capacity limitations or the lack of necessity to 
compensate is difficult to ascertain in the current paradigm. Globally, these results suggest that 
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young and older adults coped with cognitive fatigue differently by exhibiting differential 
responses as a function of Time-on-Task at both the behavioral level and the neural level. 
In 2019, Ren et al. moderated the conclusions about the absence of compensatory 
mechanisms in older people under cognitive fatigue found by the previous study (Samuel et 
al., 2019). The authors conducted an experiment in which they administered 46 older adults 
with a letter-location task (dual 1-Back) and the Color-word of the Stroop task during fMRI 
scanning. An 18-item VAS with items related to mood and energy (e.g. tired, keeping your 
eyes open is difficult, lively, efficient) was used to assess subjective fatigue before and after 
MRI acquisitions. The authors decided to divide the total sample into two groups – a low-CF 
versus a high-CF – based on participants’ score changes in perceived cognitive fatigue (CF) 
before and after the MRI scan. The total duration of the fatiguing tasks (30 minutes) were 
divided into six time blocks of 5 minutes and CVRT was calculated within each time block. 
Performance changes with Time-on-Task were calculated as the difference between Block 6 
and Block 1 with lower scores indicating better cognitive performance. Regarding fMRI 
connectivity measures, the Posterior-Anterior Shift (PAS) score was calculated as Block 6 
(Anterior – Posterior) – Block 1 (Anterior – Posterior), allowing to estimate the amount of 
shift from posterior to anterior regions with Time-on-Task. The results showed that task 
performance (CVRT) became impaired with Time-on-Task (Block 6 versus Block 1) in the 
high-CF group as compared to the low-CF group. The interaction between time blocks and 
groups revealed that decreased connectivity of the cortical‐striatal network with Time-on-Task 
was related to higher perceived cognitive fatigue. Moreover, increased posterior-anterior shift 
(or increased reliance on the anterior part of the cortico-striatal network) was related to better 
cognitive performance in older people belonging to the low-CF group, while it was related to 
worse cognitive performance in the high-CF group. These results thus suggest that the 
compensatory PASA pattern in older people performing a long-lasting task may only be 
applicable to older adults without vulnerability to CF. 
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Empirical Studies in Middle-aged People 
Mild cognitive changes can also be observed in middle-aged people (Bielak et al., 
2013; Cansino et al., 2015; He et al., 2013; Park et al., 2013; Strozyk & Jentzsch, 2012; 
Wolkorte et al., 2014) but to a much lesser extent than in older people. Moreover, this 40- to 
60-year-old population is fully immersed in active life and has to deal with cognitive 
challenges every day. Consequently, given their relatively well preserved cognitive resources 
and their engagement in social and professional life, this population could be expected to resist 
cognitive fatigue better than older people and in a way similar to young people. However, it 
would also make sense to predict the opposite. That is, because middle-aged have to deal with 
many responsibilities and numerous stressors (child caring, job, etc.) every day, they would be 
potentially at risk to undergo deleterious cognitive fatigue effects. However, up to now, very 
few studies investigating cognitive fatigue in middle-aged are available in the literature.  
Among the few existing studies, de Jong et al. (2018) required young and middle-
aged participants to perform a typewriting task and a mouse targeting task during 120 minutes, 
in combination with EEG recording. The results showed that the average typing speed was 
lower in middle-aged people than young people but decreased with Time-on-Task in both 
groups. Moreover, typing speed of the last word of the sentence to be typed did not change 
with Time-on-Task in young people while it decreased in middle-aged people. Otherwise, 
young people had diminished typing accuracy (i.e., increase in typing errors) and used the 
backspace key more often with Time-on-Task as compared to middle-aged people. In this latter 
group, the percentage of error-corrections was positively associated with the time to complete 
a sentence, indicating that correcting errors takes time in middle-aged people, while this 
relation was absent in the young group. Also, error-corrections speed was slower than correct 
typewriting speed in the young group while it was the opposite in the middle-aged group. 
Moreover, the P3 amplitude decreased with Time-on-Task, parallel with the increased typing 
time and errors in the young group, suggesting that task disengagement in this group was 
linked to diminished typewriting efficiency. In the middle-aged group, there was an opposite 
trend: an increase in the amplitude of the P3 was associated with an increase in general inter-
key interval. From these findings, the authors concluded that cognitive fatigue was more likely 
to impair the quality of processing in young people while it was more likely to impair 
processing speed in middle-aged people, suggesting that young people rather favored speed 
performance while middle-aged people rather acted in an error-aversive manner.  
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In 2014, Klaassen et al. had a group of 13 young and a group of 16 middle-aged male 
schoolteachers perform two sessions of a parametric version of the working memory Sternberg 
task using fMRI: one directly after a control condition (i.e., watching documentary videos or 
reading magazines) and one directly after a fatiguing condition (i.e., a battery of executive 
tasks) during 1.5 hour each. Brain activity associated with the Sternberg task was grouped into 
low load (3 + 4 letter string) and high load (5 + 6 letter string). Subjective rating scales – the 
short version of the Profile of Mood States (Wald & Mellenbergh, 1990) as well as the NASA 
Task Load Index (Hart & Staveland, 1988) targeting fatigue and effort – were completed upon 
arrival (time 0), between the control or fatigue condition and the fMRI session (time 1), and 
after the scanning session (time 2). The results showed that there were more errors during six 
letter trials than during five letter trials and RT increased significantly between four and five 
letter trials. Regarding age group effects, there was no group differences on the number of 
errors, but RT were globally slower in middle-aged than in young participants. Regarding the 
condition effect, the fatiguing condition triggered more errors than the control condition but 
there was no difference between the two conditions on RT. Also, perceived fatigue and effort 
ratings were higher in the fatigue than the control condition at time 1 and time 2. Regarding 
brain activation, there were two main findings. Firstly, middle-aged people showed greater 
activation during the Sternberg encoding phase in the fronto-parietal network ‒ the left DLPFC 
and left superior parietal cortex ‒ than young people, this result being independent from the 
cognitive load (low versus high) or the condition (control versus fatiguing). According to the 
CRUNCH model (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008), age-related over-activations, particularly 
in PFC regions, have typically been interpreted as functional compensation in response to 
cognitive decline, when it allows equivalent performance between age groups. As it was the 
case in this study, the authors tentatively suggested that this global fronto-parietal 
overactivation in middle-aged as compared to young may have fulfilled a compensatory role. 
It could be surprising that this overactivation was not modulated by the cognitive load or the 
condition. However, the authors interpreted this as a plateauing of load-dependent activation 
after about 4 or 5 items (Cappell et al., 2010; Nagel et al., 2009; Schneider-Garces et al., 2010), 
which would indicate compensatory activation was reached in these brain areas.  
Secondly, the results also showed that load-dependent activation in dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) during the encoding phase was more elevated in middle-aged 
people as compared to young people in the control condition. By contrast, this load-dependent 
DMPFC activation did not differ between the groups in the fatigue condition. These results 
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can be explained by the fact that middle-aged people reduced their load-dependent DMPFC 
activity in the fatigue condition as compared to the control condition while young people 
showed an increase in this load-dependent DMPFC activity from the control to the fatigue 
condition. According to the CRUNCH model (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008), aging people 
show a higher recruitment of certain cerebral regions at a lower level of the task as compared 
to young people, which would allow them to achieve a similar performance level to that of 
young people. However, once a certain degree in cognitive demands of the task is exceeded, 
the aged brain is not able to compensate anymore – the CRUNCH threshold is reached – and 
performances of aged people become weaker than that of young people. Therefore, Klaassen 
et al. (2014) proposed that middle-aged people resort to compensatory mechanisms more 
quickly than young people but also that they reach their CRUNCH point – reflecting the 
exhaustion in neuronal resources – much more rapidly. 
 In 2016, Klaassen et al. carried out a relatively similar study to that of 2014. They 
required a group of 14 young and a group of 15 middle-aged male schoolteachers to perform 
a memory encoding-recognition task using fMRI after a control and a fatiguing task on two 
separate weekends. In this subsequent memory paradigm (Paller & Wagner, 2002), items 
presented during the encoding phase are classified according to performance on a subsequent 
recognition task. Cerebral activation to items that were successfully remembered was 
subtracted from activation to items that were forgotten in each participant as first-level 
contrasts and entered into second-level analyses consisting in a two (control versus fatigue) by 
two (young versus middle-aged) full factorial model. The results showed that perceived fatigue 
ratings were higher following the fatigue than the control condition at time 1 and at time 2 but 
did not differ between young and middle-aged people. Regarding RTs, responses to 
subsequently recognized words were slower than responses to subsequently forgotten words, 
suggesting that the encoding processes benefitted from more prolonged study of word stimuli. 
There was no effect of age group or condition on recognition performance nor on confidence 
levels attributed to the recognition. Activation related to successful encoding was found in the 
ACC in both young and middle-aged adults. However, middle-aged males showed greater 
successful encoding activation than young males in the left DMPFC, DLPFC and OFC. Also, 
there was a greater activation in the right ACC in the control than in the fatigue condition 
independently of age groups, suggesting this area plays a role in the experience of cognitive 
fatigue that is not restricted to the aging brain. 
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Moreover, there was a trend for an interaction between age group and fatigue 
condition in the left ACC:  activation in this area was greater in middle-aged than young adults 
in the control condition. In light of the CRUNCH hypothesis (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008), 
this may indicate neural compensation to maintain performance at an equivalent level. Indeed, 
it can be hypothesized that middle-aged teachers recruited more neural resources than younger 
teachers in relation to similar levels of cognitive performance. Furthermore, middle-aged 
adults showed significantly reduced activation in the fatigue compared to the control condition, 
whereas no significant activation change was evident in young adults. According to Klaassen 
et al. (2016), this reduction in response to the fatigue induction may indicate that, due to 
increased compensation, a so-called resource ceiling is reached earlier in the middle-aged 
teachers compared to the young. However, according to the CRUNCH model, decrease in 
brain activation due to the reach of the compensatory limit should be accompanied by a decline 
in performance, which was not observed. These findings should thus be interpreted with 
caution. Finally, the authors proposed that changes in ACC activity from the control to the 
fatigue condition could also correspond to a difference in effort.  
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Intermediate Summary 
From this presentation of studies, it appears that older people resist relatively well to 
cognitive fatigue (no important decrease in performance) as compared to young people. It has 
been proposed that they are more motivated and less prone to boredom triggered by the long-
lasting and repetitive nature of most cognitive fatigue paradigms. At the cerebral level, some 
studies have shown compensatory mechanisms in older people (Arnau et al., 2017; Wascher 
et al., 2016) but not all (Samuel et al., 2019). Regarding middle-aged, very few studies exist 
and they seem to show a faster resort to compensatory resources than young people (Klaassen 
et al., 2014; Klaassen et al., 2016). However, while studies focusing on older people used a 
Time-on-Task approach, those focusing on middle-aged people mostly used a Probe approach. 
More crucially, no study has ever assessed cognitive fatigue effects in middle-aged and older 
people in a same protocol. Therefore, it seemed crucial to carry out studies investigating young, 
middle-aged, and older people inside a same framework. 
 In this sense, the present Thesis work assessed these three age groups through three 
studies using the Time-on-Task approach (Study 1 and Study 2) as well as the Probe approach 
(Study 3). The two first studies will allow to determine whether Time-on-Task differentially 
affect behavioral performance as a function of age (Study 1) but also whether allowing people 
to take breaks during the task relieves performance in the same way for the three age groups 
(Study 2). The third study (Study 3) will enable to investigate whether cerebral activity after 
having performed a fatiguing task, relatively to a control one, vary as a function of age and 
working memory load.  
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Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
Nowadays, human beings are increasingly cognitively solicited until a relatively 
advanced age. Several studies conclude to an important impact of cognitive fatigue on 
behavioral performances (e.g., slowdown in RT, increased errors) but also on task-related 
cerebral networks. However, based on the set of models and studies presented in the 
Theoretical Introduction, it is obvious that middle-aged as well as older populations have 
scarcely been the focus of thorough studies bearing on cognitive fatigue. Investigating 
cognitive fatigue as a function of age is crucial given the increasing retirement age and that 
aging people are also characterized by diminished cognitive functioning efficiency (Collette 
& Salmon, 2014; Crawford et al., 2000; Salthouse et al., 2003; West, 1996, 2000). Indeed, 
cognitive fatigue is a prevalent cause of accidents in everyday life (Dinges, 1995; Shen et al., 
2008) but also in the workplace (McCormick et al., 2012) and can lead to tragic consequences 
in certain professions such as airplane pilots (Bartlett, 1943), car-train drivers (Brown, 1994; 
Campagne et al., 2004; Kecklund & Akerstedt, 1993; Torsvall & Akerstedt, 1987), firefighters 
(Aisbett & Nichols, 2007; Aisbett et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2016), as well as intensive care 
unit physicians (Maltese et al., 2016). From a medical point of view, repetitive cognitive 
fatigue can sometimes turn into burnout (Maslach et al., 2001), triggering costs for the public 
health care system but also for the employers (Ricci et al., 2007). Understanding how cognitive 
fatigue affects aging people may help prevent its negative consequences. From a theoretical 
point of view, investigating cognitive fatigue with advancing age will help understand whether 
compensatory mechanisms are implemented to counteract fatigue effects or whether some age 
groups reach their limit of cerebral compensation.  
Consequently, the main objective of this Thesis work was to investigate the impact 
of cognitive fatigue on behavioral tasks as well as on cerebral activity, systematically in young, 
middle-aged, and older samples. 
 
Briefly, Study 1 aimed at assessing the changes in RTs (more precisely, the ex-
Gaussian parameters; see below) during an uninterrupted long-lasting Stroop task as a function 
of the time spent on the task and the three age groups. Study 2 was globally based on the same 
design as Study 1 but with the new objective of investigating the hypothesized beneficial 
influence of short breaks on performance. Therefore, participants had also to perform a long-
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lasting Stroop task but were allocated either to a “No Break” condition in which they had to 
perform the Stroop task in an uninterrupted way (as in Study 1) or to a “Break” condition in 
which they were able to take 5-minute breaks during the task. Finally, Study 3 assessed the 
impact of a cognitively fatiguing condition versus a control condition on cerebral activity 
during an N-Back task (Kirchner, 1958) performed in an fMRI scanner, again in young, 
middle-aged, and older participants. To make a link between theory and practice, Study 1 and 
Study 2 belong to the Time-on-Task approach since RT data were analyzed as a function of 
the time blocks of the task itself (i.e., the Stroop task) while Study 3 belongs to the Probe 
approach given it assessed the impact of an initial task (fatiguing or control) on a subsequent 
task (i.e., the N-Bask task). 
In the following lines, the experimental approach of Study 1 will be fully developed 
in order to help the reader grasp the rationale behind the ex-Gaussian approach and the reasons 
why this approach is more appropriate to investigate RT data as compared to mean and median 
of RT. Study 2 will be presented to a lesser extent because it is based on the same design as 
Study 1 except for the addition of a new condition (Break; No Break). Afterwards, Study 3 
and its hypotheses will be developed. 
In Study 1, a long-lasting 160-minute Stroop task comprising three items types 
(Congruent, Incongruent, and Neutral) was administrated without interruption to young, 
middle-aged, and older participants. In the literature, cognitive fatigue has been associated 
with decreased behavioral performance with Time-on-Task. However, if young people have 
been found to show reduced accuracy as well as increased RTs, performance patterns seem 
different in middle-aged and older people. From a behavioral point of view, middle-aged 
people are more consistently found to preserve accuracy at the expense of speed (de Jong et 
al., 2018; Wolkorte et al., 2014). Similarly, older people performing a 160-minute Stroop task 
have already been found to have preserved accuracy but slowed speed (Burke et al., 2018), 
what the authors explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff in the favor of accuracy in older 
people (Salthouse, 1979). Therefore, we decided to capitalize on RT data in order to compare 
our groups on a measure that is sensitive to the three age populations. However, the question 
we were asking at the beginning of this Thesis work was the following: What best represents 
RT data?  
As Wang et al. (2014) mentioned, studies investigating cognitive fatigue often use a 
well-established procedure consisting in comparing the mean RT between the different time 
blocks of a long-lasting fatiguing task (such as a 160-minute Stroop). However, reaction time 
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data are rarely normally distributed but instead tend to be positively skewed, meaning that they 
show a right-tailed asymmetry representing extreme RTs made by the participant (Heathcote 
et al., 1991).Therefore, the classical use of the mean (or median) of RT would lead to erroneous 
conclusions because central tendency measures are only useful for symmetrical distributions. 
Likewise, in some studies, individuals’ RTs are ranked from the fastest to the slowest and then 
grouped into separate RT bins (e.g., 10 bins containing each 10% of RTs) in which mean or 
median RTs are calculated. This type of procedure is methodologically limited for several 
reasons. The first issue is that several means or medians are extracted from only one 
distribution. Secondly, there is a higher risk to get biased estimates since each mean or median 
is calculated from only 10% of the distribution. A third issue related to this bin approach in the 
context of cognitive fatigue is to consider only the slowest 10% of RTs (the tenth bin) as the 
outcome of interest. This procedure would be meaningful if we were able to ensure that 
cognitive fatigue is a discreet process that is not present on 90% of RTs but is restricted to RTs 
belonging to the last bin. By contrast, if we consider cognitive fatigue as a continuous 
phenomenon, it is likely that some previous bins (e.g., bins 7 to 9) already contain slowed RTs 
(Schmiedek et al., 2007).  
Given all these reasons, it has been proposed that a distributional analysis is the most 
appropriate way to describe RT data because it allows to extract parameters from the entire 
distribution (Heathcote et al., 1991). Among the various theoretical mathematical models that 
can be used to describe RT distributions, the ex-Gaussian distribution has proven to fit RT data 
very well (Dawson, 1988; Heathcote et al., 1991; Hohle, 1965, Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008; 
Luce, 1986; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976; Schmiedek et al., 2007). The ex-Gaussian distribution 
is the convolution of the Gaussian and exponential distributions (Burbeck & Luce, 1982; Luce, 
1986) and is characterized by three parameters: µ and σ are respectively the mean and the 
standard deviation of the Gaussian component and τ is the mean of the exponential component. 
More concretely, a change in µ reflects a shift in the RT distribution while a change in τ 
represents a change in the thickness of the tail of the distribution – the density of extreme RTs 
made by the participant (Schmiedek et al., 2007; see red-colored area under the curve in Figure 
27). The sum of µ and τ is equal to the mean RT. In other words, µ represents the mean of the 
distribution that has been cleaned from its extreme values. Therefore, considering the classic 
mean RT as the main outcome can be misleading because an increase in τ may be counteracted 
by a decrease in µ, triggering a null effect on the resulting mean RT. Likewise, it is possible 
that two different conditions lead to the same value of mean RT even if they have two different 
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distributional shapes (Balota et al., 2008; Spieler et al., 1996; Tse et al., 2010). These properties 
further support the resort to distributional analyses, particularly in the context of cognitive 
fatigue in which extreme reaction times are interesting to catch, rather than means and 
medians. Figure 27 represents an example of probability density function (PDF) of the ex-
Gaussian distribution that was fitted to an individual RT distribution in a single participant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Probability Density Function (Φ(x)) of the Ex-Gaussian Function. X represents RT data 
limited to 2.5 seconds by trial in our Stroop task. The Gaussian component is characterized by μ and σ 
while the exponential component is represented by τ. 
 
 
The area under the curve of a PDF defines the density of the function in a specific 
range. Finding the parameter values of a probability function that best represents the 
distribution of empirical data is sometimes trivial. For example, regarding the Gaussian 
function, the algebraic mean and standard deviation of the empirical data are the most accurate 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the best‐fitting Gaussian function. However, 
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the task of getting the best estimations of the parameter values can be more complex 
(Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008).  
To paraphrase Lacouture and Cousineau (2008), to find the values of a probability 
function that best represent the ex‐Gaussian function, an iterative approach known as 
maximum likelihood estimation allows the best-fitting parameters to be estimated. Given a data 
set and a probability density function with specific parameter values, the likelihood value 
(LogL criterion) provides an indication of the goodness of fit between the data and the 
function. To find the parameter values that correspond to a minimum of the minus LogL 
criterion, a search of the parameter space is required. Systematically trying all possible values 
would be time consuming. This is particularly the case for functions comprising several 
parameters defining a multi‐dimensional space (Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008). To solve this 
problem, algorithms such as the Simplex method that allow to find a minimum of a multi‐
parameter function have been implemented (Cousineau et al., 2004; Lacouture & Cousineau, 
2008). Regarding our Study 1, we decided to use an algorithm based on the simplex method 
described by Nelder and Mead (1965) coupled with a greedy approach. Our algorithm is 
available on osf.io/8d7hb (see Supplementary Materials of Study 1 for further details). 
A direct relation between the ex-Gaussian parameters and functional cognitive 
processes is not easy to establish. However, RTs are classically thought to result from two 
different components (Hohle, 1965; Luce, 1986): the time to make a decision about the 
response – the decision component – and the time to physically make the response – the 
transduction component. As mentioned in Dawson (1988), reaction times allocated to the 
transduction component are believed to be normally distributed (with a mean of µ and a 
standard deviation of σ ), while reaction times allocated to the decision component are assumed 
to be exponentially distributed (with a mean of τ). As a consequence, a distribution of reaction 
times following the ex-Gaussian function would be able to capture both transduction and 
control-decision processes (Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008).  
Beyond this transdution versus decision distinction, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) 
have proposed that mean RTs can be divided into motivational and executive control processes 
when the individual is ego-depleted (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In that context, τ 
parameter has been linked to higher level executive control processes (Brewer, 2011; 
Schmiedek et al., 2007; Unsworth et al., 2010) while µ has been associated with motivational 
processes (Bresin et al., 2011). 
162 
 
Therefore, the resort to the ex-Gaussian approach is a promising method to more 
precisely catch which component of the RT distribution is affected by cognitive fatigue as 
induced by our Time-on-Task paradigm. Will cognitive fatigue trigger a right-sided move of 
the entire curve or, rather, will it increase the number of extreme RTs made by the participant? 
The ex-Gaussian approach may also help disentangle which cognitive processes are more 
likely to be affected by Time-on-Task. Indeed, it is possible to distinguish between changes in 
the transduction component and motivational aspects of the RTs versus changes in the decision 
component and executive control processes, which is not possible when using the simple mean 
and median of RT. 
Relevant to our study, Wang et al. (2014) assessed the changes in the ex-Gaussian 
parameters in young people using a modified version of a computerized Stroop task (Cohen et 
al., 1999) during 3 hours and found a significant increase in τ, while µ and σ were not found 
to change with Time-on-Task. However, up to now, no study has ever applied the ex-Gaussian 
approach to discriminate between age groups in the context of cognitive fatigue. 
In Study 1, we thus aimed at investigating the effect of cognitive fatigue as induced 
by Time-on-Task on the ex-Gaussian parameters in three age groups (young, middle-aged, and 
older). The 160-minute Stroop duration was artificially divided into four successive time 
blocks of forty minutes in which the ex-Gaussian parameters were extracted for each individual 
RT distribution and for each item types (Congruent, Incongruent, Neutral). 
Since older people basically experience cognitive decline compared to young people, 
we assumed that a greater fatigue effect induced by our long-lasting task would be observed 
in this population. However, as the older age group seems to resist cognitive fatigue relatively 
well as compared to young people (Arnau et al., 2017; Falkenstein et al., 2002; Philip et al., 
1999; Samuel et al., 2019; Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016), difficulties could 
be observed only on the most resource-demanding Incongruent items in both young and older 
people. These difficulties should be observed to a larger extent in older than young people due 
to baseline cognitive decline in older people. 
Regarding middle-aged people, a hypothesis was more difficult to establish given the 
very few existing studies. However, as this population shows relatively well preserved 
cognitive resources and is able to deal with cognitive challenges every day, we hypothesized 
middle-aged to be able to resist cognitive fatigue in a similar way to young people, namely 
they would show increase in τ with Time-on-Task only on Incongruent items, but the 
installment of cognitive fatigue could occur earlier than in young people.  
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From the past to now, fatigue induced by Time-on-Task has been associated with the 
energy depletion hypothesis according to which people become fatigued because they possess 
a limited energy-resource supply that is depleted after a period of work (Hockey, 2013). 
Interestingly, rest breaks have been proposed to decrease fatigue by enabling the organism to 
restore its exhausted energy levels by temporarily disengaging from work or task demands 
(Meijman & Mulder, 1998). Therefore, Study 2 aimed at investigating the influence of breaks 
on task-performance and subjective feelings during a long-lasting task. The same 160-minute 
Stroop task was administered to young, middle-aged, and older people. However, participants 
were allocated either to a Breaks condition or a NoBreak condition. This latter one was exactly 
the same as in Study 1. In the Breaks condition, participants were allowed to take a 5-minute 
break every forty minutes. As in Study 1, the ex-Gaussian function was fitted to each 
individual’s RT distribution in each block for each item type. Anticipating on the results, 
Study 1 only shows a significant Time-on-Task effect (i.e., block effect) on τ but not μ and σ. 
Therefore, analyzes for Study 2 were restricted to τ. 
As for Study 1, we predict that τ should significantly increase with Time-on-Task 
(Wang et al., 2014). Also as in Study 1, we expected a Group by Time-on-Task by Item 
interaction on τ, with τ increasing particularly on Incongruent items (i.e., the most demanding 
items) in all age groups but quicker in middle-aged than young and to a larger extent in older 
than in young people.  
 
More relevant to this study, we predict that the Breaks condition would be associated with 
smaller τ values than the NoBreak condition. More crucially, if rest breaks are beneficial for 
cognitive performance and relieve fatigue (Finkbeiner et al., 2016; Meijman & Mulder, 1998), 
we should observe a Condition by Time-on-Task interaction showing τ increase with time in 
the NoBreak condition but not in the Breaks condition. Given age has rarely been a variable 
of interest in break studies, we tentatively propose that the three age groups should benefice 
from breaks and show τ invariance with Time-on-Task in the Breaks condition.   
 
In Study 3, young, middle-aged, and older participants were allocated either to a 
control condition in which they were watching non-demanding videos, or to a fatigue condition 
in which they performed a long-lasting Stroop task (during 100 minutes for young and 80 
minutes for middle-aged and older). Afterwards, all participants were required to perform an 
N-Back task with three working memory loads (1-Back, 2-Back, 3-Back) during fMRI 
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acquisition. In this study, the 1-Back load serves as a baseline allowing to assess brain activity 
related to the 2-Back (2-Back > 1-Back) and to the 3-Back (3-Back > 1-Back) loads. 
Young people classically recruit fronto-parietal areas during working memory tasks 
(Collette & Van der Linden, 2002; DʼEsposito, 2007; Jonides et al., 1997; Jonides et al., 1993; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001; Owen et al., 2005), increase cerebral activity as a function of the 
working memory load (Braver et al., 1997; Jonides et al., 1997; Nyberg et al., 2009; Rypma et 
al., 1999) and modulate fronto-parietal activity in situations of cognitive fatigue (Coull et al., 
1996; Lim et al., 2016; Lim et al., 2010; Nakagawa et al., 2013; Paus et al., 1997). Therefore 
we suggest fronto-parietal activity will be higher in young people in the fatigue condition as 
compared to young people in the control condition for the 2-Back as well as for the 3-Back 
loads.  
Hypotheses regarding middle-aged and older groups will be stated based on the 
CRUNCH hypothesis (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008) presented in Chapter 3. As a 
reminder, the CRUNCH hypothesis posits that aging people show a higher recruitment of 
neural resources at a lower level of task demands as compared to young people, which allows 
them to achieve a similar performance level to that of young people. However, as task demands 
increase, the resource ceiling is more likely to be reached because the aging brain is not able 
to compensate anymore. In this case, cerebral activity becomes weaker than that of young 
people and performance starts to decrease. Given middle-age people could be considered an 
intermediate age with more preserved cerebral resources, we expect middle-aged people to 
show higher fronto-parietal activity in the fatigue as compared to control condition for the 2-
Back load relatively to the same contrast in young people and this should be accompanied by 
similar performance in the fatigue and the control condition (compensatory response). 
However, we predict a reduced activity in the fatiguing condition as compared to the control 
condition for the more resource-demanding 3-Back load relatively to the same contrast in 
young people, with reduced performance in the fatigue compared to the control condition (no 
compensation).  
Regarding older people, predictions are less straightforward as this age group has 
been shown to resist cognitive fatigue relatively well as compared to young people (Arnau et 
al., 2017; Falkenstein et al., 2002; Philip et al., 1999; Samuel et al., 2019; Terentjeviene et al., 
2018; Wascher et al., 2016). We predict they should show a less marked difference in cerebral 
activity between control and fatigue condition for the 2-Back load relative to the same contrast 
in young people, and this should be accompanied by similar performance in fatigue and control 
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conditions (no need to compensate). However, given their more impaired cerebral resources 
and vulnerability to higher cognitive load (CRUNCH hypothesis; Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 
2008), we expect a reduced difference in activity between the fatiguing condition and the 
control condition for the 3-Back load relatively to the same contrast in young people but at the 
expense of performance in both fatigue and control conditions. 
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Nowadays lifestyles, constantly soliciting human cognitive functions, have 
progressively turned cognitive fatigue into a pervasive symptom, even in the healthy 
population. Unfortunately, in certain cases, cognitive fatigue has revealed to be the cause of 
accidents in everyday life (Dinges, 1995; Shen et al., 2008) but also in the workplace 
(McCormick et al., 2012). It seemed therefore crucial to study cognitive fatigue, both at the 
behavioral as well as at the cerebral level. Cognitive fatigue can arise from performing an 
uninterrupted long-lasting task but can also have after-effects on a subsequent task. It is why 
we decided to investigate this topic thanks to both the Time-on-Task (behavioral studies) and 
the Probe approaches (fMRI study).  
In addition, today’s societies are characterized by increased life expectancy, resulting 
in people staying at work until a relatively advanced age. Studying how cognitive fatigue 
influences behavioral efficiency as well as cerebral activity with advanced age seemed 
therefore of great relevance and was the main objective of the Thesis work. Given the elderly 
are recognized to show baseline cognitive declines (Collette & Salmon, 2014; Crawford et al., 
2000; Salthouse et al., 2003; West, 1996, 2000), there were reasons to believe that cognitive 
fatigue may also impact this population.  
To paraphrase Lachman (2004), situated somewhere in between younger and older 
people, middle-aged individuals have poorly been the focus of research studies, probably 
because of the difficulty acceding to this population. Otherwise, midlife has been postulated 
as the most challenging life period (Lachman, 2004). Indeed, it is the time when people have 
to deal and arrange at best many spheres of their lives: from caring for children and sometimes 
for parents, being efficient at work, keeping a social life, to everyday house duties.  
This general discussion will recall the main results of the three studies, confront our 
findings with the main models of cognitive fatigue, and propose future perspectives. Given 
Study 1 and Study 2 were behavioral studies based on the Time-on-Task approach and shared 
the same experimental protocol except for the new condition in Study 2, they will be discussed 
together. Study 3 was an fMRI study based on the Probe approach and will be discussed 
separately afterwards.  
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Principle Results from Study 1 and Study 2 
 In Study 1, we found a dissociated pattern of age effect and Time-on-Task effect on 
the ex-Gaussian parameters. While age had a significant effect on μ, Time-on-Task 
significantly led to increase in τ, representing an increase in extreme RTs made by the 
participants. Reaction times have been proposed to result from two successive components: 
the time to make a decision about the response and the time to implement the motor-
transduction components of the response (Hohle, 1965; Luce, 1986). Interestingly, the ex-
Gaussian parameters have also been linked to different functional cognitive processes 
(Dawson, 1968; Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008): μ would represent the time to perform the 
motor component of the response (in short, the motor speed) while τ would represent the time 
dedicated to the decision process (in short, the decision speed). Our first results thus suggested 
that age is more likely to negatively influence motor speed but not decision speed, which is in 
agreement with previous studies (Eckert et al., 2010; Falkenstein et al., 2006; Roggeveen et 
al., 2007; Yordanova et al., 2004). By contrast, Time-on-Task is more prone to alter decision 
speed but not motor speed. This result was in line with Wang et al. (2014) who also found 
Time-on-Task influence on τ but not μ in a sample of young people. This result is also in 
agreement with studies linking τ to executive control processes (Brewer, 2011; Unsworth et 
al., 2010). This pattern of results seems also logical regarding cognitive fatigue studies in 
general. Indeed, most studies have linked cognitive fatigue to decreased accuracy and/or 
increased RTs particularly in task requiring executive functions like inhibition (Kato et al., 
2009), task switching (Lorist et al., 2009), working memory updating (Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 
2015b; Hopstaken et al., 2016), planning and preparation (Lorist, 2008; Lorist et al., 2000; van 
der Linden et al., 2003), or action monitoring (Boksem et al., 2006; Lorist et al., 2005). 
 
Based on results from Study 1, statistical analyses of Study 2 – which were dedicated 
to the investigation of breaks as candidates to relieve cognitive fatigue – only focused on the 
τ parameter. As a reminder, Study 2 comprised participants from Study 1 to form the NoBreak 
condition and we recruited new participants to compose the Breaks condition, which were 
matched as much as possible to participants of the first study on demographic data. 
Study 2 revealed that both young and middle-aged people showed Time-on-Task 
effect on τ, while it was not the case for the older group (similar results in middle-aged and 
older but not in young participants were found in Study 1). Performance declines or RTs 
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increases during a long-lasting cognitive task have been consistently shown in young people 
(Boksem et al., 2005, 2006; Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b; Hopstaken, 2016; Kato et al., 
2009; Lorist, 2008; Lorist et al., 2009; Lorist et al., 2005; Lorist et al., 2000; van der Linden 
et al., 2003). Regarding the middle-aged population, studies directly targeting cognitive fatigue 
are scarce, making it more difficult to discuss our data. In 2018, de Jong et al. found decreased 
speed with Time-on-Task in middle-aged people performing a 120-minute typewriting task. 
From a cerebral point of view, Klaassen et al. (2014; Klaassen et al., 2016) found evidence of 
a faster reach of cerebral compensatory threshold (CRUNCH hypothesis; Reuter-Lorenz & 
Cappell, 2008) in their middle-aged group relatively to their young group. Our findings thus 
seem in agreement with the existing literature. Older people have not systematically been 
reported to suffer from cognitive fatigue protocols more than young people, which has been 
attributed to a better resistance to task monotony than young people (Arnau et al. 2017; 
Falkenstein et al., 2002; Philip et al., 1999; Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, our results showed τ invariance with Time-on-Task in the older group (as in 
Study 1). 
 
How to Explain our Results with Cognitive Fatigue Models 
Cognitive Fatigue as a Combination of Overload and Underload? 
Somewhat influenced by the nineteenth century industrialization context, cognitive 
fatigue has long been postulated as the result of energy depletion, giving rise to widespread 
expressions like “I’m depleted” or “I run out of energy”. According to this view, people 
become fatigued after a long-lasting time performing a work because their limited energy 
diminishes along the task, until a state of depletion. In agreement with the energy depletion 
hypothesis, the “overload theory” (Grier et al., 2003; Helton & Russell, 2011; Helton & Warm, 
2008) attributes Time-on-Task declines to a depletion of resources due to high task demands 
or high workload. By contrast, the “underload theory” (Pattyn et al., 2008; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006) posits that fatigue-related decreases in performance are due to task 
disengagement or attentional withdrawal because of the monotonous or boring nature of the 
task. As presented in Chapter 1, more recent studies suggest that either cognitive overload or 
cognitive underload are likely to trigger Time-on-Task cognitive fatigue (Boksem et al., 2006; 
Boksem & Tops, 2008; May & Baldwin, 2009; Saxby et al., 2008). 
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Study 2 showed that breaks seemed beneficial for maintaining performance and 
stabilizing feelings of sleepiness, motivation and fatigue during a long-lasting period (160 
minutes). This result partially supports the energy depletion hypothesis since rest breaks are 
classically thought to restore energy levels that have progressively vanished during task by 
temporarily interrupting task engagement (Meijman & Mulder, 1998). However, if the energy 
depletion was supported to some extent, it appeared not to be the only explanation of fatigue 
development. Indeed, the VAS for effort was still rated higher After as compared to Before the 
task in the Breaks condition. As it is well-exposed in Hockey’s work, cognitive fatigue 
literature has progressively integrated other factors – such as motivation, the meaning of the 
goal, the cost/benefits calculation, etc. – likely to explain cognitive fatigue, below and beyond 
the energy depletion hypothesis. In addition to our findings on effort assessment, the fact that 
our task did not solely trigger depletion or an overloaded state was also suggested with the 
Item by Block interaction showing that τ increased only on Neutral items with Time-on-Task. 
We related this result to the underload hypothesis, given the higher predictability and 
monotony of these items as compared to the others. Therefore, we propose our global Time-
on-Task effect may have resulted from some energy depletion due to the long-lasting and 
exhausting duration of our task, which was relieved by breaks. Moreover, we propose that our 
Time-on-Task effect also resulted from underload/boredom because of the meaningless goal 
of the task as attested by effort deployment to maintain performance even in the presence of 
breaks. 
Interestingly, Arnau et al. (2017) proposed that a same task may be differentially 
experienced – triggering an overload or an underload state – as a function of age. More 
precisely, young people are assumed to suffer from task monotony (underload) while older 
people would suffer from resource depletion (overload). In their results, Arnau et al. did not 
find age-related differences in performance with Time-on-Task. They attributed it to the fact 
that young people decreased their motivation as well as performance because they undergone 
task monotony while older adults demonstrated higher motivation and resorted to 
compensatory mechanisms (i.e., larger EEG frontal theta power) allowing to maintain 
performance against energy depletion. This result is also in agreement with other studies 
showing a better resistance to task monotony in older as compared to young people 
(Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016). 
Since our results suggest both the energy depletion/overload (i.e., performances were 
maintained thanks to breaks) but also the underload (i.e., effort was still rated higher in the 
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presence of breaks) acted in combination in Time-on-Task effect, we propose young and 
middle-aged people probably showed performance decrements as a result of a combined effect 
of depletion and monotony. By contrast, older people probably mostly faced the depletion 
effect but not the monotony effect. However, future investigations, such as using a continuous 
EEG recording during the 160-minute Stroop task, are needed to establish that cognitive 
fatigue is differentially experienced (monotony versus depletion) as a function of age. In 
Future Perspectives, we also proposed that administering participants with a motivational 
paradigm, in which rewarding incentives will only relieve cognitive fatigue in the case of 
motivation drop or boredom but not in the case of energy depletion, would help clarify whether 
cognitive fatigue is differentially experienced as a function of age.     
 
Cognitive Fatigue as Opportunity Cost? 
As an alternative view, we propose that performing such a long-lasting Stroop task 
has probably triggered opportunity costs in our participants. According to Kurzban et al 
(2013), all mental activities cannot be performed at the same time, resulting in individuals 
prioritizing their activities. However, prioritization carries opportunity cost that is simply the 
value of the next-best alternative. Kurzban et al. proposed that the conscious experience of 
mental effort results from mechanisms measuring the opportunity costs on the current task, 
sometimes leading to the reallocation of processes away from the present task and towards the 
next best alternative (Kurzban, 2010). Generally, humans solve the prioritization problem by 
estimating the utilities of different possible actions, and then selecting the action that has the 
maximal expected utility. In Chapter 1, I used the example given by Kurzban et al. of a 
research participant asked to perform math calculations having his or her smartphone nearby. 
The model predicts that doing math in the presence of the smartphone will be perceived as 
more effortful than in the absence of the smartphone, because the opportunity cost of 
performing math is higher in the presence of the smartphone. Similarly, a research participant 
may be performing our meaningless task while thinking about many other more interesting 
activities that he or she was not performing during that time. If it was probably the case for 
young people, we think it may have been even more the case for middle-aged people who had 
many everyday responsibilities. Regarding older people, we do not intend to say that they have 
nothing else more interesting to do but it is possible they had less urgent activities or demands 
to meet at the time they performed our task. To test this hypothesis, we should have 
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administered our participants with additional questionnaires asking whether they were fully 
focused on the task or were thinking about something else (e.g., what they have to do after the 
experiment, exams that are coming, not to forget a medical appointment, etc.) during task 
performance. Likewise, questionnaires administered at some time points during the Stroop task 
would have helped reveal what participants were actually thinking about when performing the 
task. However, this method would create undesired interruptions that can be assimilated to 
breaks. Such types of investigations have been implemented to assess mind-wandering 
episodes during task performance (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2016). Interestingly, 
Stawarczyk et al. (2011) developed an experience sampling method allowing isolating 
stimulus-independent and task-unrelated thoughts (SITUTs) from other kinds of distractions 
(i.e., irrelevant sensory perceptions and interfering thoughts related to the appraisal of the 
current task). They found that those SITUTs impaired performance at the Sustained Attention 
to Response Task (SART; a Go/No-Go task). Moreover, the content of SITUTs were often 
linked to the anticipation and planning of future events, supporting the opportunity cost 
hypothesis. 
 
Cognitive Fatigue as Costs/Benefits Ratio? 
Tops et al. (2004) proposed that cognitive fatigue results from an effort/reward 
imbalance. People will keep on the task if rewards are worth enough compared to the deployed 
effort. In the case of insufficient rewards, motivation decreases, people become fatigued, and 
finally disengage. In the same vein, Boksem and Tops (2008) assumed that people are going 
to expend more energy if costs are low and rewards are high. In the case of long-lasting 
cognitive tasks, the expended energy will progressively become greater than the reward, and 
motivation will eventually drop. Therefore, it is possible that the Time-on-Task effect in our 
studies was due to rewards being too low as compared to the deployed effort. Participants in 
Study 1 and Study 2 were compensated 5 euros for their participation, which is probably a 
weak reward relative to the devoted time. Besides the money-like reward, the nature of the 
task itself (monotonous, meaningless) may also be considered low-rewarding in the present 
work. 
It is worth mentioning that we intentionally low remunerated participants in order to 
not trigger an artifacted motivation effect. Indeed, several studies have shown that presenting 
people with rewarding incentives (such as money) help restore performance to its initial levels 
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(Boksem et al., 2006; Herlambang et al., 2019; Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b ; Hopstaken et 
al, 2016; . Krebs et al., 2010; Lorist et al., 2009).  
Cognitive Fatigue and the Selective Engagement of Cognitive Resource in Older 
If the low rewarding feature of our protocol may explain cognitive fatigue effect in 
young and middle-aged, why did older people not suffer from Time-on-Task? We propose that 
cost/benefit balance may not be the same as a function of age. According to the selective 
engagement of cognitive resources model (Hess, 2014), older people are more likely to engage 
in processes that promote positive affect and are beneficial for self-esteem. We thus propose 
that performing our Stroop task, which was boring but not so difficult, may have induced a 
positive affect in older people who felt they managed the task well. Accordingly, Freund 
(2006) observed that older adults exhibited higher levels of persistence on a simple 
sensorimotor task when the focus was on maintenance (i.e., instructions to match an already 
achieved level of performance) as opposed to improvement in functioning (i.e., instructions to 
do as well as possible). The opposite was true for younger adults. This study suggests that the 
rewarding nature of a task will not be attributed to the same characteristics as a function of 
age. While young people will favor novelty and more challenging tasks at the expense of 
punctual failures, older people may rather favor the feeling of mastering a task and maintaining 
performance along the task. This proposal may also explain why our sample of older 
participants did not seem to suffer from Time-on-Task on the Stroop task despite its lengthy 
and low-interesting nature.  
Future Perspectives for Study 1 and Study 2 
In this section, we propose future perspectives allowing either to test new hypotheses, 
or testing some theoretical models. For example, Study 1 and Study 2 showed Time-on-Task 
effects in middle-aged but not older people, suggesting it is not the age per se that influences 
cognitive fatigue during a long-lasting task but rather the life stage. Therefore, assessing 
several life characteristics in middle-aged seems interesting in order to help explain why this 
group underwent Time-on-Task effect while older people did not. As previously mentioned, 
Study 2 seemed to show that both depletion and boredom were at play to trigger cognitive 
fatigue. However, it was not possible to disentangle whether one or the other age group was 
more prone to depletion versus boredom. Therefore, we propose that administering a 
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motivational paradigm, which implies that rewarding incentives will relieve cognitive fatigue 
only if it is due to a lack of motivation or boredom but not if it is due to depletion, would allow 
to better determine how cognitive fatigue is experienced as a function of age. Finally, given 
nowadays obligations of working until an advanced age, we dedicate a longer section of future 
perspective to breaks. If Study 2 allowed to show that the different age groups benefited from 
breaks to the same extent, it only tested one type of breaks. It is possible that different types 
of breaks (e.g., different length, different nature, or given at different intervals) are 
differentially beneficial to people as a function of age. 
As a first perspective, we propose that investigating Time-on-Task effects using 
shorter blocks than ours (i.e., 40 minutes) would help reveal finest temporal fatigue-related 
effect. In our studies, we decided to use relatively long blocks in order to have enough RT data 
to properly fit the ex-Gaussian function to RT distributions. Regarding the main effect of 
Block, this procedure allowed us to show increased τ in Block 4 (i.e., after 120 minutes of 
task) relatively to the beginning blocks.  However, it is possible that the Time-on-Task effect 
was present sooner. Likewise, analyzing RT distributions with a sliding window (e.g., 
assessing RTs in 8 overlapping time blocks of 20 minutes instead of 4 non-overlapping blocks 
of 40 minutes) would allow an even better characterization of temporal effects of cognitive 
fatigue.  
As a second perspective, we propose that measuring life characteristics of participants 
would help explain individual differences in the sensitivity to cognitive fatigue, and more 
particularly for middle-aged people. Midlife has already been postulated to be the most 
challenging life period (see Box 6) due to the many responsibilities and facets of life they have 
to deal with. Accordingly, we also carried out a supplementary study (data not presented in 
this Thesis work13) in which we recruited a sample of 78 middle-aged participants (40 to 65 
years; NMales = 30;  mean age males =  52.13 ± 6.55; NFemales = 41; mean age females =  50.73 
± 5.23 for women; 7 participants excluded) that were administered with a 100-minute Stroop 
task but were also screened on a large battery of self-reported questionnaires comprising, 
among others, socio-demographic, health, depression, quality of life and subjective fatigue 
state ratings, as well some objective ratings such as BMI, pupillometry during a 5-minute PVT, 
handgrip strength, and blood pressure. Future analyses will thus be dedicated to the 
                                                          
13 Because of technical issues due to Covid-19, the sample needed for planned statistical 
analyses could not be completed but data acquisition is still ongoing.  
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investigation of the links between self-reported questionnaires and objective health-related 
measures on fatigue-related performance. 
As a third perspective, we propose to investigate the effect of manipulating 
motivation by rewarding incentives on our long-lasting Stroop task. To this end, participants 
will be asked to perform the task during 120 minutes and, at this time, a screen will appear 
signaling that they would receive a certain amount of money if they perform well for the 
remaining time. This procedure would allow to further test to what extent the energy depletion 
hypothesis may explain results from the two first studies. Indeed, if cognitive fatigue is 
triggered by depleted resources, therefore proposing money to keep on performing should 
normally not restore performance. By contrast, if cognitive fatigue is caused by a lack of 
interest performing the task, then rewarding incentives may help restore performance by 
enhancing motivation. As proposed earlier, it is also possible that cognitive fatigue is 
differentially experienced as a function of age. Therefore, we propose that young people (and 
probably middle-aged people), that were assumed to mostly suffer from task length and 
monotony, should benefit from monetary incentives while older people, who were assumed to 
compensate for resource depletion, should not be largely influenced by a motivational 
manipulation.  
As a fourth perspective, more specifically related to Study 2, we propose it should be 
interesting to test the effect of varying breaks. Basically, we decided to administer short breaks 
(5 minutes) because long breaks were found to be associated with an immediate performance 
rebound followed by later decrements (Lim & Kwok, 2016; Lim et al., 2016). However, studies 
remain scarce and it remains a possibility that the length of breaks has not the same effect on 
performance as a function of age. Arnau et al. (2017) proposed short and long breaks to young 
and older participants during a 3-hour Simon task. They found that frontal theta power 
decreased over breaks only in older people, which was interpreted as compensatory processes 
counteracting resource depletion with Time-on-Task. However, the authors did not discuss the 
difference between short and longer breaks.  
Also related to Study 2, we propose it would be interesting to test the effects of breaks 
of different nature than “rest breaks”. As cited in Mathiassen et al. (2014), dating back more 
than 100 years, Sechenov proposed that any type of ‘‘diverting’’ activity – physical or mental 
– would positively influence recovery from fatigue. Accordingly, Mathiassen et al. proposed 
that “cognitive breaks” would help recover from fatigue during repetitive manual work. Closer 
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to the cognitive fatigue domain, Blasche et al. (2018) compared the effects of four conditions 
(no break, unstructured break, physical break, relaxing break) on fatigue and vigor scales 
during classes of 4-hour. They found that if rest breaks were beneficial when performing 
mental tasks, their effect can be further improved by engaging in physical or relaxing activities. 
Beyond cognitive fatigue triggered by the task itself, we should also mention that sitting during 
many hours (i.e., having a sedentary behavior) is detrimental for cognition (Baker et al., 2018; 
Voss et al., 2014; see Flack et al., 2017 for a systematic review). Studies comparing sitting 
with a sit-stand work position found that the sitting position resulted in more fatigue and lower 
energy (Dutta et al., 2014) as well as reduced focus and productivity (Pronk et al., 2012) than 
the sit-stand position. Therefore, future studies should be dedicated to the comparison of a 
long-lasting task performed in a sitting versus a standing position and/or sitting breaks versus 
standing-physical breaks. 
The Attention Restoration Theory (ART; Kaplan, 1995; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989) 
posits that looking at natural scenes or biological movement may help restore attention 
(Herzog et al., 1997; Kaplan, 1995). According to this model, direct (actively controlled) 
attention and effortless (passively controlled) attention are considered distinct systems, with 
the active one being prone to fatigue and depletion (Kaplan, 1995). One way to facilitate the 
recovery of actively controlled attention resources is to engage the effortless (passively 
controlled) attention system. This can be easily achieved by presenting people with natural 
scenes or natural movement (Berto, 2005; Herzog et al., 1997). People are thought to typically 
perceive these scenes as effortlessly fascinating and as promoting a sense of being away from 
everyday concerns, and as being compatible with their needs (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989). Based 
on this theory, studies have included different types of breaks in their protocols, such as 
looking at a green (natural) versus concrete rooftop (Lee et al., 2015) or looking at dog 
(natural) versus robots videos (Finkbeiner et al., 2016). Globally, results showed higher 
benefits from breaks including natural stimuli at both the performance (Lee et al., 2015) and 
the well-being level (Finkbeiner et al., 2016).  
Finally, Study 2 assessed break effects on a laboratory-like protocol: a 160-minute 
task with short breaks that were imposed every 40 minutes. This study does not directly reflect 
real work conditions where breaks are sometimes of varying length and are taken at more 
irregular intervals. We propose future studies should vary all the above-mentioned parameters 
(i.e., the types of breaks, the length of breaks, the imposed versus deliberated nature of the 
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breaks) in different age groups in order to find what is the most beneficial to maintain 
performance at different ages.   
Principle Results from Study 3 
Study 3 showed the expected effects of age (young > middle-aged > older) and 
working memory load (1-Back > 2-Back > 3-Back).This study also revealed lower accuracy 
(d’) in the N-Back task following the fatigue compared to the control condition while cerebral 
activity did not largely differ between these two conditions. Subjective feelings of sleepiness 
and demotivation were globally higher after the manipulation session independently of the 
condition but subjective feelings of effort were higher after the fatigue but not after the control 
condition, suggesting that the fatigue condition led to a higher deployment of cognitive 
resources. A Group by Condition interaction was observed for the criterion index (C), showing 
that middle-age participants adopted a more liberal decision criterion in the fatigue condition 
than in the control condition. We tentatively attributed this finding to a decrease of controlled 
processes following cognitive fatigue induction. At the brain level, no large age-related effects 
were found for middle-aged people. However, a group effect was observed for older 
participants, mainly characterized by decreases of activity in bilateral fronto-parietal areas and 
increased activity in left anterior brain areas. We did not show large changes in brain activity 
between the fatigue and the control conditions. However, age-related fatigue effects were 
observed in the older (but not the middle-aged) group. Masking the fatigue by the control 
condition revealed small foci of increased activity in frontal areas (cingulate and OFC) as well 
as decreased activity (anterior and posterior regions) in older as compared to young people, 
particularly for the 2-Back load. 
How to Explain our Results with Cognitive Fatigue Models 
The Specificity of Transfer Effect? 
Study 3 did not show large differences in cerebral activity between the control and 
the fatigue condition. As proposed in the discussion of that study, it is possible that our loading 
task (i.e., the Stroop task) did not fully transfer fatigue effects to the probe task (i.e., the N-
Back task) because these two tasks did not exactly tax on the same cognitive resources and 
cerebral substrates.  The N-Back task requires WM updating and mainly involves prefrontal 
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and fronto-parietal areas (Owen et al., 2005). Tasks such as the Stroop task mainly involve 
inhibition and rely on fronto-parietal areas but also on some additional specific areas: inferior 
and middle frontal gyri, occipital, and temporal regions, as well as some subcortical regions 
including the caudate nucleus, the thalamus, the putamen, and the cerebellum (Niendam et al., 
2012). According to the process-specific hypothesis, transfer effects are only possible when 
the two successive tasks rely on the same specific process as well as on overlapping neural 
representations. This proposal has been supported by studies showing transfer effects between 
two tasks sharing the same cognitive requirements (Persson et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2007).  
An alternative explanation to this absence of marked difference between the control 
and the fatigue conditions is that the control condition also induced a certain state of sleepiness 
and demotivation due to the long-lasting duration of watching videos. Indeed, subjective 
sleepiness and demotivation were higher at T2 as compared to T1, independently of the 
condition.  However, the effort scale was rated higher after the fatigue but not after the control 
condition, suggesting higher deployment of cognitive resources and effort to perform the 
fatiguing condition. We also found that accuracy (d’) was smaller in the fatigue than in the 
control condition but also that middle-aged were more liberal (i.e., adopted a more risky 
strategy) following the fatigue than the control condition. Therefore, our results suggest small 
but significant behavioral effects of the fatiguing condition but not of the control condition. 
We thus propose that our fatigue condition was well more fatiguing and effortful than the 
control condition but that cerebral effects were weak because of the divergence in cerebral 
networks required by the two tasks.  
If the latter proposal is true, why did older people seem to show more fatigue-related 
effects as compared to young people? Masking the fatigue by the control condition revealed 
increases and decreases in activity in older as compared to young people, suggesting fatigue 
effects specifically in the older sample. We propose it can be explained by the fact that older 
people basically show cerebral dedifferentiation while performing a task, contrary to young 
people. This has been proposed by several hypotheses (HAROLD, PASA, ELSA) assuming 
that older participants recruit the same cerebral network than young people to perform a task, 
but also additional areas that are not normally required by the task. Therefore, if older people 
show a lack of specificity in the cerebral network they used to perform a task, there is chance 
that they used common networks between the two tasks and underwent fatigue effects. In brief, 
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transfer effect may be less process-specific in older brains because cognitive processes also 
rely on less specific networks.  
In Chapter 1, I presented the energy depletion hypothesis according to which people 
become cognitively fatigued because of the depletion of a limited cognitive resource. I also 
made the distinction between general and specific transfer effects.  If the transfer of fatigue 
effects appears to be process-specific, this would mean that depleted resources are limited to 
the specific process that was required by the task. This result would have some implications in 
the workplace, because cognitive fatigue triggered by a long workday may be relieved to some 
extent by varying the tasks.  
However, as already discussed for Study 2, it remains difficult to distinguish between 
energy depletion and motivation-like hypotheses to explain cognitive fatigue. On the one hand, 
the specificity of transfer effects would signify that the depleted limited resources are restricted 
to the cognitive processes required by the task and that other cognitive processes remain 
unaffected. On the other hand, evidence for the specific effect of fatigue could also be partially 
in agreement with the motivational hypothesis according to which fatigue effects (e.g., 
performance impairments) are primarily due to a loss of interest in the current goal and to a 
motivation drop (Hockey, 2013). Accordingly, changing the task goal may result in a certain 
degree of recovery because motivation that progressively vanished on the previous task is now 
reset thanks to the new task goal. In this case, cognitive fatigue is not discussed in terms of 
depleted energy but rather in terms of motivation loss or goal extinction, that are renewed when 
the individual changes activity (Hockey, 2013).  
If the lack of marked difference between the control and the fatigue condition has 
been discussed as a lack of process-specific requirement between the two successive tasks, this 
study alone cannot attest it. In order to do that, future studies proposing an inhibition task 
during fMRI (or a WM updating task during the fatigue condition) should help answer this 
question.  
Cognitive Fatigue as Costs/Benefits Ratio? 
Older people in the fatigue condition showed less deactivation in cingulate areas in 
2- and 3-Back load as well as in orbitofrontal area in 3-Back load relatively to fatigued young 
people. These two cerebral areas belong to the limbic loop and are core structures of some 
fatigue and effort-related models. According to Boksem and Tops (2008)’s model, a particular 
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behavior will be implemented if it is highly valued, both in terms of appetitive/aversive 
consequences and in terms of energetic costs for the body. To this end, the OFC integrates 
sensory information and estimates the reward value of stimuli (Kringelbach, 2005; Walter et 
al., 2005) while the insula gauges the aversive value (costs and punishments) of our decisions 
(Small et al., 2001; Nitschke et al., 2006). This reward/aversive-related information is 
conveyed to the ACC, which also receives dopaminergic inputs from VTA to goal-direct 
behavior and estimate effort. Likewise, the model proposed by Verguts et al. (2015) proposes 
that ACC codes stimulus value as well as values of different options for a given stimulus and 
that learning to exert effort is supported by dopaminergic projections from the VTA towards 
the ACC. Therefore, the lower deactivation in the ACC and in the OFC found in older people 
relative to young people in the fatigue condition may be explained by a higher estimation of 
the deployed effort to perform the most challenging 3-Back WM load. 
Cognitive Fatigue and the Selective Engagement of Cognitive Resource in Older 
According to Boksem and Tops (2008), VTA projections towards the ACC normally 
strengthen connections in the case of rewarding behavior while induce extinction in the case 
of unrewarding behavior. As previously mentioned, older people will decide to engage in 
activities that promote self-esteem and are positively valued (Hess, 2014). Accordingly, older 
people will often favor activities in which they are high-performing instead of activities more 
prone to failures. Since the N-Back task is relatively difficult, it is also possible that more 
fatigue effects were observable in older people because the task was globally perceived as low-
rewarding. Indeed, ACC activation is also linked to error detections (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Cohen et al., 2000; Kerns et al., 2004), which may have triggered a negative affect and a poor 
feeling of self-efficacy in older people. By contrast, the N-Back task might have been 
perceived as challenging and stimulating, and to some extent rewarding, in young and middle-
aged people. 
Cognitive Fatigue in Time-on-Task versus Probe approach 
Interestingly, our two first studies rather showed an absence of Time-on-Task on 
behavioral performance in older people. This finding was attributed to a better resistance to 
task monotony from older people and was in agreement with previous studies which used a 
Time-on-Task approach (Arnau et al., 2017; Terentjeviene et al., 2018; Wascher et al., 2016). 
By contrast, our Probe approach fMRI study rather showed an absence of transfer effects in 
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young and middle-aged while there were some fatigue effects in older, relatively to young 
people. We propose that the process-specific hypothesis of transfer effect may be true in young 
and middle-aged people while it could be less important in older people that are less specific 
in the cerebral network they recruit to perform a task (i.e., dedifferentiation). Whether this 
proposal is true or not, it seems that older individuals may be able to resist long-lasting 
paradigms but show post-task fatigue effects at the cerebral level. 
By contrast, middle-aged people had a profile that resembles more that of young 
people. Middle-aged people showed Time-on-Task effects in Study 1 and Study 2, possibly 
due to task monotony. Contrary to older people, there was an absence of fatigue-related 
cerebral effects in middle-aged in Study 3, probably because their cerebral networks are 
efficient and are differentially recruited by the different cognitive processes required by the 
tasks. 
However, very few studies have investigated cognitive fatigue in middle-aged and 
older people using a Probe approach. Future studies are thus needed to better understand 
whether cognitive fatigue effects are more or less at play in middle-aged and aging people as 
a function of the methodology (Time-on-Task or Probe approach) that is used.  
Future Perspectives for Study 3 
Study 3 did not show large differences between the control and the fatigue condition 
on N-Back performance or on cerebral activity. We proposed it is possibly due to the lack of 
commonalities between the loading and the probe task while transfer effects of fatigue might 
be process-specific. As previously mentioned, it should be interesting to administer an 
inhibition task during fMRI or a WM updating task during the fatigue condition in order to test 
the hypothesis of process-specific transfer effects of cognitive fatigue.  
However, if global performance on the N-Back did not seem impaired by the 
preceding fatigue condition, we did not test whether correct and incorrect answers (or rapid 
and slower RTs) were differentially distributed along the task. It is possible that performance 
following the fatigue and the control condition were similar on average but that performance 
diminished (or RTs increased) from the beginning to the end of the N-Back task following the 
fatigue condition, while staying relatively stable following the control condition. Likewise, 
fMRI data were analyzed using a block design. It is possible that using event-related analyses 
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would help reveal a profile of brain responses varying from the beginning to the end of the 
task. Consequently, further analyses will be dedicated to testing whether Time-on-Task effects 
directly measured on the N-Back task following the fatiguing and the control conditions show 
age-related differences in fatigue effects on cerebral activity and behavioral performance.   
Cognitive fatigue is associated with the DA system (Boksem & Tops, 2008; 
Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000, 2004; Dobryakova et al., 2013). Otherwise, it has been proposed 
that genetic effects are more important when brain resources (e.g., the DA system) diminish 
such as when the individual ages (Lindenberger et al., 2008; Nagel et al., 2008). It has been 
proposed that genotype effects on cognition may be modulated by age-related changes in 
neuromodulation such as in DA transmission (Li, 2012). In other words, genetic effects on 
cognition are more likely to reveal inter-individual difference in populations with diminished 
resources than in young people. Therefore, futures analyses should be dedicated to the 
investigation of relevant variants of genes such as the COMT val158met SNP which is 
particularly involved in DA regulation. Regarding the COMT, Val/Val homozygotes are 
characterized by lower baseline levels of DA as compared to Met/Met homozygotes. These 
different genotypes may trigger individual differences on cognition that would be even more 
important as the individual ages. Such analyses would allow to determine whether some DA-
related SNPs would allow a better resistance to cognitive fatigue in individuals possessing the 
most beneficial allelic variants, more particularly in older populations.  
As dopamine seems to play an important role in cognitive fatigue, we propose it can 
also explain cognitive fatigue in pathological populations. Accordingly, cognitive fatigue has 
been  frequently reported in psychological conditions such as depression (Demyttenaere et al., 
2005; Lavidor et al., 2002) and neurological illnesses such as PD or MS (Chaudhuri & Behan, 
2000; Kluger et al., 2013), which have been explained by a down-regulation of the 
dopaminergic system in striato-thalamo-cortical fibers (Chaudhuri & Behan, 2000, 2004; 
Lorist et al., 2009). Likewise, MS patients have been characterized by abnormal activation or 
connectivity strength in the BG and in the PFC (DeLuca et al., 2008; Finke et al., 2015; 
Tartaglia et al., 2008). Chaudhuri and Behan (2000) also proposed that inadequate dopamine 
levels in the BG are linked to fatigue in several diseases. Abovementioned models could 
partially explain cognitive fatigue in these pathologies. Dopaminergic projections from the 
VTA towards the ACC normally strengthen in the case of rewarding behavior and normally 
decrease in the case of unsuccessful behavior (Boksem & Tops, 2008). It is possible that 
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pathologies such as PD or MS are characterized by inefficient dopaminergic projections 
between the VTA and the ACC, leading to the inability to distinguish between rewarding and 
non-rewarding behaviors and to an undifferentiated implementation of everyday behaviors. 
Accordingly, Dobryakova et al. (2013) assumed that fatigue might occur as a result of reduced 
DA availability in the BG, leading to reduced firing of striatal DA neurons in response to a 
rewarding outcome. Future studies are needed to test which mechanisms are at play to trigger 
cognitive fatigue in healthy young, healthy aging, as well as in pathological populations. We 
propose our protocols could be used in pathological populations and then be confronted to our 
results. It would allow to test whether a young MS patient (or an older PD patient) experiences 
cognitive fatigue more like young, middle-aged, or older people. Likewise, it could allow to 
test whether cerebral areas influenced by DA projections (e.g., the ACC and the OFC) are 
activated to the same extent as in older people in pathology characterized by dopamine 
dysregulation.   
Conclusions 
This Thesis work adds some new findings to the existing literature. First of all, we 
showed that cognitive fatigue as measured by a Time-on-Task paradigm seems to increase the 
density of extreme RTs made by the participants (represented by τ parameter). This means that 
when people become fatigued, they do not progressively become slower but rather start to 
display a larger number of longer RTs, which can be assimilated to periodic attention drops. 
This result also suggests that cognitive fatigue more particularly affects the decision 
component of response while the motor-transduction component remains unaffected (Hohle, 
1965; Luce, 1986). This result can thus explain everyday accidents as well as attention drops 
in airplane pilots (Bartlett, 1943) or large speed variations already found in car or train drivers 
under cognitive fatigue (Brown, 1994; Campagne et al., 2004; Kecklund & Akerstedt, 1993; 
Torsvall & Akerstedt, 1987). 
Secondly, we assumed it was particularly important to investigate age-related effects 
on cognitive fatigue because life expectancy has progressively increased these last decades 
and because people are often required to work until an advanced age. Moreover, older people 
are characterized by baseline cognitive changes as compared to younger people, rendering this 
population at risk to suffer more from fatigue effects. Middle-aged people are less studied in 
the literature. However, we assumed they also could be the target of cognitive fatigue given 
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their challenging everyday lives as compared to the other age groups. Our data showed that 
middle-aged but not older people underwent Time-on-Task effects while we found the reverse 
age effect when using the Probe approach. We propose middle-aged may resemble young 
people in the way they experience cognitive fatigue and are more sensitive to task monotony 
and boredom while older people may be more resisting to long-lasting and relatively easy tasks 
but more sensitive to challenging tasks following fatigue induction. However, it is possible 
that we did not show large transfer effects of fatigue in young and middle-aged people with 
our Probe approach because the two successive tasks did not exactly rely on the same processes 
and networks. Therefore, future studies are needed to test the process-specific hypothesis and 
whether the Probe approach still differentially impacts people as a function of age when the 
two successive tasks rely on the same cognitive process.  
Thirdly, we were interested in the effects of breaks and how they are beneficial in the 
different age groups. We showed that the Time-on-Task effect was relieved by the presence of 
breaks (i.e., performance was maintained) but that the rating of effort still remained higher 
after as compared to before the task, even in the presence of breaks. Therefore, we propose 
that cognitive fatigue may not be due to only one process in particular but that it can be induced 
by a combination of both energy depletion and boredom. More crucially, it is also possible that 
a same task is experienced as more or less depleting or boring as a function of age (Arnau et 
al., 2017).  Future studies, manipulating for example a motivational variable, are needed to test 
whether cognitive fatigue is differentially experienced as a function of age. More importantly, 
we found that our short punctual rest breaks that were given at regular intervals seemed 
beneficial to the same extent for the three age groups. This result suggests that adaptations in 
daily life, and more particularly in the workplace, should not be difficult to implement in order 
to guarantee a better maintenance of cognitive efficiency. However, future studies should be 
dedicated to determining whether different types of breaks are differentially beneficial as a 
function of age.  
Regarding the confrontation of our results with the existing literature, we tried to 
discuss our findings on the Time-on-Task studies with some cognitive fatigue models. 
However, it is not easy to determine which model best fits our data. For example, it is not 
possible to distinguish whether cognitive fatigue triggered by the long-lasting Stroop task was 
due to a costs/benefits imbalance or whether it was due to opportunity costs triggered by the 
task. We propose that administering participants with additional questionnaires (i.e. how did 
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participants perceive the task?; what were they thinking about during the task? etc.) or with 
the experience sampling method of mind-wandering episodes (Stawarczyk et al., 2011) during 
task may help distinguish between different interpretations. Regarding Study 3, we found 
fatigue-related increases in cerebral activity in older relative to young participants in the ACC 
and in the OFC. This finding was discussed thanks to the model of Boksem and Tops (2008) 
as well as the model of Verguts et al. (2015) linking dopaminergic inputs from the VTA 
towards the ACC in order to goal-direct behavior and estimate effort. Accordingly, we propose 
that considering some dopamine-relevant genes, such as the COMT, would allow to 
characterize individual differences in cognitive fatigue, particularly in older populations in 
which genetic effects on cognition are amplified (Lindenberger et al., 2008; Nagel et al., 2008). 
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ABSTRACT
The executive processes are well known to decline with age, and
similar data also exists for attentional capacities and processing
speed. Therefore, we investigated whether these two last nonexecu-
tive variables would mediate the effect of age on executive functions
(inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination). We admi-
nistered a large battery of executive, attentional and processing speed
tasks to 104 young and 71 older people, and we performedmediation
analyses with variables showing a significant age effect. All executive
and processing speedmeasures showed age-related effects while only
the visual scanning task performance (selective attention) was
explained by age when controlled for gender and educational level.
Regarding mediation analyses, visual scanning partially mediated the
age effect on updating while processing speed partially mediated the
age effect on shifting, updating and dual-task coordination. In a more
exploratory way, inhibition was also found to partially mediate the
effect of age on the three other executive functions. Attention did not
greatly influence executive functioning in aging while, in agreement
with the literature, processing speed seems to be a major mediator of
the age effect on these processes. Interestingly, the global pattern of
results seems also to indicate an influence of inhibition but further
studies are needed to confirm the role of that variable as a mediator
and its relative importance by comparison with processing speed.
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Introduction
Executive processes were first described in the context of the central executive system of
working memory (Baddeley, 1986) and the Supervisory Attentional System (Norman
& Shallice, 1986) and were related to the integrity of frontal lobes. Thereafter, several authors
(Damásio, 1995; Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss & Benson, 1986) have contributed to the fractioning
of these processes. In their neuroanatomical model based on frontal lesion studies, Stuss and
Levine (2002) describe four types of frontal abilities that are specific and interconnected: (a)
the executive functions (EFs) comprise processes such as inhibition, planning, mental shifting,
decision taking, etc.; (b) auto-regulation and decision taking capacities (for the influence of
emotion on these processes, see Damásio, 1995, 2010); (c) energization is dedicated to energy
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mobilization and allocation in order to quickly initiate goal-directed responses (Stuss, 2006);
and (d) metacognitive functions allow the representation of one’s own mental states (auto-
noetic consciousness) or that of other people (Theory of Mind) (Stuss, 2008, 2011; Stuss
& Levine, 2002). Finally, in their hierarchical model of consciousness levels, Stuss and
Anderson (2004) propose that EFs process information coming from sensorial systems and
monitor goal-directed responses as a function of the stimulus.
Of particular relevance for our present study, the EFs can be defined as a set of high-
level abilities required to deal with new, dangerous or complex situations. These func-
tions are well needed to the production of behaviors that are goal-directed. The
existence of the four distinct EFs of inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordi-
nation is now well acknowledged, based on single-case analyses of brain-damaged
patients and individual difference studies in various target populations (e.g., Burgess
& Shallice, 1996a, 1996b; Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997; Lehto, 1996; Robbins
et al., 1998). However, a commonality of processes in executive functioning was also
evidenced by Miyake et al. (2000). Using confirmatory factor analyses, these authors
have demonstrated that, although dissociable, inhibition, shifting, and updating func-
tions remain intercorrelated. Miyake and colleagues proposed these intercorrelations
could correspond to processes related to the maintenance of task goals and contextual
information in working memory and/or some “basic” inhibitory processes necessary for
EFs to operate properly.
However, this commonality of processes could also be related to the intervention of
attentional functioning and processing speed. As these mechanisms are constantly
solicited, whatever cognitive activity we are engaged in (for a review, see Rabinovich,
Tristan, & Varona, 2015), it could be expected that these variables play a certain role on
executive functioning. In agreement with that proposal, Collette et al. (2005) showed
that the functions of shifting, updating, and inhibition recruited common parietal areas
previously associated with attentional processes, more particularly attentional reorient-
ing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & Yves von Cramon,
2000; Gurd et al., 2002) and selective attention (Behrmann, Geng, & Shomstein, 2004;
Coull & Frith, 1998; Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999. Moreover, a recent confirmatory factor
analysis in young participants showed that these three EFs, and also dual-task coordina-
tion, are directly influenced by processing speed and sustained attention, these two
processes being underlay by alertness capacity (Hogge, 2008).
Like executive functioning, attention is far from a unitary cognitive function (Posner
& Boies, 1971). However, the actual characterization of its different components as well as
their interrelations has not yet been well established. Corbetta and Shulman (2002) postu-
lated the existence of two cerebral networks responsible for different attentional functions.
The first one is known as the dorsal attention network (DAN) (comprising the dorsal parietal
and frontal cortices) and is involved in the cognitive goal-directed selection of sensory
information and responses (top-down attention). The second one is known as the ventral
attention network, is centered on the right temporoparietal junction, and is dedicated to the
detection of behaviorally relevant stimuli (stimulus-driven attention). Corbetta, Patel, and
Shulman (2008) further postulated that both dorsal and ventral attention networks are also
activated during reorienting processes. Based on the definitions of Posner and Petersen
(1990), attentional functioning is currently frequently investigated by the Attentional
Network Test (ANT; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002) that simultaneously
2 J. GILSOUL ET AL.
assesses the efficiency of the alerting, orienting, and executive attention brain networks1
(Lu, Fung, Chan, & Lam, 2016; Mahoney, Verghese, Goldin, Lipton, & Holtzer, 2010; Zhou,
Fan, Lee, Wang, & Wang, 2011).
One of the most influential attentional models in clinical practice was proposed by
van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994), which distinguishes between “intensity” and “selec-
tivity” of attentional processes. The intensity axe opposes alertness and sustained atten-
tion. Alertness refers to the ability to quickly react to a recurrent stimulus that is
presented at irregular intervals, the stimulus being or not preceded by an alerting cue
(tonic vs. phasic alertness). Sustained attention characterizes one’s abilities to maintain
an attentional investment during relatively long periods in order to react to frequent
stimulations. The selectivity axe opposes selective attention and divided attention. The
former function refers to a set of mechanisms allowing the focalization of attentional
resources on a specific and limited part of information in order to maximize processing
efficiency. By contrast, the latter one is relatively similar to the concept of dual-task
coordination and refers to the simultaneous processing of many sources of information
but also to the conjoint realization of many tasks. The van Zomeren and Brouwer’s
model was selected to assess attentional functioning in the present study. As we
conceptually distinguish between attention and executive concepts and as we were
intended to fully assess the different components of attention, we preferred to use an
attentional model that did not emphasize executive aspects of attentional functioning.
Finally, processing speed refers to the way people can implement fast response times
(or reaction times) because of time-pressure or to avoid a decrease of performance (as in
working memory tasks). While the simple time reaction tasks measure alertness, choice
reaction time tasks are often used to assess the rapidity with which an individual carries
out an elementary cognitive operation on the proposed stimuli. Consequently, choice
reaction time tasks are classically used to measure processing speed (Chiaravalloti,
Christodoulou, Demaree, & DeLuca, 2003).
It is now well-established that normal aging is associated with cognitive decline (Craik
& Salthouse, 2000), particularly in tasks involving EFs (De Beni & Borella, 2015; Podell et al.,
2012; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; West, 2000). In a cerebral point of view, prefrontal
activity during cognitive tasks tend to be less lateralized in aged people in comparison to
young people. This reduction in hemispheric asymmetry could be attributed to two different
processes: while some authors tend to assume a compensatory function (Cabeza, 2002),
others claim the existence of a dedifferentiation process (Li & Lindenberger, 1999). The
hypothesis of dedifferentiation raises the question of the separability of executive processes
in aging. Some studies tend to show a dedifferentiation process in EFs (De Frias, Dixon, &
Strauss, 2006; Delaloye et al., 2009; Hedden & Yoon, 2006). For example, De Frias, Dixon, and
Strauss (2006) were intended to test the factorial structure of four executive functioning
indices (Hayling, Stroop, Brixton, and Color Trails). Their confirmatory factor analyses evi-
denced that a single-factor model gave the best fit to the data. However, individual differ-
ences among the four tasks were not fully attributed to the EF factor. Therefore, the authors
suggested that independent features may further explain the commonality between the
executive tasks. In 2009, Delaloye et al. also failed to replicate the three-factormodel ofMiyake
et al. (2000) in older people. In a very interesting study, De Frias, Dixon, and Strauss (2009)
examined the structure of the EFs (inhibition, shifting, and updating) between three groups of
older individuals characterized by different cognitive status: cognitively elite (CE), cognitively
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normal (CN), and cognitively impaired (CI). Their analyses confirmed a three-factor model for
the CE group and a one-factor fit for the two other groups. The authors concluded that CE
older adults are maybe aging in a more successful manner, leading them to exhibit an
executive functioning structure resembling that of young people. By contrast to these studies,
Vaughan and Giovanello (2010) demonstrated, thanks to structural equation modeling, that
the three main EFs postulated in Miyake et al. (2000) are also better represented by a three-
factor model in older people.
Moreover, although the executive functioning decreases in efficiency with age, the
different functions do not undergo a general decline. Rather, many studies evidence that
if some aspects become impaired with aging others remain well preserved (Borella,
Delaloye, Lecerf, Renaud, & De Ribaupierre, 2009; Collette & Salmon, 2014; Cona, Arcara,
Amodio, Schiff, & Bisiacchi, 2013; Ludwig, Fagot, & de Ribaupierre, 2011; Salthouse, Atkinson,
& Berish, 2003; Taconnat & Lemaire, 2014; Vallesi, Hasher,& Stuss, 2010). For example, with
regard to shifting abilities, older people would meet difficulties to maintain and to manip-
ulate two mental plans in working memory but not to alternate between these plans (Kray,
Eber, & Lindenberger, 2004; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Regarding updating, aged people
would meet difficulties in the process that consist in suppressing irrelevant (i.e., no more
relevant) information in working memory but have preserved storage abilities (De Beni
& Palladino, 2004). In the inhibitory domain, voluntary/intentional abilities seem well to
decrease with age while automatic inhibition would be preserved (Collette, Germain,
Hogge, & Van der Linden, 2009; Hogge, Salmon, & Collette, 2008). In this sense, Borella,
Ludwig, Dirk, and De Ribaupierre (2011) showed a lack of correlation between their two
inhibition measures (interference index and negative priming index), leading them to the
assumption that inhibition is amultidimensional construct (Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008;
Borella, Delaloye, Lecerf, Renaud, & De Ribaupierre, 2009; De Ribaupierre, 2001; De
Ribaupierre, Borella, & Delaloye, 2003; Ludwig, Borella, Tettamanti, & De Ribaupierre,
2010). Another example comes from Shilling, Chetwynd, and Rabbitt (2002), who adminis-
tered aged people with four inhibitory tasks considered as being variants of the Stroop task
and found low correlations between these different measures. This finding suggests, on the
one hand, that inhibition is not a unitary process and, on the other hand, that aging does not
impair inhibition in all of its different aspects.
All these cognitive impairments are usually seen according two different theoretical
approaches. The analytical approach claims that cognitive aging would directly impair the
cognitive components for which decreased performances are observed. For example, a
greater interference effect in a Stroop task will be interpreted as a deficit in the inhibitory
function in older people. By contrast, the global approach suggests that the cognitive
differences linked to agemight be explained by a number of general cognitive factors ranging
from diminished working memory resources (Craik, Morris, & Gick, 1990) and decreased
processing speed (Salthouse, 2000) to sensorial function integrity (Li & Lindenberger, 2002).
Today, cognitive decline seems to be viewed as being explained by some general factors as
well as impairment in some specific cognitive components. Therefore, it would be very
interesting to test whether certain nonexecutive factor such as processing or attention
would explain some decrements in EFs in normal aging.
Indeed, with advancing age, some changes are also reported in nonexecutive pro-
cesses that could influence executive functioning efficiency. Furthermore, there is a
general agreement that processing speed decreases with age (Albinet, Boucart,
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Bouquet, & Auddifren, 2012; Cona, Arcara, Amodio, Schiff, & Bisiacchi, 2013; Manard,
Carabin, Jaspar, & Collette, 2014; Salthouse, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2000;
Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Salthouse et al., 2000).
As very well summed up in Lecerf, De Ribaupierre, Fagot, and Dirk (2007), cognitive
performances in older people are mediated by processing speed (De Ribaupierre, 1995;
Salthouse, 1992), working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), and inhibition
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Some authors further assume that these three mechanisms are
simultaneously playing a role (De Ribaupierre, 2000). It seems that processing speed is the
most influent mediator between age and fluid cognition (De Ribaupierre & Lecerf, 2006;
Salthouse &Meinz, 1995). In that context, processing speed seems to be particularly relevant
to explain the age-related inhibitory decline (De Ribaupierre, 1995; Hogge, Salmon,
& Collette, 2008; Salthouse, 1992; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002;
Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998). Likewise, Fisk and Sharp (2004) found an age effect on
shifting but neither on inhibition nor updating when processing speed is controlled. By
contrast, other authors did find this influence of processing speed for the function of shifting
(Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Salthouse et al., 2000) as well as updating (Sylvain-Roy, Lungu,
& Belleville, 2015). Finally, some studies have shown that difficulties in dual-task coordina-
tion are not necessarily met when processing speed is controlled (Baddeley, 2001).
If the influence of processing speed on cognition seems well established, no study
has ever tried to assess the effect of attentional variables on executive efficiency in
normal aging although some studies have shown performance decrements in some
attentional measurements. When related to the model proposed by van Zomeren and
Brouwer (1994), these studies tend to suggest the presence of an age effect more often
on the selectivity axe of attentional functions, namely selective and divided attention
(Haring et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2015; Maylor & Lavie, 1998; Passow et al., 2014;
Störmer, Li, Heekeren, & Lindenberger, 2013) as compared to the intensity one (Mani,
Bedwell, & Miller, 2005).
In that context, the objective of the present study was to determine to what extent
decreased executive performance associated with normal aging could be influenced by a
lower efficiency of some nonexecutive processes also prone to decline in normal aging.
Here we propose that a slowdown of processing speed and weaker attentional functions
may—at least partially—explain executive difficulties associated with normal aging. To
comprehensively capture the relationships between these variables, we administered a
large battery of executive, attentional, and processing speed tasks and carried out media-
tion analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986) in a large sample of young and older participants to
determine the respective contribution of the attentional system, the processing speed, but
also their interaction to the executive abilities in normal aging.
Method
Our study comprised an initial sample of 104 young participants aged from 18 to 42 years and
an initial sample of 71 older participants aged from 57 to 81 years. Participants were part of
the Caucasian ethnicity andwere all French speakers. Young people were recruited from areas
inside the Province of Liège (Wallonia part of Belgium) mostly thanks to advertising in
MyULiège website and thanks to word of mouth. Young participants were mostly students
as well as members of the scientific community of the University of Liège (mostly outside of
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the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences). Older people were recruited thanks to
advertising in University for third age standing at Liège and thanks to word of mouth.
Obviously, participants were not included in the study if they were part of home retirement
because of the lack of autonomy in everyday life situations that would further impact the
executive functioning efficiency of older people. They all have a normal or properly corrected
vision and a normal or properly corrected audition. The repartition of the highest degree level
achieved by our participants according to the Belgian educative system is also shown (online
supplementary Table 14). All participants gave their informed consent to participate, and the
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational
Sciences of the University of Liège and was in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
(1964). Participants had no neurological or psychiatric problem, were free of medication that
could affect cognitive functioning, and reported being in good health.
Four aged people were excluded from analyses because their scores on the Mattis
Dementia Rating Scale (Mattis, 1976) were equal to or under 129 on 144 (Monsch et al.,
1995).2 Our final samples comprised 104 young participants and 63 older participants.
Demographic data are given in Table 1. In order to be sure that our young and older
groups did not greatly differ from each other in terms of intellectual capabilities, we
decided to take the educational level as well as the Mill Hill score into account. The
education variable was measured by adding the number of successful educational years
since the primary school of the Belgian educative system. The Mill Hill scale (Deltour,
1993) is a verbal task assessing crystallized intelligence linked to lexical knowledge (i.e.,
vocabulary). This task is made of 33 items. For each item, participants had to determine,
among six possibilities, the semantically nearest word of a given target word. The
dependent variable is the total number of correct answers. We observe that the
young group has a higher level of education than the older group [t(165) = –5.71,
p < .001]. However, the groups also differ on the Mill Hill scale (Deltour, 1993), with an
advantage for the aged participants [t(165) = 2.21, p = .03]. Taken together, these results
suggest that our two groups are similar in terms of cultural background.
The whole administration of tasks was divided into two sessions of approximately 1
hr 45 min each, which were separated by a few days (from 1 to 15 days as a function of
participants’ availabilities). Participants were tested individually in a testing room free of
visual or auditory disturbance.
Table 1. Demographic data contrasting the young group and the older group.
Young Older
Raw scores Z-scores Raw scores Z-scores
Gender (male/female) 44/60 – 38/25 –
Age (years)*** 24.68 (5.18) −.75 (.25) 66.38 (5.83) 1.24 (.28)
Education (years)*** 14.81 (2.23) .32 (.88) 12.68 (2.49) −.52 (.98)
Mill Hill* 24.94 (3.83) −.13 (.94) 26.37 (4.35) .22 (1.06)
Mattis DRS score – – 138.87 (4.15)
For the raw scores, values are means and (SD) except for the distribution of gender. Z-scores were also performed
through each group and means and (SD) of these Z-scores inside each group are presented.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
6 J. GILSOUL ET AL.
Cognitive battery
A battery of 21 tasks was administered to assess executive, attentional, and processing
speed performances of our two samples of participants. The executive processes of
inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination were assessed by three tasks
each. With regard to attentional functioning, the processes of selective and sustained
attention were assessed by two tasks each while only one task of phasic alertness was
administered. Finally, four tasks were used to determine processing speed. Table 2
presents the considered outcomes for all tasks3 and Table 3 the raw mean performances
in each group. We also present reliability of the executive and processing speed tasks
used in online supplementary Table 15. These reliability estimates have been extracted
from large sample studies. As the attentional tests were taken from the well-recognized
and validated battery of Zimmermann and Fimm (1994), we do not present their
reliability estimates. Correlation matrices between the EFs and processing speed mea-
sures are presented respectively in Tables 4 and 5.
Executive tests
Inhibition (Stroop, anti-saccade, and stop-signal tasks). Our computerized version of
the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) consists of naming the ink color (blue, red, yellow, or
green) of 144 words written in blue, red, yellow, or green. Participants had to give their
answers verbally as quickly and accurately as possible; the anti-saccade test (adapted
from Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994) consists of 108 arrows appearing in the left or in the
right of the computer screen and oriented to the left, to the right, or to the top. Before
the apparition of each arrow, a blank square always appears in the opposite side of the
Table 2. Outcomes of the executive, attentional, and processing speed tasks.
Tasks Outcomes
Stroop Difference of the median RT between interfering (e.g., the word blue written in red) and
neutral items (e.g., %%% symbols written in red)
Anti-saccade Proportion of correctly detected arrows from the whole set of presented arrows
Stop-signal A diminution index was computed by subtracting the median RT of the trials of the
control part from the median RT of the trials that required a response through the
entire task
Plus-minus Difference in median RT between trials with and without shifting
Number-letter Difference in median RT between trials with and without shifting
Local-global Difference in median RT between trials with and without alternation
Tone monitoring Percentage of correct detections of the fourth presentation of each kind of sound
Semantic keep track Mean percentage of correct responses
Letter memory Percentage of consonants correctly ordered for the series comprising 5–10 consonants
PASAT Percentage of correct responses
Brown–Peterson Percentage of correctly ordered responses for the intervals of 5, 10, and 20 s
Divided attention Mean RT for the visual and auditory items
Phasic alertness Difference in median RT between trials with and without warning signal, divided by the
median RT of trials for all items
Visual scanning Median RT for the condition without target detection
Ocular motility Difference in median RT for central and peripheral targets
Visual irregularity Number of nondetected irregularities (omissions)
Target detection Difference in median RT between the second and the first part of the task
Letter comparison Median RT for similar items
Tonic alertness Median RT for items without warning signal
Articulatory speed Mean RT for the repetition of the three pairs of words
Grapho-motor addition Number of correct additions
RT = reaction time.
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presentation of the arrow. Participants had to give the direction of the appearing arrow
thanks to the keyboard. Therefore, they had to inhibit their reflex gaze orientation to the
blank square in order to detect the orientation of the arrow; the stop-signal task (Logan
& Cowan, 1984) is divided into two parts. The control part is composed of 24 words
Table 3. Raw mean scores (SDs) for each executive, attentional, and processing
speed measure in the two groups.
Young Older
Stroop 143.65 (70.76) 247.49 (128.4)
Anti-saccade 89.95 (9.79) 62.14 (17.18)
Stop-signal 113.12 (152.17) 214.52 (218.36)
Plus-minus 184.33 (161.08) 375.13 (264.71)
Number-letter 624.99 (249.48) 1045 (443.44)
Local-global 186.26 (138.65) 378.92 (292.53)
Tone monitoring 55.03 (22.13) 35.14 (15.36)
Semantic keep track 84.06 (6.98) 72.77 (10.57)
Letter memory 73.29 (16.47) 58.73 (14.85)
PASAT 81.92 (10.02) 61.95 (14.99)
Brown–Peterson 90.51 (8.53) 76.25 (16.6)
Divided attention 640.35 (67.36) 701.98 (90.43)
Phasic alertness (index) 0.04 (0.08) 0.04 (0.13)
Visual scanning 3552.45 (1076.29) 5244.63 (1788.91)
Ocular motility 43.3 (67) 69.24 (160.66)
Visual irregularity detections 4.15 (5.39) 7.03 (9.65)
Target detection 95.53 (39.19) 98.96 (59.74)
Letter comparison 578.97 (90.57) 771.11 (121.76)
Tonic alertness 229.56 (29.86) 289.27 (55.6)
Articulatory speed 4423.43 (811.33) 5582.76 (1177.29)
Grapho-motor addition 51.51 (11.32) 42.56 (9.63)
Table 4. Correlation matrices between the executive measures across the two groups.
Inhibition Stroop Stop-signal Anti-saccade
Stroop Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .011
.897
.301***
.000
Stop-Signal Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .289***
.000
Anti-saccade Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1
Shifting Plus-minus Number-letter Global-local
Plus-minus Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .248**
.002
.149
.068
Number-letter Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .175*
.030
Global-local Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1
Updating Tone monitoring Semantic keep track Letter memory
Tone monitoring Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .351***
.000
.412***
.000
Semantic keep track Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .579***
.000
Letter memory Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1
Dual-task PASAT Brown–Peterson Divided attention
PASAT Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .612***
.000
.346***
.000
Brown–Peterson Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .148
.058
Divided attention Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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belonging to living or no-living categories. For each trial, participants had to decide as
quickly and accurately as possible if the word belongs to the living or no-living entities
thanks to the keyboard. The test part is based on the same principle as the control part
but is composed of 192 items with 25% being presented with a sound signal occurring
after the presentation of the item. For these items, participants had to keep themselves
from answering.
Shifting (plus-minus, number-letter, and local-global tasks). The plus-minus task
(Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976) is divided into three parts in which participants
had to react orally as quickly and accurately as possible to numbers that are verbally
presented. In the first part, they had to add 3 to each number (30 in total). In the second
part, they had to subtract 3 from each number (30 in total). In the third part, they had to
alternate between adding and subtracting 3 from each number (31 in total); The
Number–Letter task (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) is divided into three parts in which a
digit-letter pair (e.g., 7G) appears on the screen at each trial. In the first part, pairs (32 in
total) appear only in the two bottom quadrants and participants had tomake an even/odd
judgment about the digit thanks to the keyboard. In the second part, pairs (32 in total)
appear only in the two upper quadrants and participants had to make a vowel/consonant
judgment about the letter. In the third part, pairs (128 in total) appear in pseudorandom
clockwise order in the four quadrants and participants had to make an even/odd judg-
ment when the pair was presented in the bottom quadrants and a vowel/consonant
judgment when the pair was presented in the upper quadrants; the Local-Global task
(Navon, 1977) is composed of 96 geometrical shapes (square, circle, triangle, cross) that
are shaped by smaller squares, circles, triangles, or crosses. Participants had to orally
determine the number of sides (1, 2, 3, or 4) of the global level of the geometrical shapes
when they appeared in blue on the screen versus of the local level of the shapes when
they appeared in red.
Updating (tone monitoring, letter memory, and semantic keep track tasks). The
tone monitoring task (adapted from the Mental Counters task developed by Larson,
Merritt, & Williams, 1988) is composed of high, medium, and low-pitched sounds
presented in a pseudo-random order. Participants had to press the keyboard when
each of these sounds was presented for the fourth time; the letter memory task
(adapted from Morris & Jones, 1990) is composed of 42 series of consonants (4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, or 10) visually presented in a pseudo-random order. For each trial, participants had
Table 5. Correlation matrix between the four processing speed measures across the two groups.
Letter
comparison
Tonic
alertness
Articulatory
speed
Grapho-motor
addition
Letter comparison Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .625***
.000
.437***
.000
.434***
.000
Tonic alertness Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .417***
.000
.399***
.000
Articulatory speed Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1 .311***
.000
Grapho-motor
addition
Pearson’s correlation
p-value
1
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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to orally give the four latter presented consonants; the semantic keep track task
(adapted from Yntema, 1963) was composed of 27 series of words belonging to different
semantic categories and presented in a pseudo-random order. For each series, partici-
pants had to orally give the last word belonging to each category (three or four
categories for each series).
Dual-task coordination (PASAT, Brown–Peterson, and divided attention tasks). The
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT; Gronwall, 1977; Gronwall & Sampson, 1974) is
composed of five series of 21 digits randomly presented on the screen. Participants had to
add each digit with the following one and to give the result orally. The time interval
between each digit decreases from the first to the last series; in the Brown–Peterson task
(Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959), participants had to memorize three consonants
successively appearing on the screen. After a certain time delay (0, 5, 10, or 20 s), they had
to recall the three letters in the correct order. During the time interval, participants had to
repeat, in the backward order, some digit pairs that are given by the experimenter; the
divided attention task from TEA battery (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994) was also adminis-
tered and consists of the simultaneous presentation of visual and auditory information
among which specific items have to be detected.
Attentional tests
Alertness. In the phasic alertness task from the TEA battery (Zimmermann & Fimm,
1994), participants have to react to visual stimuli preceded or not by an auditory
warning signal.
Selective attention (ocular motility and visual scanning tasks). In the ocular motility
task from the TEA battery (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994), a target or a neutral stimulus
appears to the left or to the right of a fixation point. A target stimulus also appears in the
center of the screen at irregular intervals. Participants had to react to the target stimuli; in
the visual scanning task from the TEA battery (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994), participants had
to determine whether or not a target stimulus was present in a 5 × 5 matrix.
Sustained attention (visual irregularity detection and target detection tasks). In the
visual irregularity detection task (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994), a texture moves from a
rectangle to another during 15 min. Participants had to detect irregularities in this alterna-
tion; in the target detection task (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994), participants had to press the
keyboard each time they saw a black circle, which could appear on the screen with or
without blank circles. The task was divided into two parts of 5 min.
Processing speed tests
Processing speed (letter comparison, tonic alertness, articulatory speed, and
grapho-motor speed tasks). In an adapted version of the letter comparison task
(Salthouse, 1991, 1993; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991), participants had to decide as
quickly and accurately as possible whether the two consonants of each consonant
pair appearing on the screen were identical or different thanks to the keyboard; the
tonic alertness task from the TEA battery (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1994) required to
respond as fast as possible to the presentation of a visual stimulus; in the articulatory
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speed task, participants had to repeat a pair of words five times as quickly as
possible; in the grapho-motor task (adapted from Salthouse & Coon, 1994), partici-
pants had to execute as many additions as possible during 1 min on digits from 1 to
9 (e.g., 4 + 3).
Composite score computation and statistical analyses
All analyses were carried out thanks to SPSS18 (SPSS Inc. Released 2009. PASW Statistics
for Windows, Version 18.0. Chicago: SPSS Inc). Since we were interested in the effect of
age on executive functioning that is modulated by attentional and processing speed
measures, we decided to include in mediation analyses only measures for which we
observed an age effect. Therefore, in order to determine which variables were predicted
by age, we carried out hierarchical multiple regression analyses by systematically con-
trolling for the influence of gender and educational level in the first step of the model
(see Table 6).
Since we had many measures for each assessed component (21 tasks in total), we
decided to compute composite scores through both groups. Anticipating the results
(Table 6), since all the executive measures showed an age effect, all of these variables
were used for the computation of the composite scores. Theoretically based on the
definitions of Baddeley (1986) and Miyake et al. (2000), we therefore created four
Table 6. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the prediction of each function by age
controlled for gender and educational level.
Dependent variables ΔR2 ΔF df b β t p
Executive variables
Stroop *** .106 22.29 1, 154 −.016 −.344 −4.72 <.001
Anti-saccade*** .408 163.83 1, 162 −.032 −.676 −12.8 <.001
Stop-Signal*** .158 29.4 1, 155 −.02 −.423 −5.42 <.001
Plus-minus*** .069 14.07 1, 156 −.013 −.278 −3.75 <.001
Number-letter*** .261 59.69 1, 159 −.026 −.54 −7.73 <.001
Local-global*** .145 27.78 1, 151 −.019 −.395 −5.27 <.001
Tone monitoring*** .116 23.98 1, 161 −.017 −.361 −4.9 <.001
Semantic keep track*** .179 44.35 1, 163 −.021 −.448 −6.66 <.001
Letter memory*** .092 18.76 1, 159 −.015 −.319 −4.33 <.001
PASAT*** .278 79.32 1, 163 −.027 −.559 −8.91 <.001
Brown–Peterson*** .116 29.56 1, 162 −.017 −.362 −5.44 <.001
Divided attention*** .098 19.26 1, 162 −.016 −.333 −4.39 <.001
Attentional variables
Phasic alertness .000 .048 1, 162 −.001 −.018 −.22 .827
Visual scanning*** .171 39.57 1, 163 −.021 −.439 −6.29 <.001
Ocular motility .005 .77 1, 163 −.003 −.072 −.88 .382
Visual irreg. detections .021 3.7 1, 162 −.007 −.155 −1.92 .056
Target detection .008 1.33 1, 162 −.005 −.095 −1.15 .251
Processing speed variables
Letter comparison*** .322 95.97 1, 163 −.029 −.602 −9.8 <.001
Tonic alertness*** .222 55.7 1 162 −.024 −.499 −7.46 <.001
Articulatory speed*** .196 42.61 1, 155 −.022 −.472 −6.53 <.001
Grapho-motor addition** .05 10.29 1, 162 −.011 −.236 −3.21 .002
Analyses were performed on Z-scores.
b = unstandardized coefficient of the last entered variable, namely age; β = standardized coefficient of the last entered
variable, namely age; t = t-test value on the last coefficient, namely age; ΔR2 = variation in R2 from the step without
age to the step including age as predictor; ΔF = variation in F from the step without age to the step including age as
predictor; df = degrees of freedom.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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executive composite variables with the three tasks associated with each of the
following components: inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination. The
executive composite scores were created according to the method proposed by Keefe
et al. (2004). We first standardized the raw scores ðxxσ Þ by using the mean and the
standard deviation of the whole sample. We also applied a “zero minus Z-scores”
correction on certain variables in order to get all of our measures in the same
direction. Then, we averaged together the Z-scores representing the same function
(e.g., Z-scores on Stroop, anti-saccade, and stop-signal tasks were averaged together
to form the composite score of inhibition). Finally, these four newly created compo-
site scores were further transformed into Z-scores in order to keep each measure in a
same scale.
Regarding the attentional variables, we were also initially interested in creating
composite scores for the different aspects of the attentional system, theoretically
based on van Zomeren and Brouwer’s model (1994). Since only the visual scanning
measure was significantly impacted by age after the control of the gender and the
educational level (p < .001, Table 8), we did not need to compute any composite score
for the attentional variables. Rather, the visual scanning variable constituted the only
attentional mediator in our analyses.
As no theoretical model allowed us to group together the various measures of
processing speed, we decided to compute a composite score by including the measures
that showed an age-related effect and significantly correlated to each other across our
two groups. Since all the measures of processing speed were predicted by age (Table 6)
but also correlated with each other (all r > .30 and all p < . 001; see Table 5), we
computed a single composite score with our four speed variables.
Finally, we also created an interaction variable between processing speed and atten-
tional functioning mediators to test the hypothesis that the relationship between
executive functioning and processing speed was differently impacted by the attentional
function. This crossed variable was obtained by multiplying the processing speed
composite score and the visual scanning score.
We carried out mediation models, based on Baron and Kenny’s recommendations
(1986), with attentional functioning, processing speed, and the interaction between atten-
tional functioning and processing speed as mediators (Figure 1). For example, in order to
test the mediating effect of processing speed on the relation between age and inhibition,
the following criteria should be met: (a) age has a significant effect on inhibition (path c);
(b) age has a significant effect on processing speed (path a); (3) processing speed has a
significant effect on inhibition after having controlled for age (path b); and (d) in order to
get a total mediation, the effect of age on inhibition has to become nonsignificant after
having controlled for processing speed (path cʹ). Otherwise, we will be in the presence of
partial mediation. To ensure the significance of the mediation effect, we did use the Sobel
test (Sobel, 1982) whose significance threshold was corrected using the Bonferroni correc-
tion to control for the overall error rate (α/12 tests = .004). Finally, to further reinforce our
results, we conducted step-by-step stepwise regressions each time we got corrected and
noncorrected significant mediation effects. We used this strategy to confirm the results
obtained in our mediation models. Once again, we controlled for gender and education
level in a forced first bloc. Given the large number of statistical analyses, we adjusted the
12 J. GILSOUL ET AL.
alpha threshold of the stepwise regressions to control for the overall error rate by setting F
probability at .005 to enter a variable and at .01 to remove a variable.
Results
Effect of aging
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that all executive (all p < .001) and
processing speed (all p < .01) variables were predicted by age after controlling for
gender and educational level. However, regarding attentional variables, only the visual
scanning task (p < .001) was predicted by age (Table 6). Therefore and as indicated in the
“Method” section, we created four composite scores representing inhibition, shifting,
updating, and dual-task coordination to represent our four EFs whereas the visual
scanning task was the only variable representing the attentional functioning.
Figure 1. Illustrations of the mediation models with attentional functioning (AF, model A), proces-
sing speed (PS, model B), and the interaction between AF and PS (model C) as mediators. For each
illustration, the two upper boxes with path c represent the simple model, namely the effect of age
on the executive functioning. By contrast, the three-box models represent the mediation models
where AF (A), PS (B), and AF × PS (C), respectively, mediate the effect of age on the executive
functioning.
EF = executive functions, namely, inhibition, shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination standardized
composite scores; AF = attentional functioning (namely, Z-score of the visual scanning measure);
PS = processing speed standardized composite score.
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Moreover, given that all processing speed measures were significantly correlated with
each other [all r > .30 and all p < .001], we also computed a composite score represent-
ing processing speed (Table 7).
Mediation effects
The following tables present the meditation models with visual scanning (Table 8),
processing speed (Table 9), and the interaction between visual scanning and processing
speed (Table 10) separately considered as mediators. Gender and educational level were
always entered as the first step in all of the regression models.
Results of the first mediation model (Figure 1(A)) show that, after the control of age,
visual scanning performance increases the percentage of explained variance of updating
[ΔR2 = 7%, t(162) = 4.844, b = .324, p < .001], which is also confirmed by a significant
Sobel test [Z = −3.95, p < .001]. A mediation effect of visual scanning performance for
the effect of age on shifting [ΔR2 = 2%, t(159) = 2.53, b = .173, p = .012] as well as on
dual-task coordination [ΔR2 = 1%, t(162) = 2.226, b = .142, p = .027] was also observed.
However, Sobel tests on these functions do not survive the Bonferroni correction
(α < .004): for shifting [Z = −2.37, p = .018] and for dual-task coordination [Z = −2.1,
p = .036]. Importantly, all these mediation effects remain partial given that the fourth
step of analysis shows that age always remains significant after the control of visual
scanning (all p < .001). By contrast, even if visual scanning increases the percentage of
explained variance of inhibition [ΔR2 = 1%, t(161) = 2.047, b = .127, p = .042], a Sobel test
on this mediation model is not significant even when the uncorrected p threshold is
taken into account [Z = −1.95, p = .051].
With regard to the second mediation model (Figure 1(B)), results show that, after the
control of age, processing speed increases the percentage of explained variance for
shifting [ΔR2 = 7%, t(159) = 4.734, b = .368, p < .001], for updating [ΔR2 = 5%, t
(162) = 3.836, b = .319, p < .001], and for dual-task coordination [ΔR2 = 14%, t
(162) = 3.326, b = .545, p < .001]. These mediating effects are further confirmed by
Sobel tests for shifting [Z = −4.19, p < .001], for updating [Z = −3.54, p < .001], and for
dual-task coordination [Z = −6.22, p < .001]. Once again, these results suggest that
processing speed is only a partial mediator since the fourth step of analysis shows, for
these three EFs, that age remains significant after the control of processing speed (all
Table 7. Standardized composite scores (and SD) in each group.
Young Older
Inhibition*** .54 (.56) −.91 (.91)
Shifting*** .49 (.57) −.84 (1.03)
Updating*** .46 (.78) −.75 (.87)
Dual-task coordination*** .5 (.65) −.83 (.92)
Processing speed*** .54 (.64) −.89 (.84)
Visual scanning a*** .4 (.67) −.65 (1.11)
These composite scores were created by performing the mean of the Z-scores of tasks representing the same construct.
Then, the five composite scores obtained were further standardized (transformed into Z-scores).
aVisual scanning is not part of a composite score. Given that this variable was the only attentional variable predicted by
age, we only took the Z-score of visual scanning as representative of the attentional system.
Comparison of young and older participants on composite scores:
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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p < .001). By contrast, processing speed increases the percentage of explained variance
of inhibition [ΔR2 = 1%, t(161) = 2.00, b = .152, p = .047] but Sobel test is not significant
even when the uncorrected p threshold is taken into account [Z = −1.94, p = .052].
Finally, after the control of age, the mediator representing the interaction effect
between visual scanning and processing speed variables (Figure 1(C)) increases the
percentage of explained variance of inhibition [ΔR2 = 1.8%, t(161) = −2.55, b = −.115,
p = .012], shifting [ΔR2 = 3.9%, t(159) = −3.57, b = –.181, p < .001], updating [ΔR2 = 2.9%,
t(162) = −2.86, b = –.147, p = .005] but Sobel tests are not significant even when the
uncorrected p threshold is taken into account [Z = −1.4, p = .16 for inhibition; Z = −1.56,
p = .12 for shifting; Z = −1.45, p = .15 for updating]. Furthermore, the interaction
between visual scanning and processing speed did not increase the percentage of
explained variance of dual-task coordination [ΔR2 = 0.7%, t(162) = −1.56, b = –.074,
p = .12]. Globally, there was no significant mediation effect between age and executive
functioning by the interaction between visual scanning and processing speed.
Confirmatory stepwise analyses
In order to fully support these results, we carried out confirmatory stepwise regression
analyses (Table 11) for the corrected and noncorrected significant mediation effects. The
results show that visual scanning increases the explained variance of updating beyond
the effect of age [ΔR2 = .074, β = .324. p < .001] but not for the other EFs. Regarding
processing speed, this variable adds supplementary explained variance to shifting once
age is taken into account [ΔR2 = .065, β = .363. p < .001]. Interestingly, processing speed
is chosen as the first explicative variable for updating [ΔR2 = .206, β = .319. p < .001] and
dual-task coordination [ΔR2 = .382, β = .545. p < .001] before age, showing again the
contribution of this variable to explained variance.
Exploratory analyses: inhibition as a mediator?
We finally tentatively explored a mediation by inhibition hypothesis by carrying out a
posteriori mediation analyses (see Table 12) of age by the function of inhibition on the
three other EFs: shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination. We found that, after the
control of age, inhibition increases the percentage of explained variance of shifting
[ΔR2 = 1.8%, t(158) = 2.362, b = .206, p = .019], updating [ΔR2 = 2%, t(161) = 2.478,
b = .218, p = .014], and dual-task coordination [ΔR2 = 2%, t(161) = 2.811, b = .224,
p = .006]. These results are further supported by significant Sobel tests [Z = −2.31, p = .02
for shifting; Z = −2.41, p = .016 for updating; Z = −2.7, p = .007 for dual-task coordina-
tion] but only for uncorrected p values. As for the other mediators, these exploratory
results suggest that inhibition would be only a partial mediator since the fourth step of
analysis shows that age remains significant after the control of inhibition (all p < .001).
However, confirmatory step-by-step stepwise analyses performed for these mediation
effects did not retain inhibition as a predictor of the other EFs once gender, educational
level, and age were taken into account (see Table 13).
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Discussion
The aimof this studywas to determine the potentialmediating effect of processing speed and
attentional processes on age-related effects in executive functioning. Accordingly, we admi-
nistered a large battery of executive, attentional and processing speed tasks. We observed age
effects on the visual scanning attentional task, and on all executive and processing speed
measures. We also evidenced a partial mediation effect of visual scanning abilities on updat-
ing performance as well as a partial effect of processing speed on shifting, updating, and dual-
task performance. These results were also supported by confirmatory stepwise analyses.
However, processing speed and attentional factors were not mediators of the age effect on
inhibitory abilities, and an exploratory analysis seems to indicate that inhibition could also be a
mediator for the three remaining executive variables. Nevertheless, these mediation by
inhibition effects were not further supported by confirmatory stepwise analyses.
Age effects on executive, processing speed, and attentional tasks
Our results are in agreementwith previous data by showing that all executive variables were
predicted by age (Collette & Salmon, 2014; Crawford, Bryan, Luszcz, Obonsawin, & Stewart,
2000; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; West, 1996, 2000). Nevertheless, some studies
indicated that not all aspects of executive functioning decrease with advancing age, with a
preservation of automatic inhibitory processes and specific alternation processes in shifting
task (e.g., Hogge, Salmon, & Collette, 2008; Kray, Eber, & Lindenberger, 2004). The general-
ized age-related effect across tasks observed here can be explained by the use of only
controlled inhibitory tasks and shifting tasks that were not designed to disentangle local
and global alternation processes.
Likewise, and as it could have been expected from several previous studies (Albinet et al.,
2012; Cona, Arcara, Amodio, Schiff, & Bisiacchi, 2013; Manard, Carabin, Jaspar, & Collette,
2014; Salthouse, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2000; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991;
Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Salthouse et al., 2000), all processing speed variables were
predicted by age. Salthouse proposed that perceptual speed is more involved in the
relationship between age and cognition than motor speed (Salthouse, 1993, 1994b). We
consider tasks administrated here as involving perceptual speed as they all require proces-
sing auditory or visual information before producing the response.
With regard to attentional functions, we found that only performance on the visual
scanning task, requiring selective attention abilities, was significantly predicted by age. It
is somewhat consistent with studies having shown an age effect on selective attention
(Haring et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2015; Maylor & Lavie, 1998; Passow et al., 2014;
Störmer et al.,2013) and no effect on sustained attention (Quigley, Andersen, & Müller,
2012). Nevertheless, it is not in agreement with studies demonstrating an age effect on
alertness (Festa-Martino, Ott, & Heindel, 2004; Pate, Margolin, Friedrich, & Bentley, 1994)
and sustained attention (Mani, Bedwell, & Miller, 2005). However, attentional abilities
remain rarely explored with a large range of tasks in older people.
Here, we decided to use van Zomeren and Brouwer’s model (1994) in order to fully
assess attention in its different components. This model is still greatly used in the clinical
practice, allowing to apply a well-recognized and validated battery of attention tasks
(Zimmermann
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& Fimm, 1994). Nonetheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that the use of other
attention models, such as the one of Corbetta and Shulman (2002) but also the one of
the three attention networks based on Posner and Petersen (1990), could have led to
slightly different results. For example, administering tasks assessing the dorsal attention
network (DAN) and the ventral attention networks (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008;
Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) would have maybe allowed evidencing some age effect on
goal-directed attention vs. stimulus-driven attention. Indeed, as aging is well recognized
to primarily impact EFs (De Beni & Borella, 2015; Podell et al., 2012; Salthouse, Atkinson,
& Berish, 2003; West, 2000), it would be interesting to test whether the more controlled
top-down attention (DAN) is more diminished than the bottom-up attention (ventral
attention network) during normal aging. Likewise, we cannot exclude that different
results could have emerged if we were using the ANT (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz,
& Posner, 2002). However, the few studies having used the so-called4 Attentional
Network Test (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002) to simultaneously assess
the processes of alerting, orienting, and executive attention have shown a larger
negative age effect on the executive network than on the two other networks
(Mahoney et al., 2010; Lu, Fung, Chan, & Lam, 2016; Zhou, Fan, Lee, Wang, & Wang,
2011). These results can be considered as relatively similar to those obtained here with
separate attentional and executive tasks. Similarly, the investigation of canonical resting-
states brain networks in young and older people showed that the executive control
network (ECN) was the most affected by age, followed by the DAN (Zhang et al., 2014).
Therefore, it seems that attentional functions decrease to a lesser extent with age as
compared to EFs.
The absence of age-related effect on our attentional tasks could also be related to the
control of educational level. Indeed, previous studies that showed an attentional
decrease in older people did not systematically take the educational level into account
(Festa-Martino, Ott, & Heindel, 2004; Haring et al., 2013; Jefferies et al., 2015; Mani,
Bedwell, & Miller, 2005; Maylor & Lavie, 1998; Passow et al., 2014; Pate, Margolin,
Friedrich, & Bentley, 1994) while educational level has been related to various measures
assessing cognition in aging (Meguro et al., 2001; Springer, McIntosh, Winocur, & Grady,
2005). Therefore, it is possible that the level at which people are educated is correlated
with attentional functions that are particularly needed in school learning (Posner
& Rothbart, 2014). Consequently, our control for the educational level may challenge
the previously found age effect on attentional variables.
Correlations between the executive tasks
Globally, we have some evidence of convergent validity. For each EF, there are maximum
two tasks that do not significantly correlate with each other while the others are well
correlated. However, our methodology was more theorically driven than data-driven.
Indeed, we decided to perform these grouping of tasks theoretically based on Miyake’s
model (2000). Nonetheless, there are very obvious reasons to explain the lack of correla-
tions between certain tasks supposed to tap the same EF.
In a theoretical point of view, Harnishfeger (1995) distinguished between intentional vs.
nonintentional inhibition but also between cognitive vs. behavioral inhibition. In agreement
with this conception, many studies suggest the existence of different inhibitorymechanisms
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(e.g., Borella, Delaloye, Lecerf, Renaud, & De Ribaupierre, 2009; Hamilton & Martin, 2005;
Nassauer & Halperin, 2003; Rush, Barch, & Braver, 2006). For example, Borella, Delaloye,
Lecerf, Renaud, and De Ribaupierre (2009) evidence weak correlation between inhibition
indices of two version of a same inhibition task as well as between different inhibition tasks.
Nassauer and Halperin (2003) evidenced some difference in performances between percep-
tive vs. motor inhibition in young people. Likewise, Rush, Barch, and Braver (2006) evi-
denced weak correlation in young and older people between different inhibitory tasks
comprising a Stroop task and a stop-signal task. Given the cognitive nature of the Stroop
task and the motor nature of the stop-signal task, our lack of correlation may suggest these
tasks would assess different aspects of the inhibition function (Rush, Barch, & Braver, 2006).
As mentioned in the introduction, Borella, Ludwig, Dirk, and De Ribaupierre (2011) failed to
find correlation between their two inhibition measures (interference index and negative
priming index). This finding pleads in favor of the assumption ofmultidimensional inhibition
(Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008; Borella, Delaloye, Lecerf, Renaud, & De Ribaupierre, 2009;
De Ribaupierre, 2001; De Ribaupierre, Borella, & Delaloye, 2003).
In a same vein, the lack of correlation between two shifting tasks could be due to the
fact that they bear on different mechanisms. Indeed, the required alternation inside the
plus-minus task is fully predictable and therefore is initiated in an endogenous way
while the required alternation inside the global-local task is not predictable at all and is
therefore initiated in an exogenous way (Salmon et al., 2010).
Likewise, Fournier, Larigauderie, and Ganoac’h (2004) evidenced different processes
of dual-task coordination: (a) the ability to simultaneously maintain and manipulate
visuospatial information; (b) the ability to simultaneously maintain and manipulate
verbal information; and (c) the ability to coordinate different types of processing that
do not need any storage. Given that the Brown–Peterson is a very good example of task
requiring to simultaneously maintain and manipulate verbal information while the
divided attention task requires coordination without any storage, the lack of significant
correlation between these two tasks is understandable.
Attention and processing speed as mediators of the age-related decline on
executive functioning
The attentional variable “visual scanning” significantly mediated the effect of age on the
updating function. However, this mediation effect was a partial one, meaning that age
remains a significant predictor of updating despite the presence of that mediator.
Therefore, we can assume that the decrease in updating efficiency in older people is
primarily explained by age but also by selective attention. In the updating tasks,
participants have to continuously switch their attentional focus to the most recently
presented information, a process requiring selective attention abilities very close to the
ones necessary to sequentially inspect the matrix of stimuli in the visual scanning task.
However, no mediator effect of that attentional variable was observed for the EFs of
shifting, inhibition, and dual-task coordination. As a whole, these results do not agree
with our initial hypothesis that attentional efficiency would influence executive perfor-
mance in normal aging. This hypothesis was based on a neuroimaging study claiming
the existence of common neural substrates between executive and attentional pro-
cesses (Collette et al., 2005) and a recent confirmatory factor analysis indicating that
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attentional processes could in part drive the commonality of EFs (Hogge, 2008). Actually,
the absence of mediation effect by visual scanning seems logical for dual-task coordina-
tion that requires to separate one’s attentional resources between different cognitive
activities. This notion is just opposed to the function of selective attention in van
Zomeren and Brouwer’s model (1994). Likewise, shifting has already been considered
as a complementary component of divided attention (van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994).
Indeed, shifting can intervene as soon as people have to switch their attention between
several activities they are engaged in and they are not actually able to simultaneously
manage. By contrast, the absence of mediation effect of age by visual scanning on
inhibition is more difficult to explain as selective attention and inhibition are often
considered to act conjointly to select target information and suppress irrelevant one
(Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995). As the visual scanning task mainly assesses the external
orientation of attention and does not require any need of inhibition, we therefore
suggest that the task could not be the most adequate to explore a mediation effect
of age by selective attention on inhibition.
However, two alternative hypotheses have to be considered to explain the lack of
mediation effect by attention: the mediation by inhibition hypothesis and the dedifferentia-
tion hypothesis. Regarding themediation by inhibition hypothesis, Miyake et al. (2000; see also
Friedman et al., 2008; Friedman, Miyake, Robinson, & Hewitt, 2011) proposed that all EFs
involve an inhibitory capacity to suppress task-irrelevant distractors, which is considered to
be a basic unit of working memory or executive functioning by certain authors (e.g.,
Dempster & Corkill, 1999; Zacks, Hasher, & Radvansky, 1996) but also as a “‘fundamental
regulatorymechanisms’” (Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007) of cognition. Otherwise, inhibition is
considered as one of the first cognitive processes to decline with age (Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
Persad, Abeles, Zacks, & Denburg, 2002; Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 2005). Hasher and
Zacks (1988) proposed that a reduction in inhibition would be a major source of decrement
in working memory of aging people. It is the reason why some authors assumed that it
could explain some deficits in other cognitive tasks (e.g., Borella, Carretti, Cornoldi, & De
Beni, 2007; Borella, Carretti, & Mammarella, 2006; Persad, Abeles, Zacks, & Denburg, 2002).
Consequently, inhibition could be a mediator variable between age and executive abilities.
We assessed that hypothesis in exploratory post-hoc analyses and evidenced a partial
mediation of the age effect by inhibition on the three other EFs. These results are in
agreement with studies explaining the common activation of EFs by a certain implication
of inhibition mechanisms that allow people suppressing irrelevant distracting stimuli and
keeping focused on the current task goals (Miyake et al., 2000; Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999).
However, as these exploratory results were not confirmed by stepwise analyses, further
studies are necessary to confirm the potential role of inhibition as a mediator for executive
efficiency in aging.
Otherwise, only young participants were included in studies having shown the
influence of attentional processes on the EFs (Collette et al., 2005; Hogge, 2008) while
the organization of executive functioning seems to be modified in aging. Indeed, some
data indicates that aging is associated with a dedifferentiation of the executive processes
(De Frias, Dixon, & Strauss, 2006; Delaloye et al., 2009; Hedden & Yoon, 2006), leading to
a grouping of factors (e.g., flexibility and inhibition, De Frias, Dixon, & Strauss, 2006;
flexibility and updating, Adrover-Roig, Sesé, Barceló, & Palmer, 2012). Moreover, there
would also exist a reduction in the distinctiveness of neural representations, as well as
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changes in the ability of different neural regions to communicate with each other (Goh,
2011). On this basis, we can tentatively propose that the more diffuse cognitive and
brain representations in aging lead to changes in the relationships between attentional
and executive variables by comparison with young participants. This interpretation
obviously needs to be specifically explored in future studies.
According to our initial hypothesis, the processing speed variable significantly par-
tially mediated the effect of age on shifting, updating, and dual-task coordination. These
results are in great agreement with the literature showing a large influence of the
slowdown of processing speed on different aspects of cognition in aging (Albinet
et al., 2012; Cona, Arcara, Amodio, Schiff, & Bisiacchi, 2013; Manard, Carabin, Jaspar, &
Collette, 2014; Salthouse, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2000; Salthouse & Babcock,
1991; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Salthouse et al., 2000). Moreover, processing speed was
chosen as the first explicative variable for updating and dual-task coordination in
stepwise analyses. These results are particularly interesting given that outcome mea-
sures for updating and dual-task coordination were all except one expressed in other
measures than reaction time. This suggests that processing speed is at least as useful in
predicting performance in terms of level of accuracy as in terms of reaction time.
However, our procedure does not allow us to disentangle on which mechanisms
processing speed acts to mediate the effect of age. For example, it is possible that
older participants meet certain difficulties to perform adequately all required cognitive
operations due to the paced nature of the tasks (a limited time mechanism) or that the
processed information decreases in availability over time (due to longer response times,
a simultaneity mechanism) (see Salthouse, 1996).
Finally, if the mediating effect of processing speed on shifting (Kray & Lindenberger,
2000; Salthouse et al., 2000), updating (Fisk & Sharp, 2004), and dual-task coordination
(Baddeley, 2001) is consistent with the literature, our results are far from the common
findings according to which the control of processing speed dramatically decreases the
effect of age on inhibition (De Ribaupierre, 1995; Hogge, Salmon, & Collette, 2008;
Salthouse, 1992; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen & De
Meersman, 1998). As mentioned in the “Method” section, it is also the reason why many
authors (De Frias, Dixon, & Strauss, 2006; Delaloye et al., 2009; Ludwig, Borella, Tettamanti,
& De Ribaupierre, 2010) rightly prefer to adopt relative scores that control for individual
differences—namely, baseline processing speed individual difference—in their analyses
instead of simple difference score. However, since we were interested in the mediation
effect of processing speed between age and inhibition, we used simple difference score
(MacLeod, 1991). Therefore, we would say that even without computing interfering score
controlled for baseline processing speed we did not find any mediation effect of processing
speed between age and inhibition. If we had controlled for baseline processing speed in
our interference scores, our absence of result could have been attributed to this choice of
score computation. As it was not the case, our data greatly evidence that inhibition with
advancing age is not mainly explained by a slowdown in processing speed.
Moreover, many of these studies systematically used the Stroop task to assess inhibition.
A recent study by Wolf et al. (2014) investigating the effect of age on inhibition and
processing speed found that inhibition, as measured by the Stroop task, would decrease
with age by itself and that this decrement cannot be explained by a general slowing.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, inhibition seems itself to be a mediator variable and
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is postulated to play a very central role in cognition (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988). So, we
could postulate that inhibition plays a role as important as processing speed to explain
changes in complex cognition including executive functioning associated with normal
aging. For example, Van der Linden et al. (1999) using latent-construct structural equation
modeling showed that significant relationships between age and language performance
are mediated by reductions in speed, resistance to inference and working memory. Further
studies will be obviously necessary to test these hypotheses.
Future perspective
In future investigation, it would be interesting to analyze the relation between age,
processing speed, attention, EFs, and the cognitive reserve built by older people
throughout the life span. According to Stern (2002), the concept of cognitive reserve
relates to brain network utilization efficiency in the sense of a more efficient synaptic
processing or the use of alternative brain networks when required. In the aging context,
the classical hypothesis is that people with a higher level of cognitive reserve would
better resist to deleterious age effects and would have better cognitive performances as
compared to aged people with a lower level of cognitive reserve. With regard to this
latter point, Roldán-Tapia, García, Cánovas, and León (2012) evidenced better perfor-
mances on a Stroop task, the Trail Making Test, and different WAIS subtests in aged
people with a high cognitive reserve, as indexed by the educational level, the occupa-
tional attainment, and the vocabulary level. A main factor of cognitive reserve in older
people is the educational level (see Bennett et al., 2003; Meguro et al., 2001; Springer,
McIntosh, Winocur, & Grady, 2005). Consequently, we consider that variability in cogni-
tive reserve did not impact our results as we controlled for the educational level in the
first step of all analyses. Interestingly, different factors of cognitive reserve would have
an impact on specific executive processes (Hultsch, Hertzog, Small, & Dixon, 1999; James,
Wilson, Barnes, & Bennett, 2011; Le Carret, Lafont, Mayo, & Fabrigoule, 2003; Shimamura,
Berry, Mangels, Rusting, & Jurica, 1995). Therefore, future investigation should take those
different cognitive reserve factors into account and to test the possible influence of each
factor on our mediation analyses.
Conclusion
Results obtained here emphasize that processing speed is the most prominent mediator
explaining age-related effects on executive functioning, even if this effect is partial and
does not totally suppress the effect of age. It is in great agreement with Salthouse’s work
assuming a large influence of processing speed on various cognitive variables in normal
aging (Salthouse, 1996). However, contrary to our expectations based on young partici-
pants, we did not observe a major influence of attentional variables on executive
efficiency and some exploratory post-hoc analyses suggest that inhibition could be
another important mediator. These results, particularly the relative contribution of
processing speed and inhibition, have to be confirmed in further studies but suggest
that the relationships between attention, processing speed, and executive functioning
could be modified with age.
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Notes
1. The alerting network comprises frontal and parietal areas and allows maintaining an alert
state and a phasic reaction to a cued signal. The orienting network comprises the temporal
parietal junction, the superior parietal lobe, and frontal eye field (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002)
and allows selection of information. The executive control network comprises the anterior
cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortex (Fan, Fossella, Sommer, Wu, & Posner, 2003; Fossella
et al., 2002) and is responsible for cognitive and emotional auto-regulation.
2. Moreover, participants were also excluded from the study (a) if we did not possess at least
three executive composite scores in older participants and at least four executive composite
scores in young participants. This criterion was a little less severe for older participants
because the sample was smaller; (b) if we did not have at least four measures assessing the
attentional system; and (c) if we did not possess at least three measures assessing processing
speed. Finally, if a participant did not have at least two different measures for a particular
function, we decided not to compute the composite score on the function for this participant,
what gave rise to four missing values.
3. Some studies have evidenced a certain influence of processing speed on inhibitory tasks in
normal aging (De Ribaupierre, 1995; Hogge, Salmon, & Collette, 2008; Salthouse, 1992;
Salthouse & Meinz, 1995; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998).
This is the reason why many authors (De Frias, Dixon, & Strauss, 2006; Delaloye et al., 2009;
Ludwig, Borella, Tettamanti, & De Ribaupierre, 2010) rightly prefer to adopt relative scores that
control for individual differences—namely, baseline processing speed individual difference—in
their analyses instead of simple difference score. However, the choice of score computation has
to be done according to each study design. Given that we were interested in the mediation
effect of processing speed between age and inhibition, we use simple difference score
(MacLeod, 1991) to avoid to control for processing speed in our interference scores.
4. We have added the adjective “so-called” because we do not fully agree with this conceptua-
lization tending to “merge” attention and executive concepts as being all attentional. Rather,
we theoretically prefer to distinguish between attentional and executive functions.
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